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Abstract
Judicial Independence in Pakistan: A Case Study of Lawyers’ Movement, 2007-2009
Shabbir Ahmad Khan
This study focuses on a social movement, the Lawyers’ Moment 2007-2009 of Pakistan, a
transitioning democracy, which brought vast changes in its judicial system, especially in terms of
its judicial independence. There are three main research questions in this study: 1) the status of
judicial independence before the Lawyers’ Movement; 2) was judicial independence a major
goal in the Lawyers’ Movement? and 3) did the Lawyers’ Movement alter the status of judicial
independence? The research methodology used to explore the answers to these questions also has
three main sources: 1) the literature which explains some areas of scholarship in social
movements and their impacts, including, cause-lawyering, political development, and the
judicialization of politics; 2) opinions and observations of 30 elites directly connected with the
Lawyers’ Movement including lawyers, jurisprudents, retired judges of superior courts,
academicians, parliamentarians, politicians, media persons, and the representatives of civil
society; and 3) a survey completed by these 30 elites indicating the status of judicial
independence before and after the Lawyers’ Movement. The research findings in this study
clearly show an overall political development in the country along with a significant
change/improvement in the judicial system, in particular, the independence of judiciary after the
historic Lawyers’ Movement in Pakistan.
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To the martyred cause lawyers who were burnt alive in the cities of Sahiwal and Karachi. From
their charred remains a glimmer of light flashed in the form of the independence of judiciary in
Pakistan. Today we largely owe a free and independent judicial system in this country due to the
indefatigable struggle and sacrifices made by these great souls.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Scholars and researchers in political science, particularly, in the area of judicial politics
view judicial independence as a critical component of modern liberal democracies. Judicial
independence is a complex phenomenon, difficult to define and measure, although most
observers agree that the distinction between de jure and de facto is essential. All agree the nature
of judicial independence is shaped by the type of system in which the courts operate:
authoritarian, democratic, or emerging/transitional democracies. My dissertation focuses on
Pakistan, a transitioning democracy, and seeks to illuminate three important features regarding
the development and evolution of judicial politics in Pakistan. First, in examining the
development of the judicial system in Pakistan, I pay special attention to the status of judicial
independence between 1947 and 2007. Second, I document the role of the Lawyers’ Movement,
a social movement that sought to transform the judicial system in Pakistan between 2007 and
2009, as well as to bring broader fundamental changes to the government. Finally, I examine
how, if at all, the Lawyers’ Movement altered the judiciary of Pakistan, again, paying attention
to the status of the courts’ independence. This study is grounded in the literature on social
movements, mass protests, cause-lawyering, political development, judicialization of politics,
and judicial independence (JI). At the core of this study are data collected from thirty in-depth
interviews with Pakistani elites connected with the Lawyers’ Movement, including lawyers,
jurisprudents, retired superior court judges, academicians, parliamentarians, politicians,
journalists, and representatives of civil society organizations.
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The De Jure and De Facto roles of the Courts in Pakistan
Historically, the role of the courts in Pakistan has been complex and controversial. As far
as independence is concerned, the courts have played a shifting role under both military and
civilian regimes. Scholars who study judicial independence distinguish between the de jure and
de facto independence of courts, and this has been a concern in Pakistan as well. Since the
inception of the country in 1947, lawmakers sought to ensure the de jure autonomy of the
judiciary through constitutional and statutory arrangements. Pakistan inherited a common law
tradition from its colonial rulers. Strict rules were created for the appointment of impartial judges
and for their removal. The British Parliament passed extensive legislation for United India to
ensure the independence of its judiciary. The Independence Act of 1947 guaranteed an
independent judiciary to safeguard the rights of the citizens. Like other Anglo colonies, the Privy
Council was established as the highest court of appeal of decisions of the courts in Pakistan,
including the High Courts and the Federal Court.
From the framing and adoption of its first Constitution in 1956 until the implementation
of its third and final Constitution in 1973, a free judiciary has been a significant feature or trait of
every Constitution of Pakistan. The Courts were given a wide range of powers of interpretation
of the Constitutions and laws to resolve issues among the governments of all levels and the
community at large (Choudhary, 1959, pp. 240-245).
The history of the de jure role of courts in Pakistan can be divided into two major eras,
first, the period when there were civilian governments in power, and second, when there were
military rulers who came into power after imposing martial law and abrogating the written
Constitution of the country. In addition, there were two major challenges faced by the courts.
First, there were cases in which the courts had to decide the validity or legitimate right of the
military rulers to rule the country under the umbrella of the notorious “Doctrine of Necessity,”
2

i.e., providing legitimacy to the military rulers through the court decisions. Secondly, the courts
had to decide cases dealing with the dismissal of civilian governments by military presidents of
Pakistan who acted under the provisions of section 58 (2) (b) of the Eight Amendment in the
Constitution introduced by a military ruler as a safety valve and to put pressure on the civilian
governments. According to the Eighth Amendment, the President of Pakistan could dismiss the
elected government along with the federal and provincial elected legislatures. In most of these
cases, the courts had to make compromises with the military leaders to insure their continued
functioning, albeit with a loss of some of their independence.
Zafar (2019) argued that the Pakistani judiciary played a critical role in the polity through
its de facto role in which it:1) established ‘legal order’ that ensured political democratic stability
in the country; 2) gave relief to the citizens of Pakistan in spite of the dictatorial rule of the
military junta; 3) facilitated the political forces that brought about the transition from an
authoritarian regime to democratic civilian rule; 4) decided cases between the head of the state
and local governments, and 5) dealt successfully with the failed attempts to topple democratic
governments and tried to correct the social evils in society.
Researchers who stress the de facto role of the courts often look at how other actors or
institutions shape the independence of the courts in Pakistan. Most focus on the impact of
military regimes, and how PCOs (Provisional Constitutional Order) limit judicial independence
(Hussain, 1992; Khan, 2016; Maluka; 1995; Newberg, 1995; Samdani, 2002; Shah, 2012). Paula
Newberg (1995) concludes that Pakistani Courts assumed a responsibility to maintain social
order by validating military takeovers. Her take is that the judiciary, through its decision-making,
provided instructions to help the country avoid serious bloodshed and eventually come out of
political and legal crises produced by military takeovers.
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Objectives of the Study
Political scientists and researchers have produced a voluminous literature in the field of
social movements or protests, cause-lawyering, political development, judicialization of politics,
or the expansion of the powers of the judiciary. For the most part, political scientists who
examine these ideas have focused on developed political systems. There is significantly less
scholarship on the application or implications of these theories and concepts on transitioning
democracies like Pakistan.
Pakistan is an emerging democracy, transitioning from an authoritarian military regime to
civilian rule. Pakistan is also unique because the military have consistently intervened in national
politics. Research on JI in a transitional democracy like Pakistan will make a significant
contribution to this important subject, especially in light of the Lawyers’ Movement, 2007-2009.
This movement represents a unique occurrence in the constitutional history of Pakistan where
lawyers defied and helped to topple the military regime and to uphold the independence of
judiciary.
The main objective of this research is to study judicial independence in Pakistan and a
social movement’s impact on that independence. First, the study will assess the development of
judicial independence in Pakistan through 2007. Second, the study will examine the Lawyers'
Movement and its objectives, especially with regard to judicial independence. Third, the study
will assess the whether the Lawyers’ Movement altered the status of judicial independence in
Pakistan and the power of the judiciary. Through the use of an original qualitative dataset of
interviews with thirty legal elites in Pakistan, this study also sheds light on the role of
professionals in bringing about legal and political change in an emerging democracy.

4

Chapters Outline
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. This chapter briefly addresses the de jure and
de facto roles of the courts along with the main objectives of the study. This chapter also
includes the chapter’s outline of the dissertation.
Chapter 2 addresses the theoretical aspects of the problem, with a discussion of
transitioning democracies and the concept of judicial independence, discussing the literature on
de jure and de facto independence, and different methods to measure these with reference to
Pakistan. I review the relevant literature on the concepts of democracy, transitioning
democracies, judicial independence, and the roles of the judiciary in the developed countries, in
authoritarian regimes, and in the transitioning democracies like Pakistan.
Chapter 3 highlights the major research questions in this study along with the qualitative
research methods to answer these questions such as elite interviews and survey instruments.
Chapter 4 focuses on the development of the judiciary in Pakistan, dividing it into three
phases: 1) the ancient period; 2) the British period; and 3) independence. This discussion also
examines the de jure and de facto independence of courts in Pakistan during the various phases
of development. Chapter 4 makes clear that since independence, both the political and judicial
systems in Pakistan have been in transition. Pakistan has experienced four direct military
dictatorships and the judiciary has had to deal with the severe consequences of the military’s
intervention in politics. Likewise, to survive these authoritarian periods, the courts have had to
make compromises regarding judicial independence. Chapter 4 concludes with the answer to my
first research question, i.e., what was the nature of judicial independence in Pakistan prior to the
advent of the Lawyers’ Movement.
Chapter 5 begins with the story of the LM, its beginning, underlying causes, its
progenitors, its supporters, opponents, its processes, and most importantly its objectives and
5

goals. Chapter 4 answers the second research question in this dissertation, i.e., was judicial
independence an important goal of the Lawyers’ Movement? This chapter also describes the role
of the cause lawyers, judges, bar councils, civil society groups, non-governmental organizations
(NGO), and political parties in this historic struggle for the restoration of the judiciary, its
independence, and the rule of law in the country. Finally, this chapter throws light on the
difficulties, hardships, and brutalities imposed by government agencies and opponents the
activists involved in the Lawyers’ Movement.
Chapter 6 uses survey and interviews data from 30 elites to assess the impact of the
Lawyers’ Movement on judicial politics in Pakistan. Chapter 6 is informed by three major
connected areas of research: 1) social movements or protests; 2) cause-lawyering; and 3)
political development.
Chapter 7 closes with a summary and conclusion regarding the Lawyers Movement,
judicial independence and the future of judicial politics in Pakistan. This chapter also offers
suggestions for further research on the socio-political impact of the Lawyers’ Movement.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review and Theory
Introduction
My study is based on literatures in the fields of judicial independence, cause lawyering,
judicialization of politics, transitioning democracies, social movements and mass protests. This
chapter focuses on theories and concepts closely related to my dissertation such as social
movements or mass protests and different roles of the courts (Ginsburg, 2012) in transitioning
democracies like Pakistan.
Democracy in General: Meanings and Nature
The meaning of the word ‘democracy’ can be traced from the ancient Greek mythology
in which two words: ‘demo’ in Greek ‘dêmos’ meaning ‘people’ and ‘cracy’ in Greek ‘krátos’
meaning ‘power’ refer to a system of government where power lies in the hands of the people.
There are numerous definitions of the concept of democracy in literature, including Abraham
Lincoln summation of democracy as a “government of the people, by the people, for the people”
(Lincoln, November 19, 1863).
More recently, Schumpeter considers democracy “…that institutional arrangement for
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” While Robert Dahl (1971) states that the key aspect
of democracy, “…is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its
citizens, considered as political equals.” Huntington defines democracy as a political set up in
which “its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the
adult population is eligible to vote” (Huntington, 1993, p. 7).

7

Most modern observers agree with Dahl (1971), who identifies seven key features of a
democratic system: 1) elected officials have control over governmental decisions; 2) officials are
elected through frequent, fair, and free elections; 3) officials are elected by using the universal
adult franchise method; 4) people have a right to run for the public office; 5) people are given
freedom of expression; 6) people have an access to information without hindrance; and 7) people
have a right to join any party or group they like.
However, the above-mentioned definitions of democracy are ‘minimalist’ definitions;
they do not capture the issues or challenges faced by the new or transitioning democracies of the
world, where the democratic systems are yet to be consolidated. Similarly, some scholars not
only explain the concept, but rather focus on its various shades or patterns (Lijphart, 1984;
Powell, 2000; Kaiser, 1997). They characterize democracies in terms of concentration of power
or sharing power arrangements, including the different roles of the participants in the process
such as institutions, parties, and groups. In this study, I consider ‘democracy’ in the same manner
as these scholars, with an emphasis on John Locke’s notion that in a democracy ‘the whole
power of the community’ is in the hands of the ‘elected representatives’ of the people (Khan,
2012).
Transitioning Democracy: Meaning and Nature
Political scientists refer to ‘transition theory’ as capturing a transformation process from
authoritarian regimes to transitioning democracies. The communist states in Eastern Europe, the
former Soviet Union, the transitioning military dictatorships of Latin American, many African
nations and a few Middle Eastern countries have experienced ‘democratic transitions’ in recent
decades (Guo, 1999, p. 133). Theoretical models such as political culture, systems theory,
modernization, decision theory, structural functionalist theories, and intuitionalist theory have
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had a major influence on democratic transition theory. These different theories provided an
analytical framework to understand the transition phenomenon across regimes under different
conditions.
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) offer a useful definition of the concept of transition:
The ‘transition’ is the interval between one political regime and another. On one side,
transitions are delimited by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian
regime, and on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to
some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative. (p. 6)
Mainwaring (1989) considers this definition partially true - particularly at the beginning
of a transition but not applicable to whole transitioning process in a country. Bratton and Walle
(1997) define democratic transition in terms of both political liberalization and democratization
such as “…a transition to democracy can be said to have occurred only when a regime has been
installed on the basis of a competitive elections, freely and fairly conducted within a matrix of
civil liberties, with results accepted by all participants” (p. 194).
Guo (1999) attempted to categorize the major literature on democratic transitions into
four conceptual approaches: structure-oriented, process-oriented, institutional-oriented, and
political economy. The pioneers of the structuralist approach, e.g., Lipset (1959), Almond
(1963), and Moor (1966), mostly worked on Latin America and Southern Europe in the 1960s
and 1970s. They gave much importance to political, social, cultural and economic conditions in
order to better explain democratic transitions and their outcomes. Their empirical analyses of
transitioning democracies found a positive correlation between socio-economic development and
democratic values. The authors not only focused on the socio-political prerequisites of
democracy but its levels and stability. In contrast, the strategic choice approaches concentrated
on the role of political elites and their strategic choices. Schmitter (1991), O’Donnell (1979), and
Palma (1991) focused on the transition process rather than on the structural conditions. They
emphasized the importance of the interaction of political elites in terms of their strategic choices,
9

including their ability to compromise on contentious issues such as the transitioning and
consolidation of democratic regimes.
The institutionalists emphasized the importance of the role of political institutions in
shaping and constraining the goals and performances of the political actors. They also focused on
the changing relationship between societal factors and state factors in the process of democratic
transition. Some institutionalists tried to bridge the gap among the structural, strategic choice,
and institutional approaches. They argued that preexisting political structures were the ‘confined
contexts’ that decided the rules of the game of political action. Karl (1990) and Schmitter (1991)
argued that the strategic choices available to political elites were dependent upon preexisting
political conditions. O’Neil applied institutional theory on the democratic transition in Hungary
and found a strong relationship between the institutional forms in that country and its collapse.
Other scholars used political economy approaches that emphasized the interplay between politics
and the economy in order to explain the transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy.
They argued that the economic conditions of a regime set the terms and conditions, along with
the timing and nature of transformation of an authoritarian regime into a democratic transition.
They also believed that democratic consolidation is contingent on the economic legacies of the
past regime. In other words, failing to overcome economic crises could lead to a transition and
succeeding in controlling economic issues consolidates democratic regimes (Guo, 1999, P. 139).
In the previous three decades, seven different regions of the world went through this
transitional phase, including the fall of rightwing dictatorial regimes in Southern Europe in the
mid-1970s, transformation from military rule to civilian democracies in Latin American
countries during 1970s and 1980s, the collapse of communist governments in Eastern Europe in
the late 1980s, the establishment of 15 independent states after the demise of Soviet Union in the
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early 1990s, the end of the one-party regimes in many nations of the Sub-Saharan Africa in the
mid-1990s, and the beginning of quasi-liberal regimes in some parts of the Middle East in the
1990s. In the recent past, there were nearly 100 countries that were considered transitional
democracies by political science scholars, however, only a few of them, about 20 countries in
Central Asia, the Baltic region, South America, and East Asia, have made significant progress
towards stable democracy (Carothers, 2002, pp. 5-9).
There are five core assumptions underlying transitioning democracy in the literature. The
first and foremost is: when any country transforms, it does so from a dictatorial regime to a
democratic one. The second assumption is that when cracks appear in the dictatorial order, they
are due to a political liberalization. The third assumption is related to the public’s belief in
democratic processes such as elections. The fourth is a commitment of some political elite to
change their political system. And fifth is the redesign of the political institutions such as
electoral, parliamentary, and judicial reforms in which the process of state-building and
democracy-building goes hand in hand, supporting each other (Carothers, 2002, pp. 6-9).
Carothers rejects the transitional paradigm because the majority of the transitioning
democracies failed to become well-functioning democracies. Rather, they entered into a
‘political gray zone’ phase, meaning that regardless of any positive features such as genuine
elections, political freedom, and regular transfer of power to different political groupings,
democracy ‘remains shallow and troubled’ due to: 1) feckless pluralism, and 2) dominant-power
politics. Despite having some of the attributes of a democracy, such as regular elections, limited
political space for the opposition, independent civil society, and democratic constitutions, they
lack fundamental elements of a democratic life - true representation of the people beyond
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elections, abuse or misuse of law by the government, illegitimate electoral process, lack of trust
over public institutions, and weak performance of the state (Carothers, 2002, pp. 6-14).
The role of the Courts as Context-Bound
The courts, in general, and specifically in strong democracies, check the excesses of both
the executive and legislative branches of a government in order to maintain constitutional order.
They also lay down the foundations of sustainable economic development along with the popular
support for the democratic regime (Prillaman, 2000, p.1). On the other hand, some scholars
disagree that courts have an important role in democratic development, because that
development is associated with social, economic, and political factors beyond the control of
courts (Stotzky, p. 201). In a democratic state, the main functions of a judiciary are: 1) protecting
constitutional and legal principles; 2) maintaining checks and balances among the governmental
organs; 3) resolving disputes; and 4) protecting basic rights of the people (Domingo, 2000, p.
708).
Moustafa (2007), and Moustafa and Ginsburg (2008) identify five roles of courts in
authoritarian regimes: 1) maintaining social control by keeping political opponents under
pressure; 2) supporting the regimes’ claims of legitimacy; 3) ensuring harmony among the
components of the state machinery; 4) facilitating trade and investment; and 5) serving as a
“non-political” forum in which regime policy is “legitimized” (pp. 5-10).
The role of courts in transitioning democracies is significantly different than courts in
both developed democracies and the authoritarian regimes. The role of courts is contingent upon
several contextual, situational, and strategic factors. In an unstable environment like Pakistan, the
courts assume the governmental functions of the other weak institutions, including the legislature
and the executive (Shapiro, 1964). In the literature on transitioning democracies, there are five
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major categories of the roles of courts, played in two major phases: 1) upstream roles in the first
phase and 2) downstream roles in the second phase. As far as the upstream roles of the courts are
concerned, these are the activities of courts either in the last days of an authoritarian regime, or
in the early phase of a democratic transition. On the other hand, downstream roles of the courts
are related to the performance of courts in the period just before the consolidation of democracy.
There are two more scenarios of each phase. In the first phase, courts either become the
instruments of repression in the hands of the declining authoritarian regime or act as triggers of
democratization. Similarly, in the second phase, courts may play the role of ‘guarantors’ of either
the authoritarian positions or the consolidators of democracy, in which they facilitate, one way or
the other, the democratic health of the country. There might be another possibility of ‘judicial
irrelevance’ in which courts play no discernible role (Ginsburg, 2012).
Courts as Upstream Triggers of Democracy
In some situations, particularly at the time when an outgoing authoritarian regime comes
face-to-face with a strong democratic opposition, the courts have two options - either to oppress
the democratic forces or to facilitate them in transition to democracy. This situation is very
precarious because no one knows the outcome of the struggle beforehand. Courts are also in
transition and can go along with both sides (Weingast, 1997). In those circumstances when an
authoritarian regime still controls larger groups in the society, through both incentives and
coercion, it becomes difficult to coordinate among democratic forces on a ‘focal point.’ If the
courts decide to facilitate the democratization process through their decisions against the ruling
elite, it might provide the opposition a common tool or ‘focal’ point to coordinate and provide
the opposition the ‘trigger’ to bring down the declining regime (Schelling, 1960). But the most
important question is why do people focus on the courts’ decisions? Or how can courts’
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decisions create a ‘common identity’ for the people having multiple identities to form a coalition
against the oppressive regime? Along with some other advantages, such as the acknowledgement
by the court regarding the rule violations by the regime, or publicity against the government, the
most significant impact could be the mobilization of the masses on the issue. Court decisions
could unite the opposition against the dictatorial regime. There are also potential repercussions
attached to this type of move by the courts. According to Ginsburg, if courts lack institutional
and political links to power, they rarely produce decisions counter to regime interests. One
example of how courts can facilitate the goals of democratic forces occurred during Ukraine’s
‘Orange Revolution,’ when the Ukraine Supreme Court ordered a revote for the presidential
elections, helping opposition candidate Viktor Yanukovych win the second election. This
decision made the opposition stronger and helped it bring down the authoritarian regime.
On the other hand, there also lies a risk for judges, and courts as a whole, if their
decisions to facilitate the opposition fails to attract public support, as happened in Egypt under
Mubarak when the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court gave support to the demands of the
opposition. In response, the regime restructured the court by appointing judges supportive of
regime’s policies. There are always chances of both possibilities, i.e., the court’s crucial
decisions could turn into focal points for mobilizing mass support for regime opposition, or the
court’s decisions may also trigger a backlash. The occurrence of the first possibility is rare in the
history of democratic transitions. Nevertheless, it is argued that the Pakistan Supreme Court’s
decisions in the last two years of General Musharraf’s regime in Pakistan, such as the Steel Mill
Case and the Eligibility Case, provided focal points to the democratic forces in the country to
mobilize the masses against him, particularly the people in legal profession as lawyers.
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Courts as Downstream Guarantors
The argument regarding the ‘downstream guarantors’ role of the courts is more or less
similar to that of the supporters of democracy vs. justice analysis presented by Mihai (2010). The
supporters of democracy vs. justice argument focus on a kind of compromise with the remnants
of old dictatorial regime in order to consolidate democracy. An autocratic regime requires a
guarantee of their policy, property, and liberty for their associates before making a final deal
with the opposition to transfer power. In this situation, the courts play an important role ensuring
outgoing autocrats constitutional and legal protection for regime’s policies, dubbed by Hirschl
(2004) as ‘hegemonic preservations.’ This role of courts becomes possible only in those
situations where a dictatorial regime negotiates or bargains the terms of transition with the
democratic opposition such as in Chile under Pinochet in the late 1980s and in Turkey under
General Kenan Evren in 1982.
The constitutional and legal developments giving authority to the courts as guarantors of
political and economic rights of the ruling/white minority in the last days of apartheid era in
South Africa is a prime example of courts acting as the downstream guarantors (Meierhenrich,
2008). When the white ruling minority saw that they could not continue to remain in power, they
empowered the judiciary to safeguard their rights after the demise of their regime. The
Constitutional Court in South Africa supervised the transition process, i.e., transferring power
from the old regime to a new Black majority under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and the
African National Congress (ANC). The Court worked to ensure the protection of the supporters
of the displaced regime, including changes in the interim constitution, incorporating global
human rights provisions in the law, and most importantly, limiting the room for transitional
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justice. For the consolidation of democracy in the country, both declining and rising political
forces agreed to give such a role to the courts (Klug, 2000; Lollini, 2010).
Courts as Downstream Democratic Consolidators
In some situations, courts become allies of the new democratic forces, particularly when
the transition to democracy occurs after movements take power. The courts facilitate the
transitional justice process, dismantling the old legal structures, empowering the legal actors, and
serving the new democratic regime. After World War II, in transition from fascist rule to
democracy, the Italian courts assumed this role, eliminating old fascist statutes from the books
and establishing their own independent power (Ginsburg, 2012). The courts as ‘consolidators’
provide an open environment in which various political forces to compete. They also ensure the
political players a level playing field or equilibrium through transparency and accountability
across the board (Gloppen et al., 2010).
In the early phase of transition to democracy, new democratic governments prefer new
courts to those of the old regime. This is because the old courts, due to their political inclination
towards the previous regime, may be unable to fulfill the democratic agenda of the new
government. The courts in a democratic transition become the central institution to resolve
political and legal conflicts, including election-related cases, public interest litigation such as
corruption, rights adjudication, inter-branch conflicts, and economic regulations. In some
situations, human rights cases are also on the courts’ agenda.
There are multiple examples from history where these types of issues were taken by the
courts, such as the political issues handled by Thailand’s Constitutional Court of 1997-2006,
jurisdiction over cases by the Philippine courts, corruption and administrative adjudication by
courts in Indonesia, royal immunity cases in Malaysia, individual rights decisions handed down

16

by courts in Colombia, and inter-branch conflicts adjudicated by courts in Mexico and Brazil.
The courts in Costa Rica focused on both rights adjudication and inter-branch conflicts.
Researchers have also shown that courts can use periods of divided government to expand their
power, as happened in Argentina and Chile (see Chavez 2004; Ferejohn, 1999; and Scribner,
2004).
The literature on Latin American courts also shows that ideas and local cultures are of a
supreme importance in determining the role of the courts. The correlation between formal
institutions and actual powers of the courts is weak. Significant institutional reforms do not
guarantee substantive independence of the courts. Another observation that is important about
the Latin American judiciary is that the region has gone through democratic transitions, and the
courts have established norms to resist backsliding (Figueroa, 2006).
Helmke and Figueroa emphasize another important role of courts in new democratic
environments, when courts decide political cases involving interpretation of the constitutional
powers of governmental institutions. The powers given to various institutions are generally
unclear or incomplete, requiring a third party to adjudicate in cases of inter-branch conflicts. The
courts play this role as a proverbial third party in order to resolve the issue (Helmke and
Figueroa, 2011). They play another important role, particularly in the Latin American countries,
delivering justice in socio-economic rights litigation to the public. In such situations where there
was no security for the vulnerable classes in the society, for example, the middle-class after
economic crises, the courts assumed the role of a protector (Gauri and Brinks 2008). Both
Smulovitz (1998) and Epp (1998) focus on the significance of institutional reforms and the
strengthening of support structures for the judiciary to face the challenges by the other
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institutions. Helmke and Staton (2011), also explore how courts face counterattacks by the other
governmental actors, e.g., the removal of the judges or the packing of the courts.
Courts and Transitional Justice
The concept of transitional justice elucidates the role of the judiciary during political
transitions. Avello (2007) explains how this concept is used to encompass a group of judicial
proceedings that are carried out in societies undergoing a transition, most often to democracy. It
is a common observation that whenever a society decides to move away from authoritarian to
democratic governance, it has to deal with the past sooner or later. This past, full of human rights
violations, mass atrocities, genocide, brutal dictatorship, political suppression and other abuses
requires a transition from the past to the new democratic reality. According to Avello (2007), the
concept of transitional justice dates to ancient Athens, with the trials at Nuremburg and Tokyo at
the end of the World War II the origin of modern transitional justice. The trials of former
dictators in the 1980s and 1990s in Greece, Argentina, Chile, and South Africa are considered
the expansion of the transitional justice in the world (pp. 3-8).
There are two kinds of transitional justice as defined by Huntington (1993). The first is
linked to the international level, such as the trials by the Allied forces of the leaders of Axis
powers. The second involves internal trails at a national level. As far as the first kind of
transitional justice is concerned, Huyse (2009) focuses on how the concept of transitional justice
has gone through different changes in history from the late 1940s to the mid-1980s. Initially, the
policy was to bury the past and look to the future as observed in both the Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia and in Spain after Franco. Similarly, amnesty or impunity for Augusto Pinochet of
Chile is another example. The only exceptions were the War Crimes Tribunals at Nuremberg and
Tokyo, and the Geneva Conventions of 1945 establishing foundations against impunity. A major
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shift occurred after the dramatic growth of human rights culture in the world, in particular, from
the mid-1980s on.
Mihai (2010) discusses two major issues facing transitioning democracies: democracy vs.
justice and truth vs. justice. As far as the democracy vs. justice is concerned, there is a consensus
among scholars that democracy cannot be established or maintained without handling the past.
That said, the emphasis should be on institutional reforms to consolidate democracy, rather than
political victimization. The supporters of democracy vs. justice consider that transitional
democracies are usually too weak to hold accountable those who benefited from the past
dictatorial regime. Therefore, it is essential for the transition to strike a balance between finding
justice for past victims and safeguarding the fledgling democracy (Snyder & Leslie, 2004).
As far as the issue of truth vs. justice, proponents argue that some past crimes demand
punishment so as to avoid such abuses in the future. In this pursuit of justice, it is important for
the courts to maintain a firm rule of law in order to strengthen nascent democracies, restore order
in the society, and to contribute to the dignity of the victims (Minow, 2002; Penrose, 1999).
Judicial Irrelevance
Ginsburg (2012) describes a possible fourth role of courts in transitioning democracies,
when they remain silent or sidelined. He argues the Chilean courts, which were highly
professionalized, institutionalized, and formalized, neither supported the dictatorship nor
hindered democratization. Rather, they adopted a policy of ‘apoliticism,’ indicating that they
were neither interested in the past, nor the future, instead focusing on narrowly defined current
legal questions. Still, the regional trend towards ‘rights adjudication’ eventually forced the
Chilean courts to deal with political matters from the past, giving prominence to rights-oriented
litigation, which also changed the views of the legal community. In addition, structural reforms

19

that gave more power to the lower courts to decide the legal and constitutional cases brought
significant changes in the court system, and the ‘complacent’ or quiet courts evolved into
‘empowered courts’ during the consolidated phase in Chile. It is observed that both in Chile and
Argentine that once democratization was secured, the courts started to rule against the strong
executive.
Courts and their Articulating Roles
The literature has identified a number of factors that determine which role(s) the courts
assume. Ginsburg (2012) focuses on the significance of three elements, space, ideas, and time, in
determining the role of judges in various situations. These three elements correspond to the
major theories in judicial politics such as strategic, ideational, and historical-institutional. The
strategic approach, in particular, focuses on political space rather than time to explain judicial
behavior. This approach emphasizes that the power of the courts is determined by the interaction
or interplay of various political institutions. Helmke and Rio (2011), endorse this concept by
arguing that courts expand their powers during a time of political fragmentation. As far as the
prominence of ‘ideas’ is concerned, Hilbink’s argument does make sense in that justice restrains
itself from using discretionary powers due to ideational, cultural, and cognitive accounts. Time is
the third element, suggesting the changing role of the courts is due to change in the institutional
environment.
In a nutshell, the scholars in judicial politics identify four broad roles of the courts in
transitioning democracies. In some cases, the courts play the role of an agent of the past by
preserving the policies of the prior authoritarian regime. Sometimes, they act as an agent of the
future by promoting or consolidating democratic norms in the transitions phase. In some cases,
the courts trigger the democratization process through their decisions, encouraging the people
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and initiating the consolidation process. Finally, there are instances where the courts seem to
play no role at all, simply reacting after change occurs.
The Role of Activists: Cause Lawyering
Cause Lawyering is a concept that is focused on lawyers who promote social change for
the common good, in particular, for marginalized sections of society by using public interest
litigation. There are different forms of cause lawyering throughout the world where the legal
community struggled to achieve legal, political, social, civil, and democratic values. According
to the literature, lawyering is a widespread concept appearing in stable democracies, newly
emerging democracies, and authoritarian settings, however, it is not the same everywhere. It
varies from country to country and time to time (Scheingold, 2001). Similarly, some scholars
such as Halliday, Feeley, and Karpik (2007) argue for the importance of legal professionals
including lawyers and judges in constructing liberal political regimes. The authors note the
difference between ‘cause lawyering’ and ‘political lawyering’ by developing their own ‘legal
complex’ theories, and analyzing the role of the ‘legal complex’ in protecting basic human rights
in different parts of the world. According to the proponents of this argument, lawyers, judges,
prosecutors and other personnel from the legal profession should struggle to establish basic
human rights. In this study, I intend to examine the role of the legal community in Pakistan with
reference to the expansion of the cause lawyering worldwide, particularly in new emerging
democracies. During the Lawyers’ Movement, the goals of many legal professionals in Pakistan
seemed to be the promotion of democratic values through JI and rule of law.
Kilwein (1997) develops a better understanding of cause lawyering for the lower strata of
the community in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He interviewed 29 cause lawyers, both men and
women working for the disadvantaged and marginalized people in that city. The major focus of
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the study was to explore the professional and economic impacts of cause lawyering on the
respondents. The significance of this piece is its focus on the political dimensions of the cause
lawyering. The author divides cause lawyers into different types: 1) individual client lawyering;
2) impact lawyering; 3) mobilization lawyering; and 4) client voice lawyering. He also splits the
working styles of his respondents into two categories: one who preferred ‘individual client
lawyering’, and the other who opted for ‘combined cause lawyering’ based upon a number of
social, political and economic reasons. The author also explained the motivational factors behind
both styles of cause lawyering such as familial, personal, educational, and when someone joins
the legal profession. Cause lawyering for the disadvantaged or marginalized segments of the
society does not require formal, organized processes and procedures to do a significant job. It is
also true with a large-scale, countrywide social movement like the Lawyers’ Movement (LM) in
Pakistan where the cause lawyers were loosely organized and had no regular mode or processes
and procedures of decision making. The impacts of poverty on cause lawyering were not the
same on the respondents, rather they depended on their ‘practice style choices.’
Scheingold and Sarat (2004) suggest that it is not possible to define a concept of cause
lawyering acceptable for all cross-cultural segments. Both agree with Luban (1988) that lawyers
use their professional skills to achieve their social, political, cultural, economic, and legal ideals
that ultimately transcend client service. Similarly, ideological ideals animate cause lawyers.
Scheingold and Sarat associate cause lawyering with both intent and behavior. Most importantly,
cause lawyering is compatible with liberal democratic norms in a society.
Cause-lawyering has multiple forms or types and all have a symbiotic relationship with
both democracy and professionalism. The authors further explore: a) the relationship between the
cause lawyering and legal profession in historical context; b) the role of legal education in
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inculcating the characteristics of cause lawyering; c) the many sites of cause lawyering, such as
public and private, salaried and fee-for-service; d) the roles of cause lawyering in a democracy
and its repercussions for the legal profession; and e) the prospects and challenges faced by cause
lawyers in global and international perspective where the environment and the resources are
different than those in liberal democratic societies such the United States.
Anne Bloom (2008) agrees with Galanter (1983) that the practice ‘style’ helps to convert
an ordinary lawyer into a cause lawyer. However, she believes that cause lawyers are not from
particular practice styles. Rather, all cause lawyers are associated with one or another practice
styles. According to her, cause lawyers are activists who engage themselves in activities that
could help to promote a cause effectively such as publicity campaigns, rallies, marches, and
other attempt to get broader support for their cause.
Hilbink (2004) explores the typology of the concept of cause lawyering. He separates
ordinary lawyering from politics. According to him, procedural lawyering is one type of
lawyering where the lawyers primarily focus on the legal and professional aspects of a case and
keep themselves away from partisanship. The second type of cause lawyering, elite-vanguard
lawyering, is opposite to procedural lawyering where elite lawyers consider the law as a superior
form of politics and they believe in changing the society through changing the substantive law.
The third type or category is grassroots, in which the lawyers are skeptical about the law and
consider it as corrupt, unfair, unjust, and an oppressive force. Their major purpose is to achieve
substantive social justice, but not through courts but through participation in social movements.
They also do not seek to play a leadership role in those movements, but instead act as active
supporters for the cause of social justice (p. 663).
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I intend to use the preceding discussion of political dimensions and types of cause
lawyering to better understand the development and evolution of the Lawyers Movement in
Pakistan. Like Epp’s (1998) analysis I hope to determine whether the Lawyers Movement
produced a support structure for democracy, particularly in the form of a vibrant and activist
legal community, along with raising the awareness among the people of their rights.
The Role of Social Movements
In order to develop a better understanding of the Lawyers’ Movement and its social,
political, legal, and constitutional impacts, it is useful to examine the most relevant literature and
scholarship in the fields of protests, social movements, cause lawyering, and political
development. As far as the definitional and theoretical concepts of a social movement are
concerned, the Lawyers’ Movement was a widespread political and social movement, pioneered
by the people in the legal profession, such as cause lawyers and judges, including members of
the civil society for the political development of the country.
McCarthy and Zald (1977, pp. 1217-1218) define social movement as a “set of opinions
and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the
social structures and/ or reward distribution of a society.” According to Tilly (Giugni, et al.,
1984, p.7), “the term social movement applies most usefully to a sustained interaction between a
specific set of authorities and various spokespersons for a given challenge to those authorities.”
Tilly and Tarrow (2007) present several forms of contentious politics like revolutions, social
movements, religious and ethnic conflicts, nationalism, civil rights, and transnational
movements. The authors agree that similar analytical tools and principles could be used for
analyzing the variety of past and recent episodes of contentious politics.
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Aslanidis (2012) argue that before the late-1960s and 1970s, social scientists considered
social and political protest as an irrational reaction of a frenetic citizenry. Later, political and
social scientists regarded protest as rational reaction against the excesses of political regimes.
There is a voluminous literature on social movements and protests. Political scientists and
researchers developed a number of theories and approaches to explain the phenomenon of sociopolitical movements or protests such as collective behavior, mass society theory, and relative
deprivation. As far as ‘mass theory’ is concerned, the alienated, isolated or marginalized groups
in the society having no organized channels of participation were left limited to participate in
social movements or protests in order to raise their voices. According to the proponents of this
theory, protest is the product of socially atomized and marginalized individuals (Arendt, 1951;
Buechler, 1993; Jenkins, 1983; Kornhauser, 1959; McAdam, 1982).
In terms of ‘collective behavior’ theory, classical theorists Gustave Le Bon (1895), Freud
(1899), and Durkheim (1897) considered social movements and protest a “visible manifestation
of social breakdown” due to the failure of mechanisms that control the socio-political feelings of
the people. They focused on psychological variables based on irrational behavior of ‘atomized
individuals’ who wanted to tear apart the social fabric of society (Snow & Oliver 1995; Useem,
1998; Zald, 1996). Smelser (1962) suggested four important ingredients of collective behavior,
structural conduciveness, structural strain, growth along with the speed of generalized belief, and
precipitating factors (Smelser, 1962, pp. 15-16). Wallis (1979) defines social movements as
“relatively sustained collective efforts to change, maintain, or restore some feature(s) of society
or of its members, which employ relatively uninstitutionalised means to promote those ends
(Wallis, 1979, p. 1).”
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Contrary to the previous two approaches, mass theory and collective behavior, the
‘relative deprivation’ theory suggests that protestors were not marginalized with nothing to lose,
but were accustomed to a comparatively better life and hoped to increase their well-being more
in future through protest and participation in social and political movements (Snow & Oliver,
1995). According to the proponents of the ‘relative deprivation’ theory, there are reasons behind
this behavior such as aggression, frustration and discontent among the masses (Gurr, 1970;
Kerbo, 1982; Gurney & Tierney, 1982). Although relative deprivation theory is still popular
among the researchers and students of SM, it has flaws and weaknesses.
Collective behavior theories also neglected the significance of ‘agency.’ They considered
the social and political movements as spontaneous phenomena which emerged automatically and
ignored the role of strategy or deliberate and organized efforts of the movement actors. McAdam
(1982) concludes that “social movement is effective not as a political action but as therapy.”
Most significantly, the major flaw in this ‘collective behavior’ theory was revealed when
different empirical based studies refuted the major claims of this theory, such as the membership
in social movements included more well-off individuals compared to the marginalized
individuals.
Olson (1965, p. 2) challenged this argument that likeminded people struggle for their
common interests by saying: “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their
common or group interests.” Olson pointed out the issue of free-riders, asking why do people
participate in movements or protests when they can benefit from others coming out and
struggling for the common good? There must be some ‘incentives’ or ‘coercive’ measures to
mobilize the people. He brought a rationalist approach into the collective action phenomenon
when people weigh their costs and benefits of their participation in social movements.
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Sociologists and political theorists further elaborated on social movements and protests,
enhancing its scope from a psychological microlevel of analysis to the macro-structural level of
the society, particularly after the ‘new social movements’ in the late 60s and early 70s around the
globe. This movement brought a classical paradigm shift in the field and social theorists
developed alternate theories to analyze collective action or social movement phenomenon based
on the role of rational actors, available and mobilization of resources, organizations, and
networks (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973).
A new school in the social movement’s literature emerged, ‘resource mobilization,’ that
shifted the argument from psychological, personal, irrational, or micro-level analysis to rational,
macro- or meso-levels of analysis. According to this school, an organizational mindset and
allocation of proper resources were the prerequisites for successful protests. It undercut the basic
tenant of the ‘collective action’ paradigm that ‘grievances’ and ‘shared beliefs’ had paramount
importance. As far as the definition of ‘resources’ is concerned, it has very broad implications as
Oberschall (1973) observed that “anything from material resources–jobs, income, savings, and
the right to material goods and services–to nonmaterial resources–authority, moral commitment,
trust, friendship, skills, habits of industry, and so on.” Along with the ‘resources,’ the ‘formal
organization’ headed by a ‘mastermind’ is also necessary for the efficient use of available
‘resources’ to achieve success (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Similarly, preexisting organizations
and social networks play a key role in long-term sustainability of the social movement.
Like ‘collective action theories,’ the ‘resource mobilization’ paradigm had its own
deficiencies in that it was overly focused on ‘economic’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ aspects of social
movement phenomenon. A new approach in the field, the ‘political process model,’ tried to
connect the ‘missing links’ that the early ‘collective action’ and ‘resource mobilization’ theories
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left open such as the role of politics or power political elites in shaping mobilization and
managing resources, maneuvering the grievances of people and finally creating or exploiting the
‘opportunities’ to engage into social movements and protests (Jenkins, 1983; McAdam 1982;
McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996).
Eisinger (1973) first introduced the term ‘political opportunity structure’ while he was
studying riots in several major American cities. Tarrow (1998) further elaborated the term this
way: that “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their
expectations of success and failure.”
The political process model was further expanded by its pioneers and some other
researchers to examine the role of powerful elites and their allies, proponents and opponents, the
nature of political institutions, the structures of available opportunities, and the ability of the
actors to move forward or restrain themselves (Giugni, 2011; Jenkins, 1983; Lichbach, 1998;
McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). McAdam
(1982) synchronized the ‘political opportunity structure’ and ‘resource mobilization’ approaches
into one theory called the ‘political process model.’ Both McAdam (1982) and Meyer (2014)
considered the resources or ‘means’ as having the paramount significance in the emergence and
development of a social movement. McAdam (1996) said that “political opportunities were
simply one of many resources whose availability generally keyed the emergence and
development of SM (p. 26).” Similarly, Meyer added that the “structure of political
opportunities, is analogous to the structure of career opportunities individuals face, explicitly
considered the available means for a constituency to lodge claims against authorities” (Meyer,
2014, p. 127).
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Tilly (1978) combines the attributes of both ‘resource mobilization’ and the ‘political
process model’, emphasizing four variables: 1) interests; 2) organization; 3) mobilization; and 4)
opportunity to establish an alliance between a social movement’s elites and institutional actors in
order to engage in movement activities utilizing opportunities properly.
As far as the criticism on the political process theory is concerned, the notion of
‘opportunity’ is not clear in terms of what kinds or forms of opportunities are required for mass
mobilization. In other words, when is it best to start a social movement against a government?
Theorists and researchers have answers to this query that divide among political elites, existence
of political alliances, erosion of the state, and space in the political system which are considered
the best opportunity to launch mass movement or protest against the regime (McAdam, 1996;
Morris, 2000). Similarly, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) described the ‘mobilizing
structures’ as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people
mobilize and engage in collective action.”
Staggenborg (2015) focuses on the protest cycle of 1960s including women’s rights, gay
and lesbian rights, the new American right, and the global justice movements in order to
understand their tactics, strategies, and organizational challenges including the role of the mass
media and counter-movements in determining the outcomes of those movements. Jamison and
Eyerman (1991) focus on comparative analyses of the American civil rights movement,
environmental movements, and protests in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The
authors stress the importance of social and cultural aspects which help the participants of a mass
movement to establish or promote new identities in order to create harmony and unity in a
society.
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Polletta and Jasper (2001) examine the role of collective identity in four periods of a
social movement such as: 1) creation of collective claims; 2) recruitment; 3) strategic or tactical
decision making; and 4) outcomes of the movement. The authors try to find the answers to
important questions such as: why do social movements emerge? Why and how are social
movements successful? How do the social movements affect the people and their organizations?
How and why people are mobilized? How do the participants or activists select targets,
strategies, tactics, deliberative styles, and organizational forms from available options?
According to them, collective identity has a paramount importance in the process of a protest.
Collective identity is different from personal identity. It is also different from common
ideological commitment.
Polletta (2002) analyzes the role of participatory democracy in recent social movements
in the United States such as the Civil Rights Movement, the New Left, and groups against
globalization. This analysis is based upon extensive interviews with activists who participated in
these movements at different levels. The major focus of the study is to explore the role or
facilitation provided by the participatory democratic model to the activists in terms of
coordination, cooperation, information, negotiations, and developing skills, not only to the
existing conflict, but to the future scenarios. The author raises some important questions
regarding the decision-making process used by the activists during these movements. These
probing questions are related to their styles of deliberations, particular tactics, targets, ideological
frame, and most importantly the way of making decisions. According to the author, participatory
democratic decision-making process can help the social movement groups to affect political and
institutional change due to a number of factors, such as the ownership of the decisions, the
innovatory and transparent nature of the decisions, and their developmental benefits. Along with
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the advantages of participatory democracy, there are also some disadvantages of the participatory
democratic decision-making process such as the slow pace in reaching decisions requires more
patience, time, and energy from the participants/activists.
Anwar (2009) considers the Lawyers’ Movement as a social movement started by a
professional group over a single issue. According to him, the demand for the reinstatement of
deposed judges, including the Chief Justice, was viewed as synonymous to the establishment of
independence of judiciary in Pakistan and that the movement was not about individuals, but
instead focused on the institution of judiciary. He also examines the role of modern
communicative means, the private electronic mass media, which gave an opportunity to the legal
community to communicate its message. This research is based on focus group discussions
(FGDs) with the people from the legal profession in Pakistan. The results of these FGDs show
that there was a consensus among the legal community that the main focus of the LM was the
restoration of judges intertwined with the ultimate goal of establishing JI and the rule of law in
Pakistan.
Tarrow (1998) examines the parameters of the collective action phenomenon or dynamics
of mobilization along with the reasons for its failures. He also gives a brief history of how social
movements developed in the West in the Eighteenth Century. His major focus is on the
‘repertoire’ of social movements and their impact on society and their relationship with the statebuilding.
New Social Movements
The debate over the old and new social movements is as old as the concept itself. The
new social movement (NSM) paradigm is primarily based on both macro-historical and microhistorical levels. On the one hand, it concentrates on the role of economic and cultural factors
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behind social movements, and on the other, it studies the role of identity and personal behavior in
the present social movement literature.
Millward and Takhar (2019) examine the development of scholarship in social
movements and protests, in particular, by sociologists. The authors trace back the history of the
literature on social movements and protests stemming from ‘collective action’ or activism,
resource mobilization, rational action theory, political processes and mobilization theories, to the
new trend from materially-rooted theories to the NSM based on ideas, and culture. The authors
come to the recent developments in mass mobilizations in the form of the anti-globalization
occupy movement, the Arab Spring, women’s marches against Donald Trump’s presidential
campaign, the digital revolution through social media, and movements like Black Lives Matter
and #MeToo. According to the authors, issues like racial injustice, sexual abuse, and misogyny
have become globally important.
The current outrage in the United Sates against police violence is not new. It started in
2013 from a hashtag created by the activists Patrice Cullors, Alicia Garza, and Opel Tometi.
When the court acquitted George Zimmerman of the murder of Trayvon Martin in Florida, the
movement started against the police brutality. During the Ferguson, Missouri uprising against the
brutal actions of the police department, the slogan of ‘Black Lives Matter’ became the rallying
cry of protestors. The anger against police authorities turned into a mass movement, initially
founded by two black women, a number of other factions of the society like feminists, LGBTQ
activists, organized labor, low income working groups, and social media activists. The members
of this movement kept away from the traditional old guard of the Civil Rights movement, like
Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton, and from the American political establishment (Rickford, 2016,
pp. 35-37).
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The recent murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota by a white police officer
gave new impetus to the Black Lives Matter movement and has almost attained global attention.
It has become a massive mass movement for the safety of the black people in the world,
particularly in the United States, asking for justice and far reaching policing reforms. The
movement against the mistreatment of black people in America is expanding not only in the US,
but the other countries of world as well. It is inspiring African American youth and awakening
the spirit of racial equality, solidarity, and equity (Brownstein, 2020).
There is voluminous literature on the role of social movements, mass protests, and causelawyering. The literature on social movements and new social movements also focus on the,
causes, procedures, resources, and the types of mass mobilizations and the role of individuals
and organized groups in order to motivate common people. However, the vast literature has
examined the social movements and their roles including their impacts in the Western countries,
in particular, the Latin American nations. The research in this study to explore the causes,
resources, mobilization of the legal community and its impact on the democratic system of
Pakistan and on Pakistani society as a whole is grounded in the literature on social movements.
Conclusion
In this chapter I identify the concepts of democracy, transitional democracy, the different
roles of the courts in different kinds of regimes such as developed democracies, authoritarian
regimes, and transitional democracies like Pakistan. I identify that both democracy and the
judiciary are in transition in Pakistan. I also identify the five major roles of the courts in
transitioning democracies: 1) as upstream triggers of democracy; 2) as downstream guarantors;
3) as downstream democratic consolidators; 4) as judicial irrelevance; and 5) as articulators. I
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also introduce work on cause lawyers and social movements relevant to understanding transitions
to democracy in polities like Pakistan.

34

Chapter 3
Methodology
Introduction
My dissertation focuses on three important research questions. First, it examines the
development of the judicial system in Pakistan, paying special attention to the status of judicial
independence from 1947 to 2007. Second, it analyzes the Lawyers’ Movement, a social
movement that took place from 2007 to 2009 that sought to transform the judicial system in
Pakistan and to bring broader fundamental change to the whole of government. In this part of the
study, I analyze the movement, explore how it organized and operated, and examine the group’s
goals, including to what degree its leaders were concerned with judicial independence. Third, my
study examines whether the Lawyers’ Movement altered the political status of the judiciary,
again, paying attention to the status of the courts’ independence.
To answer these questions, I use mixed methods that rely on existing documentary
sources and original qualitative data drawn from interviews with legal elites and movement
activists. In this chapter I explain how I collected these qualitative data. Since the concept of
judicial independence is part of my research, I begin this chapter by reviewing the literature in
terms of how other scholars have measured this concept.
Measuring Judicial Independence
As discussed in chapter 1, judicial Independence (JI) is commonly viewed as an
important feature of modern liberal democracies. There is a consensus among scholars that JI
contains three significant features: impartial justices, respect for their decisions, and noninterference in their affairs. JI is a complex phenomenon to define and measure (Cross, 2008;
Rosenn, 1987). It is different in various types of political systems such as stable democracies,
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authoritarian regimes, and transitional democracies (Russell & O’Brien, 2001). There are also
different meanings to the term JI in different types of regimes based on both the de jure, and de
facto role of the judges and the courts (Rios-Figueroa, 2006). The various models of judicial
decision making--legalist, attitudinal, and strategic—further complicate the definition of judicial
independence (Stephenson, 2003).
Scholars have used different methods to measure the independence of the judiciary. For
example, Feld and Voigt (2003) distinguished between de jure independence and de facto
independence. They developed a scheme to establish indicators of both forms in order to test its
impact on the economic growth of 57 countries. The authors developed their measure through a
survey of experts in 71 countries. There are twelve variables measuring de jure independence
and eight variables measuring de facto JI. As far as the de jure indicators of JI are concerned,
most relate to textual or constitutional guarantees like stability of constitutional provisions,
appointment procedures, rules on judicial tenure, salaries, accessibility to the courts, allocation of
cases to judges, judicial review, and publishing the decisions courts (Feld & Voigt, 2003, pp.
501-503). Indicators of de facto independence include the effective term length of the judges, the
internal influence of judges as colleagues, the financial autonomy of both judges and the courts,
frequency of rule changes, and the relationship or cooperation of other branches of the
government. Feld and Voigt conclude that de facto independence has a robust, significant and
positive impact on economic growth, while de jure had no impact (Feld & Voigt, 2003, pp. 503504).
Other researchers have conducted large, cross-national studies of judicial independence,
including Rios-Figueroa and Staton (2014), Linzer and Staton (2015), Dijk and Vos (2018), and
Keilitz (2018). In these and other studies, researchers explore the status of judicial independence

36

and its impact on economic growth, regime stability, the protection of human rights, corruption,
and institutional accountability (Gibler & Randazzo, 2011; Keilitz, 2018; La Porta et al. 2004;
North & Weingast, 1989).
Rios-Figueroa and Staton (2014) describe de jure JI as institutions that insulate judges,
while de facto independence is found in judicial behavior and influence. Colon (2003) explored
the work of Latin American scholars on the indicators of the judicial independence and
summarized them into eight categories: 1) the appointment process of the judges; 2) salary
protection; 3) life tenure of judges; 4) professional qualification of judges; 5) judges’
involvement in the judicial discipline, i.e., accountability of judges by themselves; 6) financial
autonomy; 7) fixed numbers of judges of the superior court and; 8) functional autonomy from the
other branches of the government. According to Colon, greater involvement of the judiciary in
the above-mentioned matters ensures greater judicial independence (Colon, 2003, p. 109).
Colon adds to these indicators with what he calls constitutional powers variables that deal
with the independence of the judicial branch from the other branches of the government. These
thirteen variables are mostly related to constitutional provisions regarding the decrease or
increase in judicial independence. Six variables enhance judicial independence: 1) judicial
review; 2) a supreme court’s powers to certify proposed legislation including the appointment of
its own judges; 3) prohibitions against the other branches of the government interfering with
judicial functions; 4) powers given to the other branches of the government to enforce the
judgments of the Supreme Court; 5) delineation of exclusive powers of the Supreme Court to
resolve disputes; and 6) explicit constitutional powers given to the Supreme Court to initiate
legislation/policy to operate. Colon identifies seven common constitutional provisions that are
designed to, or have, the impact of discouraging or eliminating judicial independence: 1)
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reserving the power of other branches to self-judge the constitutionality of their acts; 2) setting
limits on the judicial review powers of the supreme court; 3) setting super-majority thresholds
for court decisions to become precedent; 4) giving powers to the legislature to alter the
jurisdiction of the supreme court; 5) giving powers to the legislature to limit the applicability of
supreme court decisions; 6) establishing courts whose decisions may not be reviewed by the
supreme court, and 7) constitutional provisions for the other branches of the government to issue
decrees, pardons, or states of siege independently of the courts (Colon, 2003, pp. 119-120).
Dijk and Vos (2018) examine European court systems to measure judicial independence
and accountability. The authors divided the indicators of judicial independence into two major
categories: formal and perceived, or de jure and de facto. Ultimately, they focus on thirteen
indicators of JI: 1) legal or constitutional independence; 2) organizational independence; 3)
financial independence; 4) managerial independence; 5) control over human resource decisions;
6) control over disciplinary procedures, i.e., a competent body established under the ENCJ
procedures to make judges accountable ; 7) non-transferability, i.e., a formal guarantee to the
judges not be transferred without their prior consent ; 8) internal independence; 9) subjective
independence as measured by public opinion; 10) subjective independence as measured by court
users; 11) subjective independence as measured by judges themselves; 12) judicial corruption as
perceived by the public; and 13) the public’s relative trust in judiciary (Dijk & Vos, 2018, pp. 811).
Linzer and Staton (2015) have presented a cross-national measure of de facto JI covering
200 countries from 1948 to 2012 including Pakistan. The time period of this study covers both
periods in Pakistan, i.e., before and after the Lawyers’ Movement 2007-2009. The figure A1
regarding the results of the estimates of judicial independence show an increase in the judicial
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independence in Pakistan after the Lawyers’ Movement (Linzer & Staton 2015, p. 249). The
authors offer a measurement model called TSCS, i.e., time-series, and cross-sectional model to
measure the latent Judicial Independence for 200 countries since 1948 to 2012. First, the authors
adopted the division of the concept of JI in the previous literature into two parts, de jure and de
facto. However, the authors also made the distinction between the autonomy of judiciary and its
powers based on the separate roles of the judges as individuals and the role of judiciary as role of
judges collectively or as an institution.
According to Linzer and Staton (2015) judicial independence in Pakistan goes up and
down from 1948 to 2012, however, their study does not conclude why judicial independence
goes up after the Lawyers’ Movement which is the crucial part of my work in this study. They
made a general analysis of judicial independence across the world of more than 200 countries,
however, the qualitative analysis in my study covers one major objective measure, i.e., of
judicial independence in Pakistan, the historic Lawyers’ Movement.
All methods have limitations, therefore, scholars often recommend and apply a multiple
methods approach to analyze social phenomena (Denzin, 1970; Web, 1970). According to
Creswell (2009, p. 12), the quantitative research method has an advantage to explore and analyze
numerically and statistically the attitudes, behaviors, and opinions of sample or targeted
population in the study. However, the qualitative research technique has the ability to highlight
the relationship or interactions among the various actors or players based on their personal, local
knowledge and experience. Scholars suggest using both quantitative and qualitative methods side
by side in order to explore both numerical and data-based analyses of social problem and to
develop a better understanding of the issue through real-life experience of the participants in the
study (Creswell, 2004, p.14).
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In this study, I use face-to-face interviews of 30 elites closely and directly associated to
the Lawyers’ Movement, as well as a survey, and documentary sources. I sent to the respondents
the structured interview schedule and survey by mail and by hand. Before sending the
questionnaire and survey I contacted each respondent to ensure their willingness and ability to
participate in the project. I also sent a cover letter issued by my dissertation chair explaining the
research topic along with its purpose and significance, with a paragraph ensuring them
anonymity (a copy of the letter enclosed as annexure A). As suggested by scholars (Aberbach
and Rockman, 2006; Creswell, 2009; Dodge, Ospina, Foldy, 2005; Ospina and Dodge 2005), the
main purpose of face-face interviews was to understand the opinions and perceptions of
participants about their roles, communication, and interactions. The in-depth information I
gathered about the concepts, the Lawyers’ Movement, its goals, and the status of judicial
independence before and after the LM, and most importantly, the impact of this social movement
on country’s judicial system and society could come from any source other than the face-to-face
interviews and a survey.
Survey Instruments and Methodology
For my study, I collected data from key elites inside and out of the judiciary of Pakistan.
I collected these data in two ways. First, I conducted in-depth, face-to-face interviews with thirty
individuals. Second, I developed an instrument designed to measure judicial independence in
Pakistan before and after the Lawyers’ Movement. Participants who participated in the
interviews were also asked to complete this Pakistan JI instrument. In this section, I introduce
both the interview schedule and the JI instrument and describe how I conducted my research.
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Elite Interviews
Interview Participants – I interviewed thirty respondents who were either closely
associated with the Lawyers’ Movement, or are prominent members of the legal community, or
are noted observers of the Pakistan justice and political systems. These men (27) and women (3)
are retired judges, lawyers, professors, politicians, journalists and others. I could not interview
current judges because according to Pakistani law sitting judges are not allowed to express their
views in an interview unless they been have retired from active service for at least two years.
Among my respondents were three retired justices of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The
interviews took place at the residences of two justices; the other was with a retired justice who
taught at a prominent Pakistani law college of law. The duration of interviews varied between
forty minutes to one hour. I interviewed one former Chief Justice of a High in his chamber. I also
interviewed four retired justices of the High Courts. I met three of them at their homes. One
justice out of four was a PCO judge whom I met at his chamber. I interviewed four top leaders of
the Lawyers’ Movement all of whom were also renowned lawyers at the Supreme Court of
Pakistan. One of them later became a justice of a High Court. Two out of five Supreme Court
lawyers I interviewed had also served as Federal Law Ministers at various times, one in President
General Ayub Khan’s cabinet and the other in General Pervaiz Musharraf’s cabinet. One of them
was also a member of the Judicial Commission responsible for the appointment of judges. One of
them is also a renowned author of dozens of books on law, the judiciary, and courts in Pakistan.
As far as the lawyers of the Supreme Court are concerned, I interviewed both supporters and
opponents of the Lawyers’ Movement in order to get a balanced and unbiased data.
I interviewed two politicians, one of whom was the General Secretary of a major
religious political party in Pakistan. The other served as a Federal Minster, had been a former
Chairman of the Senate which is the upper house of the Parliament, and had also served as the
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Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee which drafted the Eighteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. This amendment brought major changes in the appointment process of the judges
of the superior courts. I met him in his office at the Parliament House, Islamabad, and the federal
capital of Pakistan.
Four participants in this study are renowned and senior journalists. All four publish
regular columns in the top national newspapers of the country. Two of them are also the owners
and chief editors of their newspapers/magazines. Two of them host their own popular primetime
television talk shows on two major cable network news channels. I interviewed two of them at
their homes and the other two in their offices. One of them has six decades of experience of
writing for the editorial page of his newspaper.
I conducted interviews of five professors from the fields of law, political science, and
history. All interviews were conducted at their work places, i.e., offices, except one professor of
history whom I met at his residence. Two professors of law were also the principals (deans) of
law colleges, one in the private sector, and the other in the public sector. Similarly, I interviewed
three professors of political science, one retired from a public sector university, one professor
and dean of a public sector university, and the other from one of the major private sector
university in Pakistan. I interviewed a professor of Islamic Studies in his capacity as a
representative of the teaching community in the Lawyers’ Movement. I also interviewed a
representative of social active non-governmental organization.
Primarily, the respondents were selected based on purposive and convenience sampling
methods, however, the recommendations and guidance provided me by dissertation committee at
the time of my prospectus defense helped me to select the most relevant people. Among these
elite interviewees, most of them were highly associated with the Lawyers’ Movement either as
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an active participant or a close observer of this historic event. All of them were in high positions
in their respective fields.
All of my participants agreed to my audio recording of their interview with the exception
one judge of the High Court; I took notes for his interview. As Clark (2011) points out in his
book “The Limits of Judicial Independence,” there are difficulties and hurdles in conducting in
elite interviews. According to him, the method of elite interviews is not a science but an art.
Most importantly, for an academician to gain access to the elites is quite unlikely and then to be
able to successfully interview them is a pretty difficult task (Clark, 2011, pp. 271-272).
Survey Instrument - The qualitative analysis of these interviews is highly significant in
this study in terms of understanding the opinions and observations of the most relevant and
concerned people associated with the Lawyers’ Movement. The questions in the survey
instrument are designed to tap into the respondents’ knowledge and experiences regarding the
historical development of judicial system, the relationship of the Lawyers’ Movement with the
concept of independent judiciary, and the future prospects of an independent and free judiciary in
Pakistan.
The survey instrument was formulated with the approval of my dissertation committee
chair and the committee members. Initially, there were twelve to fifteen questions in the tentative
interview schedule. A few more questions were added with the approval of the committee chair
in order to explore comprehensive roles of the respondents in the Lawyers’ Movement. Most of
the questions were directly linked to the major research questions in the study, however, a few
supplementary questions also asked for greater clarity of the concepts presented in the study. The
supplementary questions were also necessary to be asked from the participants in the context of
all activities relating to the Lawyers’ Movement that were important for this study.
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The questionnaire consists of twelve major questions including thirteen sub-questions.
Those in bold are the major questions and those that are italicized are supplementary questions.
1-How do you perceive the concept of democracy?
2-What do you see is the role of judiciary in a polity/democratic state, particularly a
transitioning democracy like Pakistan?
a) In your opinion, what are the bases of rule of law?
b) What should be the place of religion in law?
3-How do you perceive the concept of judicial independence?
4-In your opinion what was the status of Judicial Independence in Pakistan before March
2007?
a) In your opinion, what were the major factors which eroded the judicial independence in the
past in Pakistan?
b) How was the Lawyers’ Movement started?
c) Who were the progenitors and opponents of this movement? And who were the leaders?
d) How masses were mobilized? Most importantly, how this Movement was sustained for more
than two consecutive years despite so many difficulties including the financial?
5-What were the main objectives of the Lawyers’ Movement?
a) What was the relationship between the objectives of the Lawyers’ Movement and Judicial
Independence in Pakistan?
b) Has the Lawyers’ Movement achieved its goals? If yes how, if no why?
6-In your opinion what has been the status of Judicial Independence in Pakistan after the
Lawyers’ Movement?
a) After the 18th amendment in the constitution, how do you evaluate the appointment process of
the judges?
b) How do you evaluate the removal methods of judges of superior courts?
c) Judicial accountability is an important part of a strong democratic system, how do you rate
the accountability of judges in Pakistan?
7-What do you think about the overall impact of the Lawyers’ Movement on the judicial
system of Pakistan?
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a) What do you think about the impact of Lawyers’ Movement on Judicial Independence in the
future?
b) With reference to the new code of the judges, could the current judiciary be seen as a bulwark
against any future military adventure in Pakistan?
8-Did the Lawyers’ Movement change the nature of relationship between the judiciary and
the other branches of the government, the executive, and the legislature?
9-Has this movement enhanced the image of judiciary among the general public?
10-What is the overall impact of this movement on Pakistani society?
11-What would you suggest to improve the judicial system of Pakistan?
12-What would you suggest to improve the democratic health of Pakistan?
The literature review revealed that the questions regarding the status of judicial
independence before and after the Lawyers’ Movement in Pakistan were missing from past work.
The best way to get the information required is to ask directly from the most relevant people
through the interviews and the survey (Aberbach & Rockman, 2006). In order to get diverse
opinions, I interviewed divergent section of the people both for and against the Lawyers’
Movement. I have analyzed and included the excerpts of those interviews in four of my study’s
five chapters. First, I transcribed all interviews and read them carefully before choosing the
excerpts to analyze the answers of the questions.
Pakistan Judicial Independence Instrument
Based on the literature on judicial independence discussed above, I developed an
instrument to assess how, if at all, my elite respondents feel that the Lawyers’ Movement had an
impact on the Pakistani polity, the judicial system, and judicial independence (see Table 6.1).
At the conclusion of each in-depth interview, I presented this JI instrument to the respondent and
asked her or him to complete it. Most of the respondents completed the survey immediately and
handed it back to me, however, some of them completed it later and returned it to me by mail.
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As Table 3.1 shows, I made two columns: 1) the state of JI before the Lawyers’
Movement; and 2) state of JI after the Lawyers’ Movement, and gave respondents four options to
mark in front of each indicator of JI, by using a scale with four options: a) poor, b) fair, c) good,
and d) excellent. All thirty respondents completed this survey. I applied the Paired Samples T
Test to analyze data of the survey, not only to measure the status of JI before and after the LM,
but to make a comparison of both periods and more importantly, to test the impact of the LM on
the whole judicial system of Pakistan, including the independence of judiciary.
This study is exploratory in nature. The interview schedules were designed to tap into the
belief or perceptions of the participants regarding the key concepts in the study such as
democracy, transitioning democracies, judicial independence, and the social movements.
Similarly, the meanings and nature of these concepts has also been explored from the existing
literature in the relevant areas of research.
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The Indicators of Judicial Independence
Table 3.1 (The State of Judicial Independence before and after the Lawyers’ Movement)
Indicators

Before March 2007

After March 2009

Poor Fair Good Excellent Poor Fair Good Excellent
1. Authority of judicial
review
2. Appointment of judges
3. Qualification of judges
4. Retention methods of
judges
5. Removal methods of
judges
6. Jurisdiction of the
courts
7. Number of judges
8. Administrative powers
of judges
9. Pay/salaries of the
judges
10. Term of office
11. Financial autonomy
12. Relationship with
executive
13. Relationship with
legislature
14. Relationship with the
military
15. Public opinion/support

47

Conclusion
This research is a mixed method study that uses qualitative, quantitative, and
documentary work to provide evidence to help answer three major research questions regarding
the status of judicial independence in Pakistan before and after the Lawyers’ Movement. This
study includes 30 elite interviews of the people highly associated with the historic Lawyers’
Movement 2007-2009. This study also includes a survey having 15 indicators of judicial
independence filled out by these thirty elite participants.
I recognize that there are challenges in understanding the concept of judicial
independence. There is no single definition of the concept in the literature and similarly no
consensus on how to measure judicial independence. However, there is voluminous literature
debating both definitional issues and the methodology regarding the measurement of the concept.
Both international and regional or national organizations have also developed the tools and
processes to evaluate the status and role of judicial independence across the globe. These
researchers have also benefited from the data collected and managed by international and
national, governmental and non-governmental organizations.
While I benefit from this prior research, my study applies it to the unique social and
political nature and conditions of Pakistan. I come to the conclusion that the mixed methods
approach has allowed me to take stock of the change in the judicial structure of Pakistan due to a
massive scale social movement of cause lawyers, judges, and other segments of the civil society.
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Chapter 4
The Judiciary in Pakistan: From 1947 to 2006
Introduction
In this chapter, I use the literature on courts in transitioning democracies to document the
development of the judiciary in Pakistan, with particular attention to how they function and what
kind of relationship they have with other governmental and societal actors. I am particularly
interested in determining the conditions under which they work independently and their impact
on the democratic health of Pakistan. This chapter also explores the status of judicial
independence in Pakistan before and after the Lawyers’ Movement. This chapter consists of four
major parts: 1) an examination of the courts of Pakistan in historical perspective; 2) an analysis
of the de jure role of the courts in Pakistan; 3) an examination of the de facto role of the courts in
Pakistan and 4) and a comparison of the role of the courts in both military and civilian regimes.
In addition, this chapter highlights the factors which determine, more often than not, that the
courts play a subservient role in the polity.
Courts: Historical Perspective
Pakistan’s judicial system is an amalgam of a variety of influences including the Hindus,
Mughals, and British colonial rulers. Pakistan’s judicial system has evolved through four
distinct eras: the Hindu Kingdom, Muslim rule, the British colonial era, and the period after
independence after the partition of India in August 1947. The British period has had the greatest
impact on the structures and functions of the court system (Hussain, 2015, p.1)
The Hindu Kingdom
The Hindu period ranges from 1500 BC to 1500 AD. Key ancient texts such as
Dharamshastra, Smiritis and Arthashastra, and the commentaries made by contemporary
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historians and jurists, are the main sources of judicial rule in this period. While the judicial
system was well defined and elaborate, the Hindu King or Emperor had absolute control over the
judicial process. There were officials appointed by the King like judges, ministers, or councilors
to assist the ruler in order to administer justice, but the final judicial decision-making powers
were in the hands of the King. The courts were established at two levels, central and local. At the
central or capital, the highest court was the Chief Justice’s Court at the Capital of the realm. The
decisions of this court could be challenged in the King’s Court. The justices were appointed by
King himself on the basis of their qualifications or experience and their class or caste, as most of
them were ‘Brahmins.’ The Hindu King had the power to overrule the decisions of the Chief
Justice’s Court (Hussain, 2015, pp. 1-2).
As far as the local level is concerned, there was a ‘village council’ or the assembly of the
people headed by a headman or ‘Serpunch.’ It was a kind of a ‘village government’ referred to as
‘Punchayat’ and performed multiple executive or administrative, religious, and financial
functions. However, the foremost duty of this organization was to administer justice. Both civil
and criminal issues were presented before this body. There were as such no written or codified
laws or rules and decisions were taken on the basis of morality, customs, and usages/tradition,
mostly associated with the religious teachings and cultural taboos (Tinker, 1968, pp. 19-20).
The procedure of the court was similar to the American jury system, the claimant/plaintiff
filed the suit or claim before the body and the other party, the defendant would present a defense
and both were allowed to present proof in the form of their witnesses in the court (Punchayat).
An appeal against the decisions of the Punchayat could be filed in the next higher court and
finally in the King’s Court. While the current court system in Pakistan is certainly more
complex, the current hierarchy is not much different from that which was used in ancient India

50

by the Hindu rulers. These ancient courts had no freedom to act freely but to protect only the
rights of the upper classes of the society (Hussain, 2015; Khan, 2009; Long, 2015; Tinker, 1968).
The Mughals
The early Muslims came to India as traders and sailors in the ports of the western coast.
The first Muslim conquest under the leadership of Muhammad Bin Qasim was made with the
invasion of Sindh in 712 AD. Delhi, the capital city, fell to the Muslims when Shahabuddin
Muhammad Ghouri defeated the Hindu Rajput ruler Prithwiraj Chauhan in 1192 AD. The first
Muslim dynasty/Sultanate was established by Sultan Qutubuddin Aibak in 1206 AD. The
Muslim Rule in India can be divided into two phases: 1) the early period ruled by Muslim
Sultans until 1526 when another Muslim dynasty, the Mughal dynasty was founded by the first
Mughal Emperor Zahiruddin Babar which lasted until the demise of last Mughal Emperor
Bahadur Shah Zafar in 1857 when the British colonial administration took the full control of
India (Hussain, 2015, pp. 2-3).
During this period, the Muslim rulers did not impose Sharia law or religious law on all
sections of the society. Both the Islamic law and customary law or local traditions were followed
to decide civil and criminal disputes. Akbar the Great (1556-1605) introduced secular laws for
the non-Muslim population (Long, 2015, pp. 245-247). He prohibited the collection of an Islamic
tax called ‘Jizya’ from non-Muslim population. Similarly, cow slaughter was declared illegal to
appease the vast Hindu majority. The country was divided into five levels of administrative units
or tiers: central, provincial (Suba), districts (Sarkar), and Tehsil (Pargana), and the lowest level
of courts was at the village/town level. There were four types of courts under the Muslim period,
the central court or King’s court in the capital, the final court of appeal having both original and
appellate jurisdiction. The King had all powers to appoint judges of caliber, repute, integrity, and
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competence. The judges could hold office as long as they enjoyed the confidence and pleasure of
the King. The second tier was the Court of Nazim-e-Suba (Provincial Chief). The head of the
provincial administration was the presiding officer of the court system at the provincial level.
Similarly, the court at the district level was headed by the judicial officers called Qazis. At the
Tehsil level, there were courts headed by Qazis, as well (Khan, 2009, pp. 3-4).
The most distinguished and important courts were at the village level and these courts,
the Punchayats, were the ancient courts started under the Hindu rulers and were retained
throughout the whole Muslim period. The Punchayat or Elder Council was an important
executive, administrative, and judicial unit at the village level, composed of influential people of
the village or society, in particular, those belonging to the rich families of higher castes such as
Brahmins. The major function of the councils was judicial and they decided both civil and
criminal matters.
Apart from the aforementioned four tier courts system, there were other individuals and
institutions that performed both, administrative and judicial functions at the same time. For
example, there was an elaborate system of revenue collection at the four levels of the
government. There were also some officials at the local level who had performed various judicial
duties in order to resolve both civil and criminal disputes such as Foujdar, Kotwal, Shiqdar, and
Subedar (Shah, 1986, p.99).
There were both written laws and orders issued by the King or his appointees (Fermans)
and unwritten customs or traditions that provided the bases for quasi-judicial independence.
Quasi because the jurisdiction of different courts was not well defined, in particular, the appellate
jurisdiction was unclear, allowing plaintiffs to take their cases to the higher courts of their own
choice. Compounding the conditional nature of judicial independence was the reality that the
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higher or appellate courts would hear cases without considering the proceedings and judgments
of the lower courts i.e., the lower courts had very little independence compared to the higher
/appellate courts (Hussain, 2015, p. 3).
British Colonial Government
On December 31, 1600, Queen Elizabeth I granted a charter to the Governor and a
company (East India Company) of merchants of London to trade in the East Indies. Other than
the power to legislate, the Charter gave the Governor and the Company the power to enforce
laws over its employees. King James I renewed the Charter in 1609. King Charles II issued a
new Charter in 1623 and gave powers to the East India Company to establish its own courts for
both civil and criminal cases involving its employees. The Charter of 1661 further expanded the
jurisdiction of the courts to all residents at the settlements of the Company other than its own
employees (Hussain, 2015, p.4). The Charter of 1661 also changed the nature of the company
from a trading or commercial entity to a territorial political power.
Initially, the British government established courts for three towns, Bombay, Calcutta,
and Madras. There were two kinds of courts, the Supreme Court and the Recorder’s Courts,
staffed by British judges appointed by the Crown. Both civil and criminal cases were decided
using British law. Non-British citizens came under the jurisdiction of other courts (Sadar Dewani
Adalat and Sadar Nizamat Adalat) which applied local laws and regulations in their decisions.
By 1823, under the Regulation Acts of 1773 and 1798, and the Act of the Parliament of 1823,
British Supreme Courts were established in the cities of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, which
consisted of Chief Justices of each Court and other Associate Judges (Hussain, 2015, pp. 3-4).
The High Court Act of 1861 replaced the Supreme Courts and Sadar Courts/Adalats with
the High Courts in Presidency Towns and expanded to Allahabad in 1866, Patna and Lahore in
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1919, and Rangoon in 1936. By the Sind Courts Act of 1926, the British government established
the Sind Chief Court. Similarly, the North West Frontier Province Courts Regulation of 1931 and
the British Baluchistan Courts Regulation of 1939 established the Court of Judicial
Commissioner in these areas. The Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 had already established the
principal civil courts such as the Court of District Judge, the Court of Additional District Judge,
the Court of Civil Judge, and the Court of Munsif at various levels of local administration such
as Tehsil and District levels (Khan, 2016, pp. 10-15).
The Government of India Act of 1935
Before partition of India into two independent states in 1947, the British ruled India
under the India Act passed by the British parliament in 1935, referred to as the India Act of 1935.
This Act provided a federal form of government. The executive authority was vested in the
Governor General appointed by the British Monarch. He would exercise his powers with the aid
of his appointees in the Council of Ministers (Marri, 1990, p. 11). This Act established two
chambers of legislatures, the Council of State, and the House of Assembly along with His
Majesty represented by the Governor General himself. According to the Section 32 of the Act,
the legislature would pass a law with the assent of the Governor General. For the administration
of justice, the Act of 1935 established a Federal Court that had original and appellate
jurisdiction. It also established at the provincial level, High Courts, the Chief Courts and the
Judicial Commissioner's Courts with both original and appellate jurisdictions. Under Section 208
of the Act of 1935, the procedure was laid down for the appeal of a decision of the Federal Court
to His Majesty in Council, the Privy Council (Amin, 2015, pp. 107-108). As such, courts under
the act were semi-autonomous. In practice, the courts under the British rule were autonomous
and enjoyed freedom of action without outside interference in their affairs.
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The India Act 1935 restructured the court system in India. It retained the previous High
Courts along with the establishment of a Federal Court having original, appellate, and advisory
jurisdiction. The Federal Court had the power to decide disputes between the Federal
Government and the Provincial Governments (Kazimi, 2009, p. 129). In terms of staffing the
courts, the British Crown had the powers to appoint the judges of the Federal Court. The
prescribed qualifications for the judges of the Federal Court were: 1) five years of experience as
a High Court judge; and 2) ten years of experience as a barrister or pleader in a High Court. The
mandatory retirement age of the judges was 65. The judges of the Federal Court and High
Courts enjoyed independence and freedom and they could not be removed from their duties
unless the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council recommended on the reference made by the
Crown (Hussain, 2015, pp. 4-5). All of the preceding gave the judiciary the grounds for de jure
independence.
The Independence Act of 1947
In this study, I examine the de jure independence of the courts in Pakistan since its first
interim Constitution, the Independence Act of 1947. After the independence of Pakistan on
August 14, 1947, the Government of India Act 1935 continued in force in Pakistan along with
the Independence Act of 1947. The Independence Act of 1947 was passed by the British
Parliament. The Government of India Act remained the first constitution of independent India
until her own constitution was adopted in 1949. Both of these acts formed the Interim
Constitutional framework of the newly independent States of India and Pakistan until the
adoption of their own constitutions later in 1949 and 1956 respectively (Munir 2014, pp. 8-9).
Section 8 (2) of the Act of 1947 stated, “…each of the new Dominions and all Provinces
and other parts thereof shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the Government
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of India Act, 1935 and of the Orders in Council, Rules and other Instruments made thereunder.”
Section 8 (1) of the Act of 1947 provided that, “…for the purpose of making provisions as to the
Constitution of the Dominion,” i.e., the new dominions of India and Pakistan, those states were
given the authority to make their own constitutions by their respective assemblies.
CJ Sir Mian Abdul Rashid pleaded for the autonomy of the Federal Court of Pakistan and
observed:
An autonomous Judiciary is the essence of Independence. Now that Pakistan is an
independent Sovereign State, it is in the fitness of things that all appeals that are at
present entertained by the Privy Council should be transferred to the Federal Court of
Pakistan. I hope the necessary legislation for this purpose will be undertaken by the
Constituent Assembly at early date. The Dominion of India abolished Privy Council
appeals as long as February 1948 (Khan, 2016, p.19).
Pakistan got the lessons of law and judiciary from the British experience and adopted the
common law tradition like other Commonwealth nations, however, there are tremendous
differences in terms of how courts in the United Kingdom and Pakistan function. Prime among
these is the written Constitution of Pakistan which has supremacy over other ordinary laws in the
country contrary to the British practice having no written constitution and no difference between
the constitutional law and the ordinary law (Neudorf, 2017, p. 128).
The Constitution of 1956
On March 23, 1956, Pakistan adopted its first constitution. It took nine years to frame the
Constitution and two legislative Assemblies struggled to meet this challenge. It contained six
schedules and 234 articles. The system of government developed was federal and powers were
divided between the federal and provincial governments. The Constitution contained three lists
of powers, one for the federal government to make laws, the second pertained to the matters
related to the provinces, and the third, called the concurrent list, was composed of the matters
where the federal and provincial governments shared concurrent powers to make law. In the case
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of a dispute between the central law and the provincial law, the central law was supreme (Amin,
2015, pp. 185-186).
All other residual powers were entrusted to the provincial governments. Like the Indian
Act of 1935, the system of government was Parliamentary and it was compulsory for the Prime
Minister and his cabinet ministers to be the members of the National Assembly. Both the Prime
Minister and his Cabinet could remain in power as long as they enjoyed the confidence of the
assembly and they were also answerable before the National Assembly for their deeds. The
President of Pakistan was the head of the state of Pakistan (Kazimi, 2009, p. 261). There was
only one chamber of the legislature, the National Assembly, in which the parity principal was
ensured for the two provinces of Pakistan by apportioning 150 members for each province for a
total 300 members (Sarwar, 2003, pp. 238-241).
Courts under the Constitution of 1956
The first apex court of independent Pakistan, the Supreme Court, was established in the
first Constitution of 1956, a document that also gave the nation its official name, the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan. The Constitution created a single federal court system, with no
independent, subnational courts for the provinces. This new federal court system was made up of
four tiers. At the base of the court system were Civil or Magisterial Courts. The second-tier
courts were District Courts. At the third level, were two High Courts for each of the provinces.
Finally, the apex court, formerly called the Federal Court, became the Supreme Court, with both
original and appellate jurisdiction. The judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court
enjoyed a degree of independence via job tenure guaranteed by the Constitution, and could only
be removed prior to retirement through impeachment by the Assembly (Sarwar, 2003, p. 240).
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The Constitution, though parliamentary, deviated from parliamentary norms and gave
explicit powers of judicial review to the superior judiciary. Like the United States, Canada, and
Australia, the Constitution was made the “supreme law” of the land and the superior courts were
given the powers to interpret constitutional law. The superior courts were given powers to issue
various writs such as habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certioraris. The
Supreme Court consisted of its chief justice and six other justices (Khan, 2016, pp. 55-57).
The Constitution of 1962
In 1958, the President of Pakistan, Iskandar Mirza, imposed the nation’s first period of
martial law by abrogating the first Constitution of Pakistan. He banned all political parties and
put the Prime Minister and the members of his Cabinet under house arrest. Later, General Ayub
Khan ousted President Mirza, assuming the Presidency for himself.
On February 17, 1960, President Ayub Khan formed a Constitution Commission headed
by the former CJ of Pakistan, Justice Shahabbuddin, to present a recommendation for a new
constitution of Pakistan (Kazimi, 2009, p. 262). The Constitution Commission presented its
recommendations on May 6, 1961. President Khan appointed a Committee to examine the
recommendations of the Constitution Committee with Manzoor Qadir, then foreign secretary, as
its Chairman. The Cabinet further examined the two reports of the Committee and the final draft
of the Constitution was discussed in a Governor’s Conference held in the last week of October
1961. On March 1, 1962, General Khan announced the implementation of the new Constitution
in a broadcast speech to the nation (Khan, 2016, pp. 193-194). The Constitution of 1962 was the
second constitution of the Second Republic of Pakistan.
The Constitution of 1962 was comprised of 250 articles. Pakistan was a federal state
under this Constitution, however, there were no separate legislatures for the provinces. While the
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new constitution retained a distribution of powers among the federal and provincial
governments, the federal government’s share of those powers expanded (Amin, 2015, pp. 196197).
An indirect election method was chosen to select the President, with the elected members
of local governments (Basic Democracies Members) given the right to select the nation’s highest
officer. In the provinces, the president had the right to appoint provincial executives, and the
Governors and their ministers were responsible to the president for their duties. The only direct
electoral connection in the new system was at the local level where the people had the right to
elect their councilors of Basic Democracies, the name for the local government system created
by President Khan in the new constitution. There were 40,000 councilors in each of the
provinces of West and East Pakistan, for a total of 80,000. These councilors formed an electoral
college to select the president and the upper tiers of the Local Governments, including the
National Assembly. This constitutional structure was neither parliamentary nor presidential.
Rather, the President of Pakistan, who was also the Field Marshal and the Commander of the
Armed forces, was the linchpin of the system (Khan, 2016, pp. 167-173).
Courts under the Constitution of 1962
There was no change in the structures of the courts under this new constitution, however,
the powers of the superior courts to interpret the Constitution and laws were reduced. The
President of Pakistan had the power to appoint the judges of the superior courts (Kazimi, 2009,
p. 262).
Unlike the interim constitutions and the Constitution of 1956, in the Constitution of 1962
the Supreme Court had no power to declare a law unconstitutional on the grounds that the
legislature lacked the powers to make a particular law. And the validity of a law passed by the
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legislature could not be called in question in any court of law. Articles 57 and 58 gave powers to
Supreme Court to decide the disputes between the central and the provincial governments or
between actors within both levels of governments. Individuals and the Court could examine the
intent or interpretation of the Constitution after the certification of the High Courts that a case
involved an interpretation of the Constitution as well. In 1963, after the first amendment in the
Constitution, the Courts vested with powers to decide the vires of the legislature (Khan, 2016,
pp. 208-210).
Article 129 of the Constitution gave powers to the CJ of Supreme Court of Pakistan to
appoint a special tribunal to resolve a dispute between the Federal and Provincial Governments
and disputes among two provinces and the center. The Chief Justice would submit the report to
the President of Pakistan for further action (Choudhary, 1959. P. 190).
The Constitution of 1973
In 1971, the Eastern Province of Pakistan gained its independence and became
Bangladesh. 1970 elections in the Western Province of Pakistan led to the selection of new
National Assembly, renamed the Constituent Assembly and its first job was to create a new
constitution for the former Western Province. The Constitution of 1973 introduced a
parliamentary form of government following the British tradition whereby the elected Prime
Minister is the real and effective head of the government having all of executive powers and the
President is a titular or ceremonial figurehead (Ziring, 1997, p. 395).
Another key feature of the 1973 Constitution is that of federalism. Pakistan now
consisted of four provinces and each province has its own elected executive and elected
provincial legislature. In the original Constitution of 1973, before amendments, there were lists
of powers reserved for the Federal government, for the provinces, and a concurrent list composed
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of the matters where both the Federal government and the provincial governments had the
powers to legislate. After the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the
third list was repealed with a significant number of the powers transferred to the Provinces,
especially in terms of education and local governments (Bengali, 2018, p. 85). However, when
federal and provincial law clash, federal law will prevail. There is also a principle of a bicameral
legislature: the National Assembly is composed of members elected on the basis of population;
and the Senate, where all provinces have an equal share of representatives (Amin, 2015, p.
2015).
Courts under the Constitution of 1973
The Constitution of 1973 retains the same provisions about the judiciary that were in the
previous two constitutions. Article 175, Section 1, of the Constitution of 1973 states “there shall
be a Supreme Court of Pakistan, a High Court for each Province and such other courts as may be
established by law”. Section 2 adds “No court shall have any jurisdiction save as it is or may be
conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law.”
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Figure 3.1 Judicial Structure of Pakistan’s Judiciary

Source: Hussain, (2015). The Judicial System of Pakistan
Figure 3.1 shows the four-tier structure of judiciary in Pakistan under the Constitution of
1973. The Supreme Court of Pakistan is at the apex, five High courts form the second tier,
followed by five District courts for each revenue district, with civil/magisterial courts at the
lowest level. There is also a Shariat Appelate Bench of Supreme Court judges along with the
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federal Shariat Court to hear cases related to Islamic injunctions, such as cases under the Hadood
laws/rape cases. Additional courts such as Accountability Courts, Terrorist Courts, Military
Courts, and the Special Courts for Drugs add a layer of complexity to the system. The superior
courts have the powers of judicial review; the High Courts and the Supreme Court may declare
any law passed by the legislatures, National and Provincial, as null and void. The superior courts
can also issue writs of mandamus and declare the actions of the executives, both national and
provincial as unconstitutional (Khan, 2009, pp. 385-386).
Courts in Pakistan: The ‘Doctrine of Necessity’
Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan experienced four periods of military rule. The
superior courts of the country gave military dictators the power to rule under the umbrella of the
“Doctrine of Necessity” or the “Law of Necessity.” Both are legal terms designed to give
legitimacy or legal cover by the courts to an extra-constitutional regime, usually a government
carried out by a military junta. This doctrine is based on the writings and philosophies of two
prominent jurists, Henry de Bracton (1208), and William Blackstone (1756) as cited by WolfPhillips (1980). The superior courts in Pakistan mostly relied on an Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen’s
book on the subject titled “General Theory of Law and State.” The application of this doctrine is
not common, in particular, no example can be found in the developed or consolidated
democracies of the world, including the United Kingdom. However, this principle was applied in
developing nations through the Dosso case in Pakistan 1958, the Matouv case in Uganda 1966,
the Ndhlovu and Madzimbamuto cases in 1968 in Rhodesia, and the Lakanmi case in 1970 in
Nigeria (Wolf-Philips, 1980. P. 37).
The first use of the doctrine came in Pakistan by the Supreme Court when it validated the
extra-constitutional emergency powers of the Governor General Mirza Ghulam Muhammad.
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Later military regimes were also legitimized by the Superior judiciary in Pakistan under the same
principle. On October 24, 1954, the action by the Governor General Muhammad to dismiss the
elected government and dissolve the Constituent Assembly was validated by the Federal Court
under the umbrella of the principal of the “Doctrine of Necessarily.” In his judgment, the CJ
Muhammad Munir quoted the maxim dubbed by Bracton “…that which is otherwise not lawful
is made lawful by necessity.” In the judicial history of Pakistan, there are a number of landmark
cases decided by the superior courts validating extra-legal actions, such as the dismissal of
elected governments and dissolutions of the elected assemblies, in the name of restoring order or
national security of the State. On the other hand, there have been a handful occasions where the
superior courts revisited their judgments and reversed their support of the Doctrine of Necessity.
There are some critical court decisions regarding the military interventions that paved the way
for the establishment of the ‘Principles of Necessity’ in the judicial and political history of
Pakistan (Wolf-Philips, 1980. pp. 4-6).
The De Facto Role of the Courts in Pakistan
Hamid Khan (2016) discusses the factors that erode judicial independence of the courts
such as the military interventions in the political system of the country and the compromising
attitude of the courts under the military regimes. Hoon P. L. (2010) suggests the independence of
the courts is subject to efforts by the executive to mold or subvert judges. He suggests the
method of appointing judges is often the key to independence. Those appointed through an
independent commission made up of lower level judges often ensure the accountability of the
judicial branch along with its independence. He criticizes the appointment or selection method of
judges in the superior courts of Pakistan where judges or chief justices have a greater say than
other people in the society. Neudorf (2017) presents an analysis of the working of the law and
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courts in the United Kingdom in order to compare the legal systems of countries under this
case study with each other and with the UK. The chapters related to Pakistan emphasize the
historical evolution of the courts in Pakistan and the major crises faced by the judiciary since
the inception of the country in 1947. In addition, the author separately discusses the role and
performance of the courts in Pakistan under both Military and Civilian eras.
First Civilian Era 1947-1958
The judiciary in Pakistan started its journey after independence under the leadership of its
first Chief Justice Mian Abdul Rashid, previously the CJ of the Lahore High Court. In its early
years, the Court heard few politically significant cases. This changed in the Rawalpindi
Conspiracy Case of 1951, when serving military officers conspired to topple the civilian
government of the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan. Rather than let the court
decide the case, the government established a special tribunal to investigate the matter. This
tribunal was the first example set in the country that the federal government could undermine the
powers of the regular or ordinary courts in the country by establishing such special courts and
established the first major blow to the independence of the Pakistan judiciary (Khan, 2016, p.
26).
After the retirement of Chief Justice Abdul Rashid in 1954, the appointment of
Muhammad Munir as chief justice, bypassing four senior justices at the Federal Court, along
with the dissolving of the Constituent Assembly, made it clear the Governor General was
attempting to centralize power. Maulvi Tamizuddin, the Speaker of the Assembly, challenged the
effort to dissolve the Assembly in a case before the Supreme Court, where it was validated by the
newly appointed chief justice and laid the foundation of the Doctrine of Necessity. In the mid1950s, the judiciary again emerged as a controversial institution when it handed down two
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landmark judgments which established that real power was in the hands of the Governor General
Ghulam Muhammad and the Commander in Chief of the Army General Muhammad Auyb Khan,
who later imposed the first period of military rule in the country (Khan, 2016, pp. 30-31).
Federation of Pakistan v. Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, PLD 1955 FC 240
Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the first Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan on October 24, 1954 while the Assembly was busy drafting the first constitution. The
proclamation stated:
The Governor General having considered the political crisis with which the country is
faced, has with deep regret come to conclusion that the constitutional machinery has
broken down. He therefore has decided to declare a state of emergency throughout
Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly as at present constituted has lost the confidence of
the people and can no longer function. He has called upon the Prime Minister to reform
the Cabinet with a view to giving the country a vigorous and stable administration. The
invitation has been accepted (Khan, 2009, p. 103).
In actuality, the Constituent Assembly had passed legislation to cripple the powers of the
Governor General, which displeased and provoked him. The Assembly introduced the Fifth
Amendment Bill in the Government India Act of 1935, then the interim Constitution of Pakistan,
in order to constrain the Governor General from dismissing a Government having the confidence
of the Assembly. The Fifth Amendment revoked some Sections including 9, 10, 10-A, 10-B and
17 of the Government of the India Act, 1935 through which the powers of the Governor General
were stripped away (Khan, 1967, pp. 49-50).
The Speaker of the Constituent Assembly went to the Sind Chief Court against the action
of the Governor General and requested the Court to issue the Writ of Mandamus. The Sind Chief
Court decided in favor of the petition and declared the proclamation order of the Governor
General as null and void. According to the decision, the Constituent Assembly and President
Maulvi Tameez-ud-Din were intact and retained power to make law. The Court further declared
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Section 223-A of the Government of the India Act, 1935 which was passed on July 6, 1954, as a
valid law that gave the Court the power to issue the writ of mandamus. Section 223-A says:
Every High Court shall have power throughout territories in relation to which it
exercises Jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases
any Government within those territories, writs, including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari or any of them.
The Federal Government appealed to the Federal Court of Pakistan (the apex court)
against the judgment rendered by the Sind Chief Court in favor of Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan.
The Federal Court overruled the judgment of Sind Chief Court and held that Section 223-A
would only become law after the signatures of the Governor General under the Indian
Independence Act of 1947 (the first interim Constitution of Pakistan) which required the assent
of the Governor General to all legislation made by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The
full bench of the Federal Court headed by the CJ Muhammad Munir consisted of Justice A.S.M.
Akram, Justice A.R. Cornelius, Justice Mohammad Sharif and Justice S.A. Rehman. Justice A.R.
Cornelius wrote a dissenting note. The Federal Court of Pakistan held that the Chief Court had
no jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus under Section 223-A which was yet to be signed by
the Governor General to become a law (Federation of Pakistan v. Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan,
PLD 1955 FC 240). That said, Justice A.R. Cornelius wrote a dissenting opinion that defined the
Constituent Assembly as a superior body that had the power to make or amend laws, as well as
write a Constitution without the assent of the governor General (Dawood, 1994, p. 14).
Validation of the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly by this verdict set a
precedent for judicial support of the unconstitutional actions of future military juntas. The
judiciary emerged from this episode a weaker institution, which could not become a bulwark
against the unconstitutional actions of the military rulers and the civilian presidents who acted on
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behalf of military generals and dismissed elected governments and dissolved the elected
legislatures.
Usif Patel v. The Crown, PLD 1955 FC 387
The Usif Patel case challenged the Sindh Control of Goondas Act, XXVIII of 1952,
passed by the Governor of Sindh Province based on an authorization issued by the Governor
General of Pakistan (Wolf-Philips, 1980. pp. 5-8). Initially, the District Magistrate of Larkana
had declared Usif Patel and two others as the Goondas (Wicked Persons, extortionists) as per the
Sind Control of Goondas Act. They filed a case before the Chief Court of Sind in order to
declare their detention illegal. They also requested the court for the issuance of the writ of the
habeas corpus as per Section 491 of the Criminal procedure Code, 1898. The Chief Court of Sind
dismissed their petition and declared their detention legal. The Chief Court Sind also rejected the
appellants’ appeal to declare the proclamation of the Governor General ultra vires or illegal per
Section 92-A of the Government of the India Act by an order/proclamation of the Governor
General under Section 9 of the Independence Act. The Constituent Assembly by this Section 9 of
the Indian Independence Act had authorized the Governor General of Pakistan to empower the
Governor of a province to make laws for that province. Thus, the Governor of Sind had passed
the said Act by virtue of such power. The aggrieved party, Usif Patel and others appealed before
the Federal Court of Pakistan (Khan, 2016, pp. 43-45).
The major question before the Federal Court was whether the alteration/extension in the
adoption date from 31 st March 1948 to 31st March 1949 by the Constituent Assembly without the
assent of the Governor General was legal. The Federal Court had already decided in the
Federation of Pakistan v. Maulvi Tameez-ud-Din case that the law passed by the Constituent
Assembly without the assent of the Governor General was unconstitutional. The Federal Court in

68

the Usif Patel case also upheld the previous reasoning that no law could be passed without the
assent of the Governor General. The Federal Court of Pakistan upheld the appeal of appellants
and the detainees were freed (Khan, 2016, pp. 43-45).
The Federal Court also recommended that in these circumstances the Government should
work to establish a new representative body or legislature in order to make valid laws. According
to the Federal Court, neither the Governor General alone through Emergency Powers Act or
through an Ordinance nor the Constituent Assembly alone could make laws, but that the
representative body, i.e., the legislature, with the assent of the Governor General could (WolfPhilips, 1980. pp. 6-8). This ruling established the supremacy of Federal Court over both the
Governor General and the elected legislature and it ordered the Government to work on the
calling of a new elected representative assembly to make the new Constitution of the country.
Courts under the First Military Regime: Ayub Khan Era 1958-1969
On October 7, 1958, the President of Pakistan, Iskandar Mirza, imposed the first
nationwide period of martial law in Pakistan. The president in his proclamation abrogated the
first Constitution of 1956. He dismissed the central and provincial governments. He also
dissolved the National Assembly and the provincial Assemblies of East and West Pakistan
(Long, 2015, p. 489). General Muhammad Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, was made the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and later Prime Minister, a
move that eventually led to a power struggle between the President and the new PM. Finally, on
October 27, 1958 General Khan ousted President Mirza and declared himself the President of
Pakistan, exiling Mirza to the United Kingdom (Khan, 2016, pp 62-65).
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State v. Dosso, PLD 1958 SC 533
The Council of Elders convicted appellants Dosso and others under Section 11 of the
Federal Crimes Regulation, Act III of 1901. Dosso case is also another example of a hindrance in
the independence of judiciary in the judicial history of Pakistan. The appellants filed
constitutional petitions under Section 170 of the Constitution of 1956 at the West Pakistan High
Court. The West Pakistan High Court declared Federal Crimes Regulation, Act III of 1901
contradictory to the fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Article 5 of the Constitution of 1956
and gave relief to Dosso and the others. These orders of the High Court were then challenged in
the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court on
the same analogy applied in previous two cases, the Tamezuddin and Patel cases, upholding once
again the Doctrine of Necessity (Wolf-Philips, 1980. pp. 11-14).
CJ Muhammad Munir wrote in his decision that after the successful coup d’état, which
the Court called a “revolution,” Article 5 of the Constitution of 1956 had already disappeared
from the new legal order, however, the Court held that the Federal Crimes Regulation Order of
1901 was still a valid law by virtue of the Continuance in Force Order 1958 issued by the new
regime. According to Justice Munir, a successful “revolution” could validly change the
Constitution. He further stated that a successful revolution passes the test of its efficacy and the
order of the successful regime becomes the valid and the basic law of the land. The Supreme
Court of Pakistan headed by CJ Munir upheld once again the ‘Doctrine of Necessity’ first
established in Maulvi Tameezuddin Case in 1954 (Wolf-Philips, 1980. pp. 12-13).
Courts under the Second Military Regime: Yahya Khan Era 1969-1971
In late 1960s, there were mass protests against the military regime of General Ayub
Khan. All opposition parties, after the failed negotiations with the Ayub administration, started a
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political movement to topple the government. On March 25, 1969, General Ayub Khan provided
this opportunity himself when he transferred his reins of powers to the Army Chief General
Yahya Khan. Yahya Khan took the control of the Government of Pakistan as the second martial
law administrator and later assumed the office of the President of Pakistan (Khan, 2009, pp. 274283).
Yahya Khan abrogated the Constitution of 1962 and declared martial law in the country.
He issued an interim constitutional order, the Legal Framework Order (LFO), to run the affairs
of State. He organized the general elections in which the Awami League of East Pakistan, led by
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, won 160 out of the total 300 seats in the National Assembly. Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) secured the second position with 81 seats in the
legislature. Both political leaders failed to compromise on any political solution and Yahya Khan
decided against handing over power to Shiekh Mujibur Rehman. There were protests on a large
scale in the eastern Bengal province of the country and Yahya Khan launched military action
against the supporters of the Awami League. India took advantage of the opportunity to
intervene in East Pakistan and the third War between India and Pakistan started. On December
16, 1971, the Pakistan Army had to surrender and Shiekh Mujibur Rehman declared the
independence of the East Bengal and Bangladesh emerged as an independent country (Neudorf,
2017, p. 161). Under General Yaha Khan’s rule in 1970, there was no Constitution in the country
but an interim arrangement called the Legal Framework Order (LFO) issued by him to govern.
Thus, the courts became subservient to the military ruler and failed to perform their role freely or
independently.
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Asma Jilani v. Government of the Punjab, PLD 1972 SC 139
On December 22, 1971, the government arrested Malik Ghulam Jilani, Altaf Gauhar and
others for political reasons in order to punish the opposition. Asma Jilani, daughter of Jilani, and
Zarina Gauhar, wife of Gauhar, challenged these arrests in the Lahore High Court through a writ
petition. The Court admitted the petition and notices were issued to the Government of the
Punjab. On December 29, 1971, a day before their appearance in the Court, the Government
rescinded the previous order of arrest and substituted another issued under Martial Law. The
Government raised the initial objection that the Lahore High Court had no jurisdiction by virtue
of the provisions of clause 2 of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order, 1969
promulgated by the CMLA. The Lahore High Court accepted the plea relying on the State v.
Dosso PLD 1958 SC 533 and held that the Jurisdiction of Courts Order was valid and binding.
Thus, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the petition (Khan, 2016, pp. 143144).
The petitioners appealed in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the Doctrine
of Necessity and declared both orders of detention void and illegal and set the detainees free. The
Supreme Court ruled that “this country was not a foreign country invaded by an army headed by
General Yahya Khan, nor was it an alien territory which had been conquered by said army.”
Therefore, martial law was never superior to the Constitution. The Supreme Court further held
that General Yahya Khan was neither a victor nor was Pakistan occupied territory. The Court
also declared him a “usurper” and held his actions illegal (Wolf-Philips, 1980, 17-20).
The interesting fact about this case is that when the judgment was released Yahya Khan
was not in power. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s political party the Pakistan People’s Party was in power
in the Western part of the country after the separation of East Pakistan from the mainland due to
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the insurgency and war with India in 1971. After this war, Bhutto assumed the office of first
civilian Martial Law Administrator and later became President and then Prime Minister of
Pakistan. Still, the Court’s decision was an effort to reestablish judicial independence and rein in
the military government.
Courts under Second Civilian Rule: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Era 1971-1977
Under the civilian administration of Prime Minister Ali Bhutto, Pakistan adopted its third
constitution. Article 232 of the Constitution guaranteed the fundamental right of the people and
set up the courts as the guarantor of those rights. The civil administration framed the Defense of
Pakistan Rules, which declared an emergency in the country and curtailed the powers of the
ordinary courts. Special courts and tribunals were established for the trial of political opponents,
bypassing the courts and their powers to grant relief to those charged (Marri, 1990, pp. 54-55).
The civilian regime introduced the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, intent on
curtailing the power of the High Courts. The courts were denied the power to grant bail to the
detained, to issue stays of recovery or to offer assessment and the collection of public revenues
were also removed. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution was designed to force the
retirement of those judges of the superior courts who were not supportive of the Bhutto regime
by introducing an upper-age limit for the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court and High Courts.
Article 204 of the Constitution relating to the judiciary’s powers to punish contempt of court
cases was also curtailed. After this amendment, the judges of the High Courts could be
transferred without their consent or the consent of the Chief Justices of the affected courts. As an
immediate consequence, the chief justices of the two High Courts, the Lahore High Court and
the Peshawar High Court, were forced to resign due to the change in the retirement age (Khan,
2016, pp. 164-166).
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Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of the Army Staff, PLD 1977 SC 657
In 1977, Prime Minister Ali Bhutto announced early general elections hoping that his
PPP would win the majority of the electorate. General elections were held on March 7, 1977 and
the Pakistan People’s Party, the ruling party won the majority in the National Assembly by
getting 155 seats out of total 200 seats. The opposition party, the Pakistan National Alliance
(PNA) secured only 36 seats. The opposition parties refused to accept the election results and
called the elections flawed and rigged (Marri, 1990, pp. 53-54).
The opposition parties not only refused to accept the results of this election, but launched
a mass movement against the Bhutto regime. People came out in large numbers and made it
difficult for the security agencies and the police to control the situation in the country. The civil
government of the PPP called the military in to assist the civilian institutions in order to restore
peace in the country. The government arrested the major leaders of the opposition parties and
launched a massive crackdown on the opposition but failed to curb the protest. Many people died
in clashes with law enforcement and the military. Finally, the military refused to obey the orders
of the civilian rulers and military chief General Zia-Ul-Haq imposed martial law in the country
and took over control of all civilian institutions. He deposed Prime Minister Ali Bhutto and put
him under house arrest at Adyala. Chief Martial Administrator (CMLA) General Zia then
dissolved the National Assembly of Pakistan and all Provincial Assemblies as well. The
Governors of the provinces dismissed the provincial heads of governments. General Zia in his
speech to the nation mentioned the reasons for his takeover and promised to hand over control of
the country within three months of fair and free elections. General Zia-Ul-Haq did not abrogate
the Constitution of 1973, but on the advice of A.K. Brohi held the Constitution in abeyance
(Khan, 2009, pp. 437-438).
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Begum Nusrat Bhutto, wife of deposed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto filed a
petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan under Article 184 (3) of the Constitution of 1973
challenging the Martial Law Order N0.12, 1977 contending that the Chief of Army Staff had no
legal authority to impose martial Law, promulgate the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, and
Martial Law Order of July 5, 1977, and the illegal detention of PPP leaders including her
husband. Her appeal argued that this intervention by the Army Chief amounted to high treason as
stipulated in the Article 6 of the Constitution of 1973 (Wolf-Phillips, 1980, p.22).
Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar, counsel for the PPP, pleaded the case by relying heavily on Asma
Jillani’s case. He contended that the Army Chief had no lawful authority to depose the elected
Prime Minister and the elected Assemblies in the country. He pleaded that the act of the Army
Chief was illegal and required the Superior Judiciary to redress the case under the Article 184 (3)
giving the powers to the Court to enforce fundamental rights after ensuring that issues of public
importance was involved (Wolf-Phillips, 1980, p.23).
On the other hand, Mr. A.K. Brohi, counsel for the Federation of Pakistan, argued that
before the imposition of martial law, the country was run by the Constitution of 1973, which was
held in abeyance, and the new military regime enforced a new legal order which got its validity
from the proclamations of the CMLA and the Continuance in Force Order. This change was not
through the suspended constitution, but it constituted a meta-legal or extra-constitutional fact
based on the doctrine of “revolutionary legality.” Now courts were working under the new legal
order issued by the new military regime after a successful revolution or coup d’état (Zafar, 2019,
p. 268).
The Attorney General of Pakistan, Mr. Sharif-ud-Din Peerzada, appeared before the court
as a Law Officer and he supported the argument that martial law did not amount to a usurpation
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of power by the Chief of Army Staff. According to him, the military intended to oust the Prime
Minister because he was a usurper who had illegally occupied the office again as a result of
massive rigging in the 1977 elections (Khan, 2016, pp185-186).
The Supreme Court established the principle that a successful revolution satisfies itself
the test of efficacy and becomes a basic law. On November 10, 1977, the Supreme Court of
Pakistan decided unanimously (9 Judges heard the case) that the extra-constitutional step taken
by the Army Chief was justified by the requirements of “state necessity” and the “welfare of the
people.” Therefore, according to the Court, the ousting of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
from office was valid and lawful. The appeal to release Bhutto and other PPP leaders was also
dismissed as incompetent (Wolf-Phillips, 1980, pp. 27-28).
Eighth Amendment, Article 58 (2) (B)
General Muhammad Zia Ul Haq promised to hold elections within ninety days of the
coup d’état and he also argued to the courts that the major purpose behind the coup was to hold
free and fair elections in the country in order to hand over the government over to democratically
elected representatives of the people. In fact, he did not fulfill his promise to the nation to hold
elections within 90 days and prolonged his rule indefinitely. The opposition parties under the
umbrella of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) launched a mass movement
against the military regime. Though the MRD movement was not successful, it did build pressure
on the military junta to hold elections in the country as they had promised to the nation.
For the first time in the political history of Pakistan, non-party elections were held in
1985. There were two major factions in the Assembly, one of them became a political party
named the Pakistan Muslim League with the support of the President General Zia Ul Haq, who
was still in military uniform. There was also a sizeable alliance of opposition parties in the
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National Assembly. The ruling party of Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Jonejo, handpicked
Prime Minister of General Zia and the opposition parties agreed to amend the Constitution
through the Eighth Amendment which gave powers to the president under Article 58 (2) (b) to
dismiss the elected government along with the powers to dissolve the National Assembly. In
return, the President of Pakistan who was still the Army Chief of the Armed Forces agreed to
resign as the Army Chief, but vowed to remain as a civilian President of Pakistan. Because of
this deal between the ruling party and the opposition, the president had acquired the powers to
dismiss the government and dissolve the legislative body.
A voluminous literature deals with court cases of superior courts in Pakistan where the
courts upheld the actions of the military rulers, in particular, after the adoption of the Eight
Amendment. The political and judicial history of Pakistan revolved around those landmark cases
where presidents dismissed elected prime ministers and dissolved elected assemblies and the
superior courts had to decide whether or not the President used constitutional power fairly and
properly under the law. After the cases involving the principle of the Doctrine of Necessity, the
courts had to compromise with presidents having the support of the military establishment. These
two major political and judicial issues were the hallmarks of judicial independence in the country
other than the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) through suo moto powers of the Superior Judiciary
or later the Contempt of court cases after the Lawyers’ Movement (Khan, 2016; Kalhan, 2013;
Jaffrelot, 2015; Long, 2015; Maluka, 1995; Newberg, 1995; Shah, 2014; Zafar, 2019).
As far as the suo moto powers of the Supreme Court are concerned, Article 184 (3) of the
Constitution of Pakistan entrust powers to the Supreme Court of Pakistan in order to protect the
fundamental rights of the people of Pakistan. It is stated in this Article:
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199, the Supreme Court shall, if it
considers that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any
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of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II is involved, have the power
to make an order of the nature mentioned in the said article.
Muhammad Saifullah Khan v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1990 SC 79
In May 1988, General Zia Ul Haq, issued proclamation orders dismissing the Prime
Minister, his cabinet, dissolving the National Assembly, and all provincial governments and
assemblies. These orders were challenged in the Lahore High Court and later appealed in the
Supreme Court. The full bench of the Lahore High Court declared the orders unsustainable,
however, it refused to restore the governments and assemblies due to the announcement of fresh
elections in the country.
The decision of the Lahore High Court was challenged in the Supreme Court in the case
Federation of Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad Saifullah Khan. The Supreme Court held that the
discretionary powers of the President after the 8 th Amendment under Article 58 (2) (b) were not
absolute and were subject to the circumstances or conditions mentioned in the Constitution. The
Supreme Court held that it had the jurisdiction to declare such orders of the President
unconstitutional if they were not exercised in consonance with the purpose of the law that
conferred these powers. Thus, the Supreme Court declared the dissolution of the National
Assembly by General Zia ul Haq as invalid and illegal.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Lahore High Court that the action of the
President was unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court denied the relief of restoring the
deposed regime along with dissolved assemblies due to the reason that the general elections had
already been announced and the nation was ready to vote for a new government and assemblies.
While a seeming exercise in judicial independence, the decision came a year after the dictator’s
death and proved the court was not above taking advantage of such events to reclaim its authority
(Khan, 2016, pp, 249-251).
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Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif Eras 1988-1999
There were four general elections in Pakistan from November 1988 to October 1999. The
Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto won in November 1988, and again in October
1993. The Pakistan Muslim League (N) won the general elections of October 1990 and of
February 1997. The two civilian regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were marked by
two major issues, first, the feud between the Prime Ministers and the head of State, i.e., the
President. Second was the tussle between the executive and the judiciary, to be more precise
between the Prime Minister and the CJ of the Supreme Court of Pakistan over the appointment of
the justices in the Superior Courts. Similarly, another tug of war occurred between the ruling
party and the opposition. There were conflicts between the Prime Ministers and the Presidents,
and sometimes with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court over political and legal issues. The
military establishment had to side either with the government, i.e., the Prime Minister or the
President or the CJ. Both Ms. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif as Prime Ministers developed
tensions with their Presidents and the CJ of the Supreme Court, who was then Syed Sajjad Ali
Shah. During Nawaz Sharif period, in one incident, the CJ of Pakistan had to leave his chair
along with other justices due to a mob assault on the Supreme Court building. Both Prime
Ministers developed conflicts with the CJ on the appointment of the justices of the Superior
Judiciary. According to the CJ Sajjad Ali Shah, both Prime Ministers insisted on the appointment
of their favorites as judges at the High Courts and the Supreme Court. Before 18 th Amendment
to the Constitution, the appointment of the justices of the Superior Judiciary was the prerogative
of the executive with the consultation of their respective Chief Justices.
The major reason of the tension between prime ministers and presidents was over Article
58 (2) (b), the President’s constitutional right to dismiss the Prime Minister and to dissolve the
elected Assemblies. Article 58 (2) (b) was considered as a safety valve to avoid direct a military
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coup, allowing the military establishment, with the support of the president, to get rid of the
civilian governments. During their tenures each president used this right, forcing superior courts
to decide the cases either in favor of the deposed prime ministers and their governments or the
presidents who acted with the ostensible support of the military establishment. These cases are
the examples of the pressures on the superior courts, even during the civilian regimes (see Khan,
2009, 2016; Long, 2015; Samdani, 2004; Talbot, 2009; Waseem, 2012; Zafar, 2019).
Ahmad Tariq Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1991 SC 78
On August 6, 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the first government of
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and dissolved the National Assembly. The 8 th Amendment of the
Constitution of 1973 empowered the president with the powers of dismissal of federal
government along with the federal legislature, the National Assembly, if he considered that the
functioning of the governments cannot be carried out in accordance with the Constitution. The
President stated the reasons of the dismissal of the government and the dissolution of the
National Assembly in his Proclamation Orders as follows:
The President having considered the situation in the country, the events that have taken
place and the circumstance, and among others for the reasons mentioned below is of the
opinion that government of the federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution, and an appeal to the electorate is necessary…therefore I,
Ghulam Ishaq Khan, President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan in exercise of the powers
conferred on me by clause (2) (b) of Article 58 of the Constitution of 1973 of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan dissolve the National Assembly with immediate effect; and the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall cease to hold office forthwith.
The orders of the dissolution of the National Assembly and the dismissal of the Prime
Minster were challenged in two High Courts, the Lahore High Court, and the Sindh High Court.
Both High Courts upheld the orders of dismissal. The decision of the Lahore High Court was
appealed in the Supreme Court, which found that despite the fact that the President of Pakistan
warned the federal government that the disputes between the federal government and the
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provinces were immense in nature and could threaten the very existence of country as a
federation if not resolved properly, the federal government failed to act. The Court observed that
despite the intercession of the head of state, the constitutional obligations were not discharged
and the actions of the president were constitutional. The decision was a clear indication that the
superior courts were making compromises on their independence (Khan, 2009, pp 255-257).
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1993 SC 473
There was little surprise when the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attempted to amend the
powers of the president to dismiss prime ministers and dissolve Parliaments in 1993. President
Ishaq Khan called such powers a safety valve between the military takeover and democracy,
while Sharif, in a televised speech to the nation, called for their repeal and refused to take
direction from the president or from any other source. The day following this speech, President
Khan dismissed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his cabinet and dissolved the National
Assembly.
The Speaker of National Assembly, Gohar Ayub Khan, challenged the dissolution orders
in Lahore High Court. The next day, deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif appealed directly to
the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, suggesting the presidential actions
violated the fundamental rights of the people to select their government. For the first time in the
judicial and political history of Pakistan, the Supreme Court restored the deposed Prime Minster,
the Cabinet and the National Assembly. However, this historic decision was short-lived as the
Prime Minister was forced to resign and dissolve the National Assembly when General Waheed
Kakar, the Army Chief of Staff, forced both the President and Prime Minister to resign, with the
proviso that General Kakar himself would not seek reappointment as the Army Chief of Staff
(Khan, 2016, pp. 299-300).
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Benazir Bhutto v. President of Pakistan, PLD 1992 SC 59
After the resignation of Sharif, the regime of the Pakistan Muslim League came to an end
and the caretaker government announced plans for elections in three months. After the elections
in 1993, Benazir Bhutto came into power and her PPP won the majority with 86 seats in the
National Assembly. Benazir Bhutto, with the help of her allies, became the Prime Minister of
Pakistan for the second time in history and her party came into power for the fourth time. The
differences between the President and Prime Minister quickly resumed. The President of
Pakistan, Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari, while a stalwart of the Pakistan People’s Party and a
close friend of Prime Minister Bhutto, had differences with her on many issues, including the
appointment of judges to the superior judiciary. The Prime Minster was also in conflict with the
CJ of Pakistan over the appointment of judges to the High Courts and the Supreme Court. Both
the President and CJ Sajjad Ali Shah joined hands in support of the military establishment and
decided to get rid of the Bhutto regime.
President Farooq Leghari dismissed Prime Minister Bhutto and her Cabinet and dissolved
of the National Assembly on November 5, 1996. He appointed a former Speaker of the National
Assembly as caretaker Prime Minister of Pakistan. President Farooq Leghari explained his
actions this way:
Whereas during the last three years, thousands of persons in Karachi and other parts of
Pakistan have been deprived of their right to life in violation of Article 9 of the
Constitution. They have been killed in police encounters and in police custody. In the
speech to the Parliament on 29 October, 1995, the President warned that the law
enforcement agencies must ensure that there is no harassment of innocent citizens in the
fight against terrorism and that human and legal rights of all persons are dully protected.
This advice was not heeded. The killings continued unabated.
Apart from the extra-judicial killings, the President framed a charge sheet against the
regime which including widespread corruption and undermining the independence of the
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judiciary by violating the Article 2 A and 190 of the Constitution of 1973. The former Speaker of
the Assembly filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court, as did the Prime Minister. The Supreme
Court rejected both appeals (6-1) and upheld the orders of the President as constitutional (Khan,
2009, pp. 613-615). In the case of the Bhutto regime, it appeared the court had learned to settle
for quasi-independence, allying itself with the President and the military.
Courts Under the Fourth Military Regime: General Pervez Musharraf Era 1999-2006
The Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf imposed Martial Law in the country on
October 12, 1999. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was arrested, and the National Assembly and all
four Provincial legislatures were dissolved. The Army Chief installed himself as the Chief
Executive, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and later as the President of the country by
issuing the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) and suspending the Constitution of 1973.
There were already differences between Musharraf and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif over
Pakistan’s military adventure with India in the Kargil War. The manner of removal of the Army
Chief by Sharif, while he was in plane returning from his official visit with Sri Lanka, further
escalated the feud between them. The military top brass considered the removal of their Chief as
an insult and refused to accept the new Army Chief, General Ziauddin Butt, then Director
General of the ISI. The Commanders of the armed forces decided to defend their chief and
launched a coup d’état against the Sharif regime (Amin, 2015; Kazimi, 2009; Khan, 2009; Long,
2015; Musharraf, 2006; Waseem, 2012; Zafar, 2019).
Zafar Ali Shah v. General Pervez Musharraf, PLD 2000 SC 869
Deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his other party leaders challenged the actions
of the Army Chief and his Proclamation of Emergency Order of October 14, 1999, and PCO No.
1 of 1999 in the Supreme Court. The petitioners argued the Army Chief had no lawful powers to
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dismiss the government or the elected assemblies. The twelve-member bench, headed by CJ
Irshad Hassan Khan, rejected the petition and upheld the doctrine of state necessity. They argued
in their opinion that the Army Chief had the power to amend the Constitution as he deemed fit,
thereby giving him powers that even the Supreme Court did not possess (Khan, 2016, pp 421423). Acting under the powers given to him by the Supreme Court, Musharraf sought a new oath
of office from the judges of the Superior Courts. Most of the judges took the oath on the PCO
and retained their positions in the judiciary. In the Zafar Ali Shah case, the Supreme Court had
also granted three years to Musharraf to hold new elections and for the restoration of the
Constitution and, in turn, Musharraf gave three-year extensions of service to the incumbent
judges.
Conclusion
Since the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the judiciary has played an inconsistent role
in the political development of the country. It earned an image as a stooge of the ruling regime,
particularly under military juntas. Through their decisions, the courts gave legitimacy and
validation to the military rulers when they abrogated and suspended the Constitution, preserving
the laws that safeguarded these leaders’ political control and undercut their own authority. These
courts also helped the military to curb the powers of elected officials and political parties. As a
result, the courts lost the respect of the general public and the legal community itself, further
eroding important bases of judicial independence. Pakistan has experienced four military
governments in her political history since gaining independence. The military has amended the
Constitution to prolong their rule and to curb political freedoms. One amendment has paramount
importance for the political and judicial history of Pakistan. Article 58 (2) (b) gave the President
of Pakistan powers to dismiss the Prime Minster and his Cabinet and to dissolve the National
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Assembly of Pakistan. This provision gave the military, even when it was not in direct control,
the ability to intervene and interfere with the affairs of the executive branch, often with the
collaboration of the judiciary. After the adoption of the 8 th Amendment in the Constitution,
different Presidents dismissed four civilian rulers and elected Assemblies. The superior courts
sanctioned the legitimacy and validity to these actions of the presidents, and as result, the courts
themselves were weakened. The judges were parties to the diminishment of their own judicial
independence.
Military takeovers are not the only cause of the failure of the judiciary to realize the
independence seemingly granted it in the Constitution. Constitutional amendments like the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments introduced by former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
also worked to reduce the powers of the judiciary. Both military and civilian leaders played a
similar role in undermining the institution of the judiciary. In addition to the military and
politicians, a former Justice of the Lahore High Court candidly blamed the judges themselves for
the deterioration of judicial independence. According to him, judges take an oath to defend the
Constitution but too often violate that promise when they make compromises with rulers to
protect their perks and positions, becoming victims of fear and favor.
In most cases, the courts in Pakistan played the upstream role of the agent of military
rulers and their anti-democratic actions through their verdicts supporting coups. There was very
little evidence the second role, that of courts as downstream guarantors where they preferred
democratic norms over the justice or truth in order to strengthens democracy through the burial
of the past dictatorial actions. Similarly, the courts’ role in the consolidation of democracy by
supporting the transitional democratic regimes has also been insignificant in Pakistan. The
superior courts did not support democratic forces when these forces won the battle against the
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military rulers. The civilian democratic regimes faced difficulties caused by the courts because
the judiciary was closely aligned with the military. The major roles of courts in Pakistan have
been to provide maximum support to the old guard as an agent of the past and less support to the
democratic forces that challenged the status quo.
There has been a consistency in the legal system of Pakistan, from the palace Court of
Rajas and Maha Rajas through the arrival of the Muslim rulers, India (and by extension Pakistan)
had a judicial structure comprising both individuals and institutions. The modern judicial system
introduced by the British simply added additional layers to this pre-existing system, along with
the adoption of a parliamentary form of government, which introduced yet another institutional
basis of power. Pakistan inherited its legal tradition from the United Kingdom, but with some
major differences, such as a written constitution. Unlike, the British parliamentary supremacy
principle, where the courts could not strike down an Act of the Parliament, the courts in
Pakistan—at least in theory—were granted the power of judicial review.
As far as the de jure independence of the courts is concerned, the judiciary was fully
authorized by constitutional provisions to exercise their right to judicial review and intervene to
stop the excesses of the executive and legislative branches of the government. The courts
enjoyed full textual or legal support from the written constitution. However, as far de facto
independence is concerned, there have been a constant set of challenges as mentioned above that
regularly challenged the independence of the courts and their role in Pakistan.
As far as the status of judicial independence before the Lawyers’ Movement goes, it was
infrequent and regularly eroded via military interventions. During most of their history, the
Pakistan courts upheld “state necessity” and supported military interventions in the political
system. When the courts had to choose between democratic freedom and state solidarity, they
sided with state solidarity over democracy and judicial independence. As I discuss in the next
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two chapters, the courts changed their posture as a result of the historic Lawyers’ Movement of
2007-2009.
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Chapter 5
The Lawyers’ Movement: Origins and Development
Introduction
This chapter presents a case study of a social movement in Pakistan that sought to restore
independence to the nation’s courts and restore deposed judges, but this movement unleashed far
more, it toppled a military dictator and fundamentally transformed the Pakistani polity. Relying
on my interview data and other sources, I introduce the reader to the Lawyers’ Movement (LM)
and show how it grew from a spontaneous resistance to the military regime’s assault on the
independence of the courts of Pakistan to a nationwide movement that sought to topple the
dictatorship, establish the rule of law and respect for individual rights, and ultimately restore
democracy. My case study of the Lawyers’ Movement builds on and adds to the literature on the
impact of social movements and cause lawyering. Large parts of the Pakistani legal community
and bench risked their professional careers to take a firm stand for the principles of judicial
independence and the rule of law. Despite the fact that many lawyers’ incomes were wholly
dependent on their daily appearances before the courts, they boycotted them. They continued
their struggle for over two years without any means of income, taking their fight to the streets,
while facing brutal treatment by the police, all to restore the lost respect of the courts. This type
of wide-scale professional resistance was and is unprecedented in the world. The legal
community in Pakistan, with the support of a vibrant civil society, fought valiantly and
succeeded in restoring the basic human legal rights in the form of a free judiciary and the rule of
law.
This chapter examines the evolution of the LM, arguing it was an outgrowth of public
resentment towards the military junta and its use of police brutality to maintain power. This
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chapter also highlights the role of the modern media, political parties, groups in civil society
such as students, teachers, doctors, engineers, and the pressure brought by other governments
and non-governmental institutions that contributed to the success of the Lawyers’ Movement.
This chapter will focus on the legal, constitutional, political, and social background of the
members of the LM, arguing that their political entrepreneurship led to the mobilization of the
legal profession in resistance to the military junta. As such, it poses and answers several
questions: What were the major goals of the participants? How were they able to mobilize the
material and finances for this movement? How did they make strategic and tactical decisions?
What have they achieved? In this chapter, I examine how the leadership viewed or perceived
judicial independence and whether they thought they were capable of transforming the nation’s
courts.
The Lawyers’ Movement: A Prelude
Pakistan’s fourth military leader, General Pervez Musharraf, wore four caps at once:
Chief of the Army Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief Executive, and President of
Pakistan. As the latter, he created his own political party (the Pakistan Muslim League (Q), made
up of handpicked politicians which ruled the country without any resistance from the opposition.
However, March 9, 2007 proved to be turning point, or a focusing event, in the political and
judicial history of Pakistan. Scheduled in late 2007, a case was pending in the Supreme Court
regarding the constitutional propriety of President Musharraf’s election for his second term as a
president in uniform. There was speculation that the Supreme Court might disqualify him for the
ballot. In response, Musharraf suspended Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary along
with 64 other judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. In addition, on the orders of
General Musharraf, the removed justices and judges, along with their families, were placed under

89

house arrest (Ahmed, 2012; Ahmed & Stephan, 2010; Amin, 2015; Anwar, 2009; Faqir, et al.,
2013).
In response, and under the leadership of the deposed CJ Chaudhary, bar associations,
lawyers, and civil society groups launched a unique and unprecedented movement against the
military regime. This movement started with large public protests and marches, boycotts of the
courts, and massive rallies all over the country; collectively, these actions became known as the
Lawyers’ Movement (LM). The LM continued for twenty-four months, eventually forcing
General Musharraf to resign. The new civilian government that replaced him restored the
deposed judges, including CJ Chaudhary, to the bench. The LM awakened, mobilized, and
unified the people of Pakistan to demand an independent and free judiciary (Harvard Law School
Report, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2007; Kareem, 2009; Malik, 2008; Sheikh, 2009).
The LM was multi-dimensional. It was a protest against the oppressive military regime of
General Musharraf. It was also a sign of growing political awareness among the people regarding
the political rights of the citizens in a democracy. As it matured, the LM turned into a social
movement, mobilizing the public to pursue their rights, in particular, their legal, political, and
constitutional rights. In addition, the movement, its leaders, and participants worked to establish
a free judiciary, the rule of law, and democracy in Pakistan (Ghias, 2010; Hassan, 2009; Kareem,
2009; Human Rights Watch, 2007).
In this case study, I will discuss the origins of the movement, its progenitors, leadership,
political entrepreneurship, the activities of the movement, and the mobilization of lawyers and
their professional organizations in support of the LM. In addition, I will examine to what degree
the leadership of this movement focused on judicial independence (JI) and why they thought that
their movement could change the judicial environment to the one that is conducive to an
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independent judiciary and the rule of law. Finally, I will analyze how successful the LM was in
bringing about these changes.
The Road to the Lawyers’ Movement
Ghias (2010) describes the development of the LM from June 30, 2005 forward when
Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Pakistan. Chaudhary initiated public interest litigation from the bench by expanding or stretching
the Supreme Court’s powers under the article 184 (3) of the Constitution of 1973.CJ Chaudhary
first foray into this activist realm was a reaction to the earthquake of October 8, 2005 in Pakistan,
when over 75,000 people died. The Court witnessed what it felt was a weak reaction by the
government to aid injured and displaced persons and took the opportunity to initiate Public
Interest Litigation (PIL) through suo moto provisions of the Constitution under Article 184 (3) to
force the government to provide disaster relief. The Supreme Court in two cases, Saad Mazhar v.
Capital Development Authority (2005), and Suo Moto Case No.3, 55 PLD SC 5 (2006) handed
down decisions against the executive branch, one against the Capital Development Authority
(CDA) Islamabad, and the other against the Lahore Development Authority (LDA), institutions
that were responsible for urban development. The Supreme Court also took suo moto actions
against commercial projects in major urban areas like Lahore and Karachi for the failure of
companies to provide for the construction of safe and reliable residential facilities for the people.
This was the beginning of media attention to Public Interest Litigation (PIL) and created high
hopes among the public regarding the role of the Court (Khan, 2009, 2016; Kokab, 2013; Malik,
2008; Traub, 2008; Waseem, 2012).
After these safety-related cases, the Supreme Court noticed the high rise in the prices of
sugar and oil, commodities that average citizens heavily depend upon. In both suo moto cases on

91

sugar and oil prices, corruption was the main cause and government policies failed to stop the
price hikes. In May 2006, the Supreme Court ordered the National Accountability Bureau
(NAB), an independent national investigation agency, to look into the matter. In addition, in the
sugar case, the Court fixed the sugar price per kilogram and gave relief to the common people
(Ghias, 2010, pp. 993-994).
In November 2006, the Chaudhary Court took notice of another important case, that of
“missing persons” or those who were kept in illegal detention by government agencies. In the
course of the War on Terror, the Musharraf regime started to arrest persons suspected of
terrorism to hand over to the United States. Many of these detainees were secretly held and
denied their legal right to appear before a court (Khan, 2008, p. 148). The Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan demanded the release of hundreds of people who were in the custody of
both civil and military intelligence agencies. The Supreme Court ordered government agencies
such as the Ministry of Interior and Defense to produce the “missing persons in the Court.” As a
result, these detainees became a bone of contention between Mushrraf’s military regime and the
judiciary (HLSR, 2010, p. 1711). As detailed in the previous chapter, the judicial history of
Pakistan was marked by the cooperation of the courts with military leaders in the name of “state
necessity” or “revolutionary legality.” By directly challenged Mushaaraf’s regime on several
fronts, the Supreme Court was clearly charting a new path.
The story of the LM actually began when the court ruled against several efforts by the
Mushaaraf regime to privatize several public enterprises (which would enrich the regime and its
allies). In Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2006 SC 697, the court declared the
privatization of the public steel corporation unconstitutional. This was the first time the court
struck down an act of the Musharraf regime (Ghias, 2010, pp. 994-995). Several other such
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efforts involving the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Limited (PTCL), Pakistan State
Oil (PSO), and Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (PSMS) engendered a public outcry. When the
government sold the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation to Citibank in 2005, where the
current PM worked prior to taking office, protests were widespread and vocal. When the
government agreed to sell the Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation to a consortium made up of the
Arif Habib Group of Companies, M/s Al-Tuwairqi Group of companies, and M/s Magnitogorsk
Iron and Steel Works, Russia, it was challenged in the Supreme Court. Alleging the lack of
transparency, corruption, illegality, and a dearth of reasonableness made the deal untenable, the
Court declared the agreement null and void (Faqir, et al., 2013; Ghias, 2010; Khan, 2009, 2016;
Kokab, 2013). The Court held the Prime Minister of Pakistan responsible for the violation of the
rules guiding such sales and privatization of public enterprises.
The decision did not sit well with Musharraf, who declared the “Chief Justice was
running a separate and independent government of his own” (Mintz, 2008, p. 2). According to
Zafar (2019), General Musharraf was also fearful because his first term as President was nearing
its end in the fall. He desired to be elected again, while still wearing the uniform of the Chief of
Staff, was threatened by an independent judiciary (p. 459).
A respondent, Senator 1, suggested that the:
Media has taken this issue so strongly that Supreme Court of Pakistan decided to take up
the matter and look into the transparency and otherwise of the regularity of the
privatization process, and struck it down. Not only the Court struck it down, it also made
such observations about the Prime Minister that caused a furor in the Senate and the
National Assembly, leading to a bitter debate with demands of the trial of Prime Minister,
for making several errors of omission and commissions and causing huge losses to the
Exchequer. That certainly was very disheartening for the government. There was a kind
of talk how do the judges know what commerce is? How do they know what are the
financial requirements, and what financial policies are needed to resolve purely executive
matters of the Government. This is interference beyond their jurisdiction but still they
were only showing their annoyance. There were some complaints from lawyers and
judges from Peshawar which also reached President Musharraf.
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He further added that, “I cannot say about the truth or falsehood of those complaints.
However, the Prime Minister was gravely offended by the observations of the CJ which made
him [Prime Minister] file a reference against him [Chief Justice].”
On March 9, 2007, General Pervez Musharraf summoned CJ Chaudhary to his office and
offered him the opportunity to resign his post or face charges of corruption and misconduct;
Chaudhary refused the offer. The action was all the more unprecedented because it was
Musharraf in uniform who summoned the Chief Justice to his military camp office. Musharraf
grilled him in front of other military commanders, in effect suggesting the ruling threatened state
security. The Chief Justice rightly portrayed the manner of the incident in his petition terming it
as having ‘humiliated his person and his office’ and was tantamount to the “subversion of the
Supreme Court.” In his petition before the Supreme Court later, the Chief Justice explained what
happened at the camp office and wrote that President Musharraf looked ‘most upset’ when the
Chief Justice refused to resign and also refused Musharraf’s lucrative offer of employment if he
resigned (IBA Report, 2009; Kareem, 2009; Khan, 2009, 2016; Kokab, 2013).
The Chief Justice was immediately suspended, taken to his residence and kept under
house arrest by intelligence agents and the police. The Chief Justice and his family remained
under house arrest for several months. Their telephone lines were cut off, their mobile phones
confiscated and their official cars were removed by the police. The Chief Justice and his family,
including school age children, were cut off from the outside world, as was the entire residential
colony of judges. Musharraf appointed the second senior most Justice, Javed Iqbal, as the Acting
Chief Justice under the Article 180 of the Constitution. The senior most Justice of the Supreme
Court, Rana Bhagwan Das, was on temporary leave visiting India (Ghias, 2010; Hassan, 2009;
IBA Report, 2009; Kareem, 2009; Khan, 2009, 2016; Kokab, 2013).
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On March 13, 2007, the first day of the Supreme Judicial Council hearing of a reference
filed by General Musharraf, the suspended Chief Justice Chaudhary came out of his residence
and started walking towards the Supreme Judicial Council to appear for his case. He had already
filed a petition in the Supreme Court for a stay of the order against his unlawful suspension as
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In the process, the police manhandled the CJ and
forcefully pushed him into a police van to stop him from reaching the Supreme Court (Khan,
2016, p. 489).
On March 15, 2007, two days after the mistreatment of the CJ by the police, the
Musharraf government issued another order of “compulsory leave,” i.e., the forcible suspension
of Chaudhary as CJ with effect from March 9, 2007 to the date of the submission of the report of
the Supreme Judicial Council. The case or reference against CJ Chaudhary was filed in the
Supreme Judicial Council, a Constitutional forum to remove superior court judges from their
positions as judges. The President of Pakistan files such references/cases against the superior
court judges and the Supreme Judicial Council reports back to the President. The order of the
removal of a judge is then issued by the President of Pakistan. On April 18, 2007, suspended CJ
Chaudhary filed a petition in the Supreme Court against his suspension orders. There were
already a number of constitutional petitions in the Supreme Court by the Bar Councils on the
same matter. On May 7, 2007, the Supreme Court of Pakistan issued a stay order in favor of the
suspended CJ of Pakistan and stopped the Supreme Judicial Council from proceeding further
with the case until there was a decision by the full bench of the Supreme Court on the issue
(Faqir, et al., 2013; Ghias, 2010; Hassan, 2009; IBA Report, Kokab, 2013).
On July 20, 2007, the Supreme Court of Pakistan set aside the suspension orders of the
CJ. The Court declared the “compulsory leave” for judges unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
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declared both orders restraining Chaudhary from working as the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court unconstitutional. The Supreme Court also declared the appointment of the Acting CJ
unconstitutional. By a majority decision 10-3, the Supreme Court of Pakistan restored Justice
Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary as CJ of the Supreme Court. This decision was a blow to the
Musharraf regime and it further exposed the hypocrisy of his image as an apolitical figure in the
country. However, this was not an end to the conflict between the regime and the Court, rather it
was the beginning of a more protracted institutional conflict (Khan, 2016, p.493-494).
November 3 Emergency Plus/Mini Martial Law
General Pervez Musharraf announced his run for a second term while the Court was
hearing a case to determine if he was eligible to run while serving as Army Chief of Staff.
According to the Constitution, he could hold only one of these posts. There was a huge risk if he
stepped down as an Army Chief, in that he might not be elected as President. The two houses of
the Parliament, the National Assembly and the Senate, along with the four Provincial Assemblies
served as the Electoral College for the election of the President of Pakistan. There were a number
of constitutional petitions in the Supreme Court against the dual office law and there was also a
legal point that the outgoing assemblies could not elect an incoming president twice in their one
term in office. Only the new assemblies produced by fresh elections could serve as the valid
Electoral College for the election of the president (Ahmed, 2012; Faqir, et al., 2013; Ghias, 2010;
IBA Report, 2009; Khan, 2009, 2016; Kokab, 2013).
CJ Chaudhary recused himself from the bench and established a nine-member larger
Bench to hear the case. On September 28, 2007, by a majority of 6-3, the Supreme Court issued a
short order declaring the petitions not maintainable. On one hand, General Musharraf got relief
and qualified to run for the Presidency for his second term from the same assemblies who elected
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him five years ago. On the other hand, the Supreme Court on the same matter of the qualification
or disqualification for the presidential elections, ordered the Election Commission of Pakistan
not to announce the results of the presidential election until the final decision by the Supreme
Court on these petitions was released. On October 6, 2007, General Pervez Musharraf was
elected President of Pakistan by the outgoing assemblies that were packed with members of
Musharraf’s Pakistan Muslim League (Q).
An eleven-member bench of the Supreme Court, headed by Justice Javed Iqbal, heard the
case regarding whether the Army Chief of Staff could be President in violation of the
Constitution. It was expected that the Supreme Court would announce its verdict on these
petitions in the first week of November. Musharraf confirmed from his intelligence sources that
the Supreme Court would not allow him to contest elections in uniform, i.e., as the Chief of the
Army Staff. (Ahmed, 2012; Faqir, et al., 2013; Ghias, 2010; IBA Report, 2009; Khan, 2009,
2016; Kokab, 2013; Malik, 2008). On November 3, 2007, Musharraf proclaimed an emergency,
a new term for martial law. As Chief of the Army Staff, he issued three executive orders that
suspended the Constitution of 1973, imposed a state of Emergency, and removed more than 64
justices of the superior courts, including the CJ Chaudhary. Then Musharraf issued a
Proclamation of Emergency and Constitutional Order. The Constitution of 1973 was held in
abeyance. The Justices of the Supreme Court and High Courts were dismissed from their posts
and ordered to take a fresh oath on the PCO under the new law of Oath of Office (Judges) Order
2007. In order to resume their duties as judge of the Supreme Court or the High Courts, the judge
had to be invited by the government to take the oath of office. Many of the judges were
dismissed and were not invited to take oath on the PCO. Some of them refused to take the new
oath; only 32 out of 95 judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts did so. On November 3,
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2007, a seven-member Bench of the Supreme Court declared the Proclamation of Emergency
and Constitutional Order unconstitutional. However, the armed forces surrounded the compound
of the Supreme Court building and prevented this decision from being implemented (Ahmed,
2012; Faqir, et al., 2013; Ghias, 2010; IBA Report, 2009; Khan, 2009, 2016; Kokab, 2013;
Malik, 2008).
General Musharraf appointed Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar the new CJ of the Supreme
Court. Dogar supported the coup, ruling in Tikka Iqbal Muhammad Khan v. General Pervez
Musharraf that General Musharraf’s actions, including the Proclamation of Emergency and
Constitutional Order, were legal and constitutional. Meanwhile, lawyers, judges, bar councils,
political parties, civil society, students and teachers, doctors, engineers, and people from both the
print and electronic media formed a social movement, later dubbed the Lawyers’ Movement,
advocating for the restoration of an independent judiciary and the rule of law. They held massive
rallies, protests, and public meetings all over the country (IBA Report, 2009; Khan, 2009, 2016;
Kokab, 2013; Malik, 2008).
The Underlying Causes behind the Lawyers’ Movement
While the preceding documented the growing split between the military and the courts,
and perhaps just as important between General Musharraf and Chief Justice Chaudhary, one is
left to wonder why this period would prove so different from earlier times. Ostensibly, the CJ
took on the Public Interest Litigation cases because they were popular and a means of generating
important political support for an independent judiciary. However, Supreme Court lawyer Munir
A. Malik suggested rather than currying political support, the CJ “… was obsessed with speedily
reducing the backlog of cases and that it would be very difficult to reconcile his obsessions with
the demands of the bar that the lawyers must be given ample opportunity and time to present
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their case before the court of last resort” (Malik, 2008). Rather than a strategic political move,
taking on the public interest litigation was more a housekeeping measure according to this
respondent. As it turns out, the events that led to the ouster of the military were more
complicated than a simple case of judicial housekeeping. How they spiraled into a broad-based
movement for reform is the subject of the next section.
Resistance by the Chief Justice and the other Justices
The majority of my respondents agreed that the sacking of the CJ and other judges of the
Supreme Court and High Courts, 64 in all, sparked the Lawyers’ Movement. While it was not the
first time in the judicial history of Pakistan that a military dictator sacked judges of the superior
courts, it was the first time that the judges and their supporters resisted. According to my
respondents, the refusal of the CJ to accept his dismissal was the single most important factor
that triggered the legal community response against the military regime.
Respondent SL 1 argued:
The turning point was of course the 9th of March 2007, when the CJ was arrested and
detained for refusing to resign. Here was a man, the lawyers thought, who was standing
up to military dictator - a thing which had never happened in Pakistan. Nobody had ever
stood up to an Army Chief and looked straight into his eyes and said no to him.
SCT Judge 2 suggested that the refusal of the CJ to resign, along with the resentment
against the Musharraf regime, played a key role in shaping the movement:
…[t]he thing which initiated this movement was that despite pressure on the CJ of
Pakistan, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary refused to submit before the military regime.
Even the people didn't like Musharraf to remain in power.
HCT Judge 5, added:
But always laws are silent before the guns. But once the entire judiciary stood behind the
CJ of Pakistan, he became their symbol, and wielded the same powers which an Army
commander wields over his forces. Not only that, the entire media and people of the
Pakistan had showed their disgust against the military dictator’s action in crippling and
maiming the judiciary of the country. The entire country rose in revolt against the high-
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handedness of the army general who found nowhere to escape the wrath of the people.
Thus, in this crisis, people looked upon Iftikhar Mohammad Khan, CJ as their Messiah.
PS Professor 1, pointed to both lawyers and the media as instigators of the Movement.
It was basically lawyers who reacted the way President Musharraf treated the CJ and
media was able to show all what had happened to the CJ and therefore lawyers were the
first to react…Media played a very important role in their mobilization. In the past, media
was very small and was in state control, but by 2007, the media was free. It was non-state
media that also played a very important role in mobilizing support for the CJ.
A professor of history was of the view that:
People were disillusioned, and for them there was no hope that the country will have any
change. In such a situation, a resistance movement emerges. He told me that the
movement was only sustained because of the lawyers and quite interestingly by the
young lawyers, who had no adequate resources to earn their livelihood. Despite these
drawbacks, their Bar Councils provided them whatever little funds were at their disposal.
Their funds were mostly inadequate to cater to the needs of such young lawyers. Thus,
this poor young lot of lawyers barely managed to keep alive to keep up their struggle for
the rule of law. The real credit to keep the movement going goes to them.
Resentment against the Military Regime
A second factor mentioned in interviews was the long simmering resentment regarding
military rule among the public, interest groups, and the legal community.
A history professor I interviewed suggested:
… various currents remain present in society, which keep brewing without finding their
physical expression until something strange happens, which blows off the lid from the
pent-up emotions of the public, eventually leading to an unusual upheaval which was
never expected before. The maltreatment of the CJ at the hands of a military general
(which was shown live on the national media) released an overwhelming reaction in the
public against this heavy-handedness and released all the pent-up feelings against the
dictatorial military regime - which was initially spearheaded by the lawyers and later
turned into a country-wide agitation - against military rule with the participation of the
general public. The military dictator could not stop this mass movement with all the
physical might at his command and was ultimately led to give in and leave the country.
Many of my respondents endorsed the idea that standoff between Musharraf and
Chaudhary was the spark that started the Movement. This pretext was enough for lawyers, and
later the general public, to voice their disgust with military rule. The various Bar Councils passed
resolutions in favor of the CJ and demanded the resignation of General Musharraf.
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Senator 1, suggested that people were already fed up with the military rule of General
Musharraf:
Pressuring the CJ to resign by a military dictator was the beginning of the Lawyers’
Movement, which proved to be the last straw on the camel’s back. With the protests and
agitations of all the Bar Councils of the country, the Movement assumed threat to the
military rule. All kinds of atrocities were let loose on the lawyers; they were beaten,
criminal cases were instituted against them and many of them were put behind the bars,
but the lawyers withstood all these atrocities, manhandling and imprisonments but did not
give in their struggle against the military dictator. This was an unprecedented movement
in the country which continued for over two years, and despite the use of violent force
against the lawyers, it gained strength with each passing day. It gained the support of the
print and electronic media which influenced the general public making it a popular mass
movement against dictatorial rule.
HCT Judge 6 focused on the issue of frustration with the military regime before the start
of the LM:
It was nothing except the frustration among the people against President Musharraf’s nine
years dictatorial rule. In fact, it expressed public indignation against the military rule. It
was the release of cumulative frustration of the public against Musharraf’s undemocratic
rule in the country.
The Role of Political Parties
In London on July 12, 2007, the All Parties Democratic Movement (APDM), an alliance
of 32 political parties of Pakistan was established at the meeting of All Parties Conference of the
heads of the respective political parties. The major parties attending were the Pakistan Muslim
League (N) (PML-N), PakistanTehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Pakhtun-Khwa Milli Awami Party
(PMAP), Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), and the Awami National Party (ANAP). These
political parties devised a plan to oust General Musharraf from power. The APDM also
supported the cause of the lawyers to restore deposed judges to the courts and to ensure the
independence of judiciary and the rule of law in the country. The leaders of two of the largest
national-level political parties of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League (N) were in exile. Sharif was
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forced to leave the country by Muharraf after he was convicted in a plane highjacking case where
he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Later under an agreement, the deposed P.M. was sent
into exile in Saudi Arabia on the promise to not take part in Pakistan politics. The government of
Saudi Arabia was the custodian and guarantor of this agreement (Ahmed and Stephan, 2010, p.
496).
Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto went to United Kingdom and preferred to stay there in selfexile. However, she was active in politics and kept her political party intact in Pakistan. On the
other hand, majority party leaders or Members of Parliament of Pakistan Muslim League (N) of
Nawaz Sharif joined a new political party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) organized by
General Pervez Musharraf and his close associates. PML (Q) won the general elections held in
2002 and next elections were due in January 2008. On December 15, 2007, the government
promulgated five Presidential Ordinances to lift the Emergency and repealed the Constitution of
1973 with necessary Amendments (Khan, 2016, p.510).
Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Shairf were planning to return to Pakistan to participate
in general elections scheduled on January 8, 2008. Benazir Bhutto was in close contact with
Musharraf and both had secret meetings in the United Arab Emirates to make a deal. Musharraf,
who already had been elected President of Pakistan for his second term, knew that he needed the
cooperation of at least one major opposition party to remain in power. Thus, he made a deal with
Benazir Bhutto and allowed her to come back to Pakistan and gave her immunity from those
cases which were still pending in the courts. Bhutto returned to Pakistan on October 19, 2007.
The same day, there was a bomb attack that targeted Benazir Bhutto for assassination and killed
120; she survived. Because of this attack and protests against it, general elections were
postponed until February 8, 2008 (Ghias, 2010, pp. 41-42).
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On October 5, 2007, Musharraf promulgated a National Reconciliation Ordinance 2007
(NRO) to grant a pardon or immunity to Benazir Bhutto and other politicians and political
workers of political parties including Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the PPP from
prosecution in corruption cases (Amin, 2015, p.266) . Through international pressure, General
Musharraf had to extend the same offer to Mian Nawaz Sharif and his political party. On
November 25, 2007, Sharif returned to Pakistan on the Saudi royal family’s private jet. Both
political leaders broke their exile and came back to Pakistan to contest general elections. On
December 27, PPP leader Benazir Bhutto was assassinated after a political rally in Rawalpindi, a
city close to the capital Islamabad. However, her political party PPP won the majority of seats in
the general election and formed a coalition government. Nawaz Sharif’s political party PML (N)
also joined the coalition. Pakistan Muslim League (Q), General Pervez Musharraf’s ally political
party lost the elections. Now two major opposition parties of the Musharraf regime were in
power. Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani of the PPP became the Prime Minister of Pakistan (Amin,
2015, pp. 266-267).
The LM had gained the attention of all kinds of segments of the society including
political parties. The lawyers were in the streets calling for their demands. They were fighting for
the restoration of judges suspended by General Musharraf at the time of the National Emergency
imposed on November 3, 2007. They stood for judicial independence and the rule of law in the
country. They also demanded the resignation of General Musharraf as Chief of the Army Staff
and as the President of Pakistan. The LM achieved one major success when President Musharraf
stepped down first as Army Chief on November 28, 2007 by handing over command to General
Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani, and later resigned as President on August 18, 2008 fearing that the PPP
government could impeach him if he did not. On September 6, 2008, Asif Ali Zardari, widower
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of former Prime Minister late Benazir Bhutto and now co-chairperson of PPP became the
President of Pakistan (Zafar, 2019, p.472).
Almost all political parties in Pakistan, except a few such as the Pakistan Muslim League
(Q) and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), supported the Lawyers’ Movement. Their
leadership called for judicial independence, the rule of law, and the restoration of all judges
suspended by General Pervez Musharraf on November 3, 2007. The PPP led Government
incrementally restored most of the sacked judges (Khan, 2016, pp. 527-528).
On March 11, 2009, Pakistan Muslim League (N), Tehrik-e-Insaf, and some other
political parties started the Long March for the restoration of the remaining justices. They started
from Lahore, and their destination was the capital city Islamabad. They decided to go by way of
the Grand Terminal road instead of the motorway to be able to pass more major cities and to
attract larger crowds. Thousands of people joined the Long March under the leadership of Nawaz
Sharif and CJ Chaudhary. When this huge crowd reached Gujranwala City, between Lahore and
Islamabad, Aitzaz Ahsan, a renowned Supreme Court Lawyer and a chauffeur of the deposed CJ
throughout the Lawyers’ Movement, received a phone call from Army Chief General Ashfaq
Parvez Kiyani saying that he had talked to the Prime Minister about the restoration of Chaudhary
as CJ of the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Gall, 2009). The Chief of the Army Staff requested the
leaders and the participants of the Long March call off their protest after his assurance that Prime
Minister make the restoration announcement soon.
On March 16, 2009, at 3:00 a.m., Prime Minster Yousaf Raza Gillani in a televised
address to the nation announced that the government would restore Chaudhary and his four other
colleagues by issuing an executive order of the Government. The U.S. ambassador to Pakistan
Anne Paterson and Richard Holbrook urged leaders of both political parties to resolve the issues
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amicably. U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton and British Foreign Minister David Miliband
exerted pressure on President Zardari to negotiate with Nawaz Shaif on the issue of the
restoration of Chaudhary as the CJ of the Supreme Court (Ahmed, 2010, p. 502).
On March 21, 2009, on the retirement day of CJ Abdul Hameed Dogar, the LM achieved
another milestone by forcing the PPP regime to reinstate the leader the CJ of the Supreme Court.
After the restoration of all judges deposed by General Pervez Musharraf, the supporters of the
LM dubbed their success as the success of the judicial independence and the rule of law in the
country. This was the end of the two-year long struggle of judges, lawyers, and the civil society
in the form of a social movement, the Lawyers’ Movement, which started on March 9, 2007
when General Musharraf suspended the CJ of the Supreme Court (Khan, 2016, p.527).
SL 3 said to me on the restoration of CJ Chaudhary that:
So, the lawyer’s leadership has been instrumental inspiring people to come and join us in
this cause, the cause of rule of law where the Chief Justice cannot be kicked out by a
military dictator like in this manner against the law, against the constitution. So that was
the beginning. With the passage of time we were becoming more and more clear in our
objective that we want to end the dictatorship. So, when he was restored the first time
under the judgment of thirteen judge bench of the same court we, first that we announced
that day that the first phase of our movement is over that we wanted the restoration of the
Chief Justice.
The Role of the Media
Before General Pervez Musharraf’s rise to power in October, 1999, there were only two
state-owned TV channels in the country. General Musharraf’s regime issued licenses to private
TV channels that were free and independently owned by private owners, most of them were the
owners of renowned national newspapers. Suddenly there were hundreds of private TV news
channels. During the Lawyers’ Movement, these channels played a key role in educating and
awakening the general public regarding the LM and its impacts on the Pakistani society moving
forward. There was another perception among the journalist community as one of my
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participants, a senior anchor on a well-known news channel, mentioned that both print and
electronic media considered that after the attack on the independence of judiciary, the next to be
targeted would be them. Thus, the media stood with the lawyers and the judges not only to
protect the courts, but to also preserve their own freedom (Bolognani, 2010; Faqir, et al., 2013;
HRW Report, 2007; Khan, 2016; Kokab, 2013).
Ghias (2012) explores that when Chaudhary became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
in June 2005, he started taking a very keen interest in the projection of the Court performance in
media. His critics, mostly lawyers, blamed him and called his actions a “media circus.”
According to his critics, the suo moto notices by the CJ were taken for his own self-promotion.
The annual Supreme Court Report 2006 included a separate section named “Supreme Court and
the Media” which consisted of 18 press reports (Ghias, 2010, p. 998). However, his passion for
media coverage helped him greatly, especially when he stood up to dictatorial acts of the
Musharraf regime. Once the regime imposed a ban on TV stations airing live coverage of the
movement, other mode of communications -- videos on YouTube, homemade blogs, Flickr,
websites, and cell phones -- were employed (HLSR, 2010, p. 1717).
The electronic and print media played an important role in highlighting and framing the
activity of the Movement. Media showed live coverage of the events of the LM: the processions
led by CJ Chaudhary, meetings of the District bar councils, the addresses of the Movement’s
leaders, and the atrocities of the police, creating anger and depression among the masses and
shifting the public’s view of Musharraf to that of an oppressor (Khan, 2007, pp. 24-25).
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Figure 5.1. March 13, 2007, Mistreatment of Police with the Deposed Chief Justice

Figure 5.1 shows police manhandling of deposed CJ of Supreme Court Chaudhary on
March 13, 2007. These and other images of the police mistreatment of the Chief Justice were
broadcast on TV channels, made it to the front page of most newspapers and dominated the
electronic media, sparking a public outcry (Ahmed, 2012; Anwar, 2009; Bolognani, 2010; Ghias,
2010; IBA Report, 2009).The private TV channels gave unprecedented coverage to the meeting
when Musharraf summoned the Chief Justice to the Army House Camp office on March 7 2007,
a first for Pakistan. The public accepted the media and court’s framing of the meeting as an
assault on the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law (Anwar, 2009, p. 29). A senior
journalist and a TV anchor suggested the incident, and its coverage, gave an unprecedented
impetus to the LM. According to him, the initial public response to the suspension of the CJ was
non-existent until the confrontation with the police, which produced “the picture which started
the LM.”
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Several respondents suggested that media framing of the events was important in
generating public support for both the LM and the end of military rule. The media, which
highlighted the highhandedness of the police, were, according to SCT Judge 1:
[a] great help for allowing the lawyers and ex-judges to formulate the issues that were
involved in those cases, which on intervention were called emergency, partial suspension
or emergency plus on 3rd of November’2007. The lawyers’ community appearing on the
media, from the evening it was announced they clearly formulated the issues for the
nation and presented them to the nation, spurred the Movement itself. Had there been no
projection of the rallies and agitations of the lawyers by the electronic and independent
media, it was likely that the dictator had temporarily succeeded in suppressing public
agitation against Musharraf.
PS Professor 2, suggested:
There are three major supporters. First, media has become very powerful institution in
Pakistan. New channels and their anchor persons or journalists exercised such autonomy
which they had never exercised before in the history of Pakistan. Second was a new civil
society. One thing common among the three strands - the civil society, the media and the
lawyers - was a new generation of the general people who were committed to the idea of
a new Pakistan and new Pakistan could not be other than a Pakistan based on democratic
principles, rule of law and constitutionalism.
Even a respondent I interviewed who argued the LM was an “elite” group of selfinterested lawyers, had to admit:
Had he [the CJ] not said NO to the General, the latter would have probably remained in
power for an indefinite time but for the media, which was healthy, robust and vibrant and
did not let it happen that way.
The Role of Civil Society
Civil society played a significant role in the rise and success of the Lawyers’ Movement.
Historically, mostly political parties and political activists participated in anti-military
movements for the restoration of democracy in the country. However, in the LM actions against
the dictator, almost all segments of civil society, including women organizations, teachers’
associations, journalists, columnists, TV anchors, associations of retired people, students, labor
and workers’ organizations, doctors’ group, engineers, traders, business organizations, NGOs,
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and overseas Pakistani organizations were involved. While the judges, lawyers, the bar
associations, and District bar councils were at forefront of this Movement, later to be joined by
the political parties, the legal community drew on and used the political support of the broader
society to effect change. Zaidi (2008) rightly regarded this movement as the “broadest-based,
and longest-sustained” in the history of Pakistan.
Ahmed (2010, pp. 495-496) argues the civil society groups that actively participated in
the Lawyers’ Movement: included the Joint Action Committee for Citizen Rights, the Women’s
Action Forum, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), the Aurat Foundation, ASR
Resource Centre, Christian Study Centre, Omar Asghar Khan Development Foundation, Sungi
Development Foundation, Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO), the Pakistan- India
People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy, the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, and
Shirkat Gah, workers and organized labour, notable workers from the Brik Kiln, from the
Pakistan Bhatta Mazdoor Union, the Labour Party Pakistan, and the National Workers Party.
A respondent, CSR 2 said:
Everyone had ownership of that movement. They were so many of them, it was so, you
had to be there to imagine what it was like, it was not like taken as a herd like cattle, that
go there and who this and who that, no everyone thought himself or herself as a leader.
There were so many leaders at every level, at district level, at city level, at all levels, and
since it was a combination of many organizations……. it was an organized movement…
Organized movement but I’m saying everyone was on the same page and nobody was
saying that this is my movement, it was, and this is what I’m trying to tell you. The
leadership was there off course, without the leadership it would have been impossible but
it was not about one leader, there was a group of leaders.
A respondent, CSR 2 further added:
Many organizations, for example Women Action Forum was there from the very first
day, and then Khaksar Tehreek was there, Labor Union was there, joint action committee
was there, Aurat Foundation was there, and there were so many others who lent their
weight to the movement. Justice and Peace Society and Student Action Committee were
born after the emergency was declared. On November 3’ 2007, when the emergency was
declared, next day we were a group of people, who were having a meeting in the HRCP

109

(Human Rights Commission of Pakistan) auditorium where all 55 of us were arrested -24
women and 31 men. So, when we came out of jail, we formed this CCP (Concerned
Citizens of Pakistan) and the idea was to consult all the civil society organization and
make a strategy.
The International Role
The Pakistani diaspora all over the world, in particular in Europe, North America, and the
Middle East sent financial support to the LM. Political parties in Pakistan mobilized their
overseas organizers and workers to raise funds for the restoration of an independent judiciary in
Pakistan. An emerging political party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf of Imran Khan appealed to its
overseas supporters to establish a “Long March 2009 Fund” to fund the lawyers’ struggle against
the Musharraf regime. As far as the international legal community is concerned, renowned world
organizations such as the Commonwealth Lawyers Association, the South Asia Bar Association,
Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva), and the International
Federation for Human Rights (Paris) sent delegations to Pakistan to investigate the situation and
to support the Lawyers’ Movement’s struggle for an independent judiciary and the rule of law in
Pakistan. Similarly, many US-based organizations worked with Pakistani legal community to
support the LM goals.
The US-based National Lawyers Guild (NLGF) sent a fact-finding delegation to Pakistan.
US lawyers headed by Devin Theriot-Orr formed a combined group of lawyers named the
Pakistan Justice Coalition (PJC) to raise awareness in the US society about the legal and
constitutional issues of Pakistan, and arranged the visits of Pakistani lawyers to the United
States. The National Lawyers Guild Foundation (NLGF) also arranged visits of US delegates to
Pakistan to analyze the impacts of the November 3 Emergency on the independence of the
judiciary and the rule of law in Pakistan, along with the media and upcoming elections. The
Harvard Law School awarded its most prestigious award, the Medal of Freedom, to deposed CJ
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Chaudhary. The renowned US National Law Journal declared him its 2007 Lawyer of the Year,
becoming the first non-American to receive this prestigious award (Ahmed, 2010, pp. 507-508).
One of my respondents, SCT Judge 3, took an oath based on the PCO of General
Musharraf, and was later forced to step down after the Supreme Court judgment regarding this
order. He argued that the LM was an international conspiracy, and that the US government was
a collaborator in this scheme to restore Chaudhary to the Supreme Court:
That was a political movement and it was also (although I don't have any evidence to
substantiate that the American Government had also supported was correct or not because
it is recorded) said that the American Government especially Vice President, Joe Biden,
who, when the Movement started, was in the opposition, (he was a Senator) then in due
process he came, and became the Vice President and it was said, although I repeat, I don't
have any evidence to substantiate. It was also in the paper. According to my opinion, it
was an international conspiracy to restore Justice Chaudhary and when they included the
substantial political parties who subsequently gained advantage. So those were the
beneficiaries - Nawaz Sharif was the beneficiary.
The Law Community
Finally, I would be remiss not to mention the law community itself as a major factor in
the reform effort. There were a total 160 Bar Councils and lawyers’ associations in the country at
the time of the Lawyers’ Movement, with over 9,000 lawyer members. This was the largest
organized body within the movement. Among these, the smallest, but most efficient and
effective, body was the National Action Committee of Lawyers. Prominent lawyers like Aitzaz
Ahsan, Ali Ahmad Kurd, Munir A. Malik, Hamid Khan, and Justice Rtd. Tariq Mahmood have
all been president of lawyers’ associations such as the Supreme Court Bar Association and the
Pakistan Bar Council. The organizational structure of the Lawyers’ Movement was comprised of
four tiers: 1) The National Action Committee of Lawyers; 2) the Pakistan Bar Association and
the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan; 3) Provincial bar associations such as the Lahore
High Court Bar Association, the Baluchistan High Court Bar Association, the Sindh High Court
Bar Association, the NWFP Bar Council; and 4) City-Level bar councils in Karachi, Lahore,
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Peshawar, Quetta, Islamabad, Multan, and Faisalabad (Ahmed, 2010, pp. 502-503). However,
there was not an ‘organized’ mechanism to make important decisions. Rather the process of
decision-making was quite haphazard and at times disorganized. A Harvard Law School Report
(2010) suggested that top lawyers like Aitzaz Ahsan, Ali Ahmed Kurd, and Munir A. Malik
directed the major strategy of the LM from above. However, much of the movement’s impetus
was generated from the bottom by the youngest and poorest lawyers.
A respondent, SL 1, talked about decision-making process during the Movement.
Joint Committee came up later but we acted through bar associations. The lawyers had
one significant attribute. There is a bar association in every corner of the country and its
management is elected every year, every year you have elections, democratic elections.
So, the most significant role was thereafter played first by the presidents of provincial
bars, then the presidents of the district bars, and the lawyers of the district bars. Now, it
was difficult to run a movement without funds, without any funds, we didn’t open a bank
account, asked for no donations, but for our major activities, we asked people to
contribute in buses like the Long March, or we asked was people organizations, or
business men of chambers of commerce or bazar or markets to contribute to us the
transport we needed massive transport to take (almost more than a hundred thousand
people from all parts of Pakistan to Islamabad) and to sit in front of Parliament, to
congregate in front of Parliament. Then there were about two hundred thousand people
that came from the adjoining areas they converged. We had, at least a hundred thousand
people into Rawalpindi and then the twin city Islamabad. Although the catchment area
was really the closest town, people contributed vehicles in hundreds and the other thing
we wanted was simple food, cooked rice, rice cooked in grams. And we got massive,
mountains of food from there. People were so happy to contribute to the movement.
Most of the material resources for the LM were donated by the lawyers themselves
(Kokab, 2013, p. 188). As some scholars like McCarthy and Zald (1977), Oberschall (1973), and
Meyer (2014) have emphasized the significance of resource mobilization and entrepreneurial
aspects for the success of movements and mass protests, the leaders and the proponents of the
Lawyers’ Movement also understood the importance of resources and their mobilization.
According to Ahmed (2010), the beginning of the donations came from Lahore High Court Bar
Association when they raised 1000 Pakistani rupees ($12), and later they raised 80,000 rupees
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($1000). The lawyers’ organizations in major cities and districts campaigned for donations and
raised money throughout the movement. The major financers were two major political parties,
Mian Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League, and Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
(Ahmed, 2010, p. 504).
One of my respondents, CSR 2, replied to my question on how this movement was
sustained despite the fact that most young lawyers were out of work said:
I tell you, when we used to take out a rally, they were always people there, they were
planted by I don’t know who or may be genuinely whatever and they used to come and
ask “where are you getting your funding from”, “how is it possible that you know
bullshit”, there was no funding, yes there were funding at different levels of different
kinds but not like somebody from outside. We were raising our own funds and remember
the civil society is very affluent in Pakistan. The people who were involved in the
Movement, you have no idea the way they donated it. They had coasters, they had
people, they had money, they had everything. So we never had a problem about
resources, never. The other thing is we were collecting, the day we came out of the jail;
we said we need to collect funds and to give to the lawyers, poor lawyers who are sitting
on. We collected funds and used to collect funds on regular basis, but used to have no
fund raisers as such. We used to have meeting with the people who used to come and
donate.
Objectives of the Lawyers’ Movement
When I asked my respondents what were the main objectives of the LM, a consensus
formed around independence of the judiciary, establishing the rule of law, restoring the judges
deposed by the military regime, reestablishing the supremacy of the Constitution, protecting
fundamental rights, restoring democracy in Pakistan, and removing General Mushraff from
power.
Senator 2 confessed that:
…[y]es, obviously the main objective of the LM as such, or the main goal of the lawyers
was the independence of judiciary. I think that was very clear that it was a movement for
the restoration of an independent judiciary.
SL 4, recalled:
Yes, this was the first speech that Mr. Munir A. Malik made. I mean, if you see all the
speeches in which we have talked about independence of judiciary and rule of law. He
also said that we are not here to reinstate judges and to give them jobs. We are fighting
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for independence of judiciary and not for their persons. There were a set of discussions
whether everybody should be restored or at a minimum that the CJ should be restored.
My own view was that, everybody should be restored.
PS Professor 1, explained that the:
…[i]mmediate objective was restoration of the CJ, especially when Musharraf removed
other judges after imposition of emergency. So, constitutionalism, rule of law and
restoration of the judiciary were the main objectives and shared by all.
PS Professor 2 argued “…[c]ertainly, they wanted an independent judiciary and they
thought that Pakistan will never be a democracy if the rule of law was absent and no rule of law
is possible without an independent judiciary.” Similarly, a law professor, when asked whether
there was a relationship between the LM and judicial independence, answered “…[y]es, one
hundred percent and a very strong relationship.”
Reading the addresses and speeches of the leaders of the movement, reinforces the
preceding, clearly identifying judicial independence as a goal of the Lawyers’ Movement.
On November 17, 2008, Chaudhary addressed the members of the New York City Bar
Association:
No democracy can survive without an independent judiciary. No strong and stable
Parliament can be constructed on the ruins of an independent judicial edifice. An
independent judiciary is, in fact, the most significant protection available to Parliament. It
covers the flanks of Parliament, resisting attacks from any adventurer in the
wings………. The Lawyers’ Movement in Pakistan is a unique and historic struggle
against all those forces which are trying to stifle the rule of law and are uprooting the
foundations of our judiciary. They are trying to suffocate and bury the concept of an
independent judiciary once and for all, and once that happens, then the very fabric of
society is destroyed resulting in a domino effect, with all the other organs and pillars of
the state falling one by one. This movement is being led by the young lawyers of Pakistan
who seek neither office nor power.
He continued by explaining the concept of an independent judge and said:
My fellow jurists permit me to emphasize one additional point. Just as an independent
judiciary is vital to sustain democracy, the independence of judiciary itself is dependent
entirely on “independent judges”. For a truly independent judiciary, the judges must be
independent and fearless. If judges are afraid of being arrested, of being manhandled, of
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being imprisoned along with their families, and that too because they had the courage to
take a principled stand against a dictator (Pervez Musharraf) and refused to be party to
the mutilation of the Constitution, then we might as well forget about any judge ever
being independent or fearless. If society turns a blind eye and condones the illegal acts of
the dictator (Musharraf), then we might as well bury the hope of ever having free judges
with free minds and a free conscience. Ladies and gentlemen, this is why Pakistan is
going through a decisive and definitive moment in our history.
The president of the Pakistani Supreme Court Bar Association, Munir A. Malik,
addressed the same meeting and said:
Our Supreme Court has frequently stressed the importance of an independent judiciary,
particularly in reference to Article 175 of the Constitution. It is observed, inter alia, in the
Al-Jehad Trust case (PLD 1996 SC 324) and the Mehram Ali case (PLD 1998 SC 1445)
that ‘the independence of judiciary is inextricably linked and connected with the process
of appointment of Judges and the security of tenure and other terms and conditions,’ and
that the ‘framers of the Constitution were mindful of the fact that in the absence of
security of tenure no Judge can function impartially and independently.’ In the absence of
an independent judiciary that is able to freely exercise its judicial functions and enforce
the law without interference, the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to citizens under our
Constitution are illusory and not worth the paper they are written on. Saleem Akhtar J
held as much in the case of Govt. of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon (PLD 1993 SC
341) when he observed: ‘Separation of judiciary is the corner-stone of the independence
of judiciary and unless the judiciary is independent, the fundamental right of access to
justice cannot be guaranteed.
He further elaborated on the struggle of the lawyers for the independence of judiciary:
Fortunately, our nation has woken up to this peril. There is unanimity within the legal
community and the general public that the ideals of the separation of powers and
independence of judiciary are worth preserving. The Rule of Law is not merely an empty
slogan but a reality worth striving towards. Montesquieu had warned, ‘The tyranny of a
prince in an oligarchy is not as dangerous to the public welfare as the apathy of a citizen
in a democracy.’ We have averted the greater danger. We are only left with the lesser
threat. And now that the people are awoken from their slumber and apathy, their will
shall prevail. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor of the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out
“Constitutions and statutes don’t protect judicial independence, people do.” But the
people Justice Sandra Day O’Connor referred to were not simply members of the general
public. She was also referring to people who practice at the Bar. She was also referring to
the people who were on the Bench. Judges, like the rest of us, also form a part of
Pakistan’s civil society. There is a mutual covenant between all sections of civil society
to uphold the rule of law and secure the independence of the judiciary. Any section that
betrays this mutual trust, in addition to injuring the others, also imperils itself.
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On February 7, 2009, Chaudhary again expressed his views while speaking at an oathtaking ceremony held under the aegis of the Lahore High Court Bar Association (LHCBA) in
Rawalpindi and said, “I congratulate the nation that after 60 years of its life, it has reached the
conclusion that the establishment of an independent judiciary and the rule of law is a prerequisite
for prosperity of the country.” Justice Ejaz Afzal, a deposed judge of the Peshawar High Court,
in his address said that, “…[r]einstatement is not important for us, what is important is that the
judiciary of tomorrow should be free from all pressures.”
Despite the fact that leaders of the Lawyers’ Movement had a number of objectives in
their mind which they expressed in their addresses to the law community and the people, there
was a consensus among the participants that the restoration of an independent judiciary was one
of their major goal along with the rule of law, restoration of deposed judges, and healthy
democratic values.
Conclusion
For more than 24 months, civil society in Pakistan stood against the dictatorial regime of
General Pervez Musharraf in order to achieve the independence of judiciary and rule of law in
the country. In 2007, Musharraf sacked more than 64 judges of the superior courts, including the
CJ of the Supreme Court Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary and kept them under house arrest and
police custody. The lawyers of Pakistan with the help of a vibrant civil society started a
significant resistance, the Lawyers’ Movement, against the military might of General Pervez
Musharraf and set the goals of an independent judiciary through the restoration of all sacked
judges.
This chapter is a case study of that struggle of lawyers and civil society for the restoration
of deposed judges of the superior courts, and ultimately for the struggle for independence of
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judiciary and rule of law in the country. My work on the Lawyers’ Movement adds to the
literature on cause lawyering. Large parts of the Pakistani legal community and bench risked
their professional careers to take a firm stand for the principles of the independence of the
judiciary and the rule of law in the country. Despite the fact that the many lawyers’ incomes
were wholly dependent on their daily appearances before the courts, they boycotted the courts.
They continued their struggle for over two years without any means of income, taking rallies on
the streets and roads, faced brutal treatment by the police by being subjected to baton charges,
tear-gas, illegal detentions, house arrests, police raids at their houses, and loss of life, and all to
restore the lost respect of the courts. This type of widescale professional resistance was and is
unprecedented in the world. The legal community in Pakistan, with the support of a vibrant civil
society, fought valiantly and succeeded in restoring the basic human legal rights in the form of a
free judiciary and the rule of law.
This chapter not only examined the story or evolution of LM since March 2007, but it
also focuses on the underlying causes of the Movement such as public resentment against the
military junta, and the police brutality against the bench and the bar. These thuggish measures
had two main aims: to perpetuate military in the country, and to make a dictator the final arbiter
for the country, a law unto himself. It also highlighted the role of modern media, the role of
political parties and civil society including students, teachers, doctors, engineers, and the
pressures of international governments and non-governmental institutions.
The role of the progenitors, leaders, and supporters of the Lawyers’ Movement played an
important part in awakening the general consciousness of the public against the repressive
measures of military regime. There were also the opponents of the Lawyers’ Movement, most of
whom had benefitted from its favors, and who supported the military regime. But against the
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juggernaut of popular social and political protests, these opponents failed in all their attempts to
block change in society.
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Chapter 6
The Impact of the Lawyers’ Movement
Introduction
In this chapter I examine the impacts of the Lawyers’ Movement (LM) on both judges
and the courts in Pakistan. I believe that the LM paved the way for the judiciary to challenge
political regimes with freedom and dignity. This chapter will analyze the role of the LM in
promoting judicial independence and democratic values in the country. This social movement is
responsible for bringing changes to the structure and functioning of the courts, in the behavior of
judges and staff, and in the attitudes of the public towards the judiciary. Finally, I will analyze
these changes and their impact on Pakistani society and on the democratic health of the country.
The Impacts of Social Movements
There is a voluminous literature on the impacts of social movements. Some researchers
have focused on the cultural impacts of social movements, e.g., on ideas, values, media, popular
culture, and on public opinion and everyday behavior (Bonastia, 2012; Earl, 2004; Fetner, 2016;
Halfmann, 2011; Luker, 1984; Eyerman & Jamison, 1991; Rochon, 1998). Recently, researchers
have shifted their interest to trace the political impact of social movements to other
contemporaneous developments, in particular, the social movement’s impacts on non-political
institutions and organizations such as science, business, and education (Amenta et al., 2010;
Arthur, 2011; Epstein, 2016; King, & Pearce, 2010). Some scholars have also analyzed the
impact of social movements on music, art, fashion and on how social movements benefit
concerned constituencies (see Amenta & Young, 1999; Giugni & Grasso, 2016; Roy, 2013;
Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004; Whittier, 2004).
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Amenta and Polletta (2019) argue that the most significant impacts of social movements
are cultural. Social movements change the world we live in; some changes are appreciable others
are not. The authors define culture broadly: “meaning-making dimensions of all policies and
practices.” They organize the literature on the impacts of social movements in four wider
groupings: “1) public opinion and everyday interactions; 2) media coverage and popular culture;
3) nonpolitical institutions; and 4) policy and political institutions.” According to the authors,
existing scholarship on movements’ impacts is mostly focused on the US and it could be
strengthened by expanding its attention to cross-national, cross-cultural, and historical cases. A
social movement’s impact is shaped by the capacity of the institutions to be responsive and
dynamic. Whether a social movement becomes an agent of social change in the society is largely
dependent on the movement’s organization, resourcefulness, and strategy. The authors suggest
that the different forms of change, in particular policy and political institutional change, occur
due to the “institutional contagion” factor, or when change in one institution inspires change in
other institutions (Amenta & Polletta, 2019, pp. 291-292).
Ahmed and Stephan (2010) emphasize the political institutional impact of the peaceful
and nonviolent Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan. This movement has had far-reaching political
impacts on Pakistan’s political landscape, from an individual act of defiance by the CJ Iftikhar
Mohammad Chaudhary to the restoration of an independent judiciary and rule of law in the
country. According to Ahmed and Stephan, the LM was a peaceful, nonviolent, united and
disciplined grassroots struggle against the repressive regime of Musharraf, as well the rule of the
PPP, which endorsed the dictator’s autocratic actions. The transfer of power from a military
dictator to a civilian political government was itself a great success perhaps most importantly,
the restoration of deposed judges, including the CJ of the Supreme Court, paved the way for the
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judiciary to act as an independent institution in the country. Through this movement, lawyers
made an alliance with opposition parties and other civic organizations in the country to achieve
their goal of the restoration of an independent judiciary. The authors also admit that the LM had
a great impact on Pakistani civil society in terms of creating political and social awareness
(Ahmed and Stephan, 2010, pp. 492-493).
The Judicialization of Politics
The judicialization of politics, whose roots can be traced to the adoption of written
constitutions and independent and free courts, may become the most significant future global
trend in governance (Tate and Vallinder 1995). The conditions that favor the expansion of
judicial power are also expanding, such as liberal democracies, separation of powers, a politics
of rights, interest and opposition groups using courts, ineffective majoritarian institutions, the
positive perception of the courts by the public, and most importantly, the rise of judicial
activism. Vallinder (1995) presents two major aspects of the concept of judicialization of
politics: (1) the process by which courts and judges come to make or increasingly dominate the
making of public policies that had previously been made by legislatures and executives, and (2)
the process by which non-judicial negotiating and decision-making forums come to be
dominated by quasi-judicial (legalistic) rules and procedures (p. 26).
Stephenson (2003) investigates the puzzle of judicial independence along with the
situations when and why public opinion supports the judiciary against the other branches of the
government. He finds different sources of judicial power. He develops formal models to measure
judicial power and examines how the stable competition among various political rival forces,
such as political parties, allows and facilitates the courts to exert their judicial power.
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Favoreu (1992) includes three indicators of judicialization of power: 1) a move towards
court-like processes and procedures in the affairs of the administration; 2) enhancement of
judicial powers over administrative matters; and 3) an increase in the judicial review. Landfried
(1985) argues that it is a shift when political decision-making is taken by the courts instead of
political institutions. In the 1990s, researchers in the field of comparative politics started to
develop theories and models to understand the behavior of various institutions including courts.
Stone (1992) emphasized the evolution of institutional behavior of policy making institutions.
Hirschl (2004) reinforces the argument that “judicialization” or empowerment of the
courts is expanding because of the fact that the political, social, and economic power-holders
estimate that judicial autonomy serves their interests in the long run. Hirschl analyzes legal,
political, and constitutional reforms in Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa.
According to him, constitutional revolutions in these countries were not driven by genuine
commitment to democratic values or universal rights, but by a strategic self-interested coalition
of politico-economic and judicial leaders.
Hirschl (2008) tracks a shift of the courts’ role away from flashy rights issues to matters
of “outright and utmost political significance.” Hirschl groups these into five major types: 1)
electoral processes and outcomes; 2) core executive prerogatives; 3) legitimacy of regime
change; 4) transitional justice; and 5) defining the nation via courts. The author also analyzes the
political backlash of the empowerment of the judiciary in terms of legislative overrides, political
tinkering with the appointment procedures of judges, court-packing attempts, and even the
removal or impeachment of the judges such as sacking of superior courts in Thailand, Ecuador,
and Pakistan.
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According to some scholars (Friedman, 1998; Ginsburg, 2004, Vallinder, 1995), the
spread of judicial review in the world may be considered the judicialization of politics. Many
other scholars (Arantes, 2005; Hirshl, 2004; Stone & Brunnell, 2013) think that the courts are
using their constitutional powers to exert against the other branches of the government, in
particular parliaments. The status of written constitutions in controlling parliamentary actions is
also expanding in many countries. There are some scholars (Cross and Lindquist, 2007;
Magalhães, Guarnieri and Kaminis, 2006; Magalhães, 2003; Moustafa, 2007; Pederzoli and
Guarnieri, 2008) who argue that judges play an active role in countering the excesses of the
majoritarian institutions. They use the term judicial activism interchangeably with the
judicialization of politics.
Another school of thought considers that when the judiciary acts freely and independently
from the other branches of the government, commonly known as judicial independence, that this
is equal to the judicialization of politics (Dressel, 2012; Ferejohn, Rosenbluth, and Shipan 2009;
Scribner, 2010; Sieder, Schjolden and Angell, 2005). Similarly, Hirshl (2004, 2008) believes that
the involvement of the judiciary in the core political controversies of a nation is a form of the
judicialization of politics. Another line of scholars (Rios-Figueroa, 2007; Rios-Figueroa, and
Taylor, 2006; Vianna, Burgos and Salles, 2007) argue that judicialization of politics occurs when
the courts handle a lot of cases. On the other hand, some scholars (Figueroa, 2006; Hamlin,
2014) have found that the business of the courts in deciding cases might be due to other reasons,
such as political bickering and competition among different political groups bringing their
disputes to the courts in litigation. Some scholars in the field (Hamlin, 2014; Kagan, 2001;
Kawar, 2014; Keleman, 2011; Tate and Vallinder, 1995) refer to the active role of some
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administrative or non-judicial institutions/organizations bringing different kinds of cases into the
courts for the common good.
Some political scientists and scholars (Couso, Huneeus and Sieder, 2013; Rueda, 2013)
see the social and behavioral change in the society regarding the reformation of new laws and
statutes, i.e., the people in legal profession and non-judicial judicial organizations have become
well aware and active in motivating and mobilizing the society about the laws and statues
concerning their rights and issues. There are also some studies (Hirschl, 2004; Landfried, 1989;
Stone, 1992; Vanberg, 1998; Sala, 2014; Volcansek,1992) that focus on the change in the
behavior of legislatures due to the fact that the courts could use their power to review or nullify
legislative action. In essence, legislative bodies anticipate judicial review by the courts and they
change the laws and statutes accordingly to avoid judicial scrutiny. Ghias (2009) develops an
argument that the failure of economic liberalization and public’s discontent due to media
attention could trigger the empowerment of the judiciary, as happened in Pakistan. The second
point he makes is that the cooperation between bar and bench could also give the impetus for
courts to assert their power and influence. According to him, the Public Interest Litigation (PIL)
at the time of economic liberalization provided the Pakistan courts an opportunity to side with
the public against the government resulting in the suspension of the superior judiciary by the
Musharraf regime.
So, what was the impact of the LM on the judicial system of Pakistan? What follows
examines both de jure and de facto aspects of changes after the LM, on both judges and the
courts. Apart from the constitutional and legal changes, the Lawyers’ Movement has brought
some fundamental structural and functional changes in both legal practices and procedures as
well as in professional institutions.
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Major changes in Judicial Policy
Chief Justice Chaudhary convened a meeting of the National Judicial Policy Making
Committee (NJPMC) as its chairman on April, 18, 2009. The NJPMC was constituted under a
Presidential Ordinance in 2002. The CJ of the Federal Shariat Court, the Chief Justices of all
High Courts, and the Secretary Law & Justice Commission are its members. In the light of the
developments after the Lawyers’ Movement, the NJPMC framed the first National Judicial
Policy. The NJPMC proposed radical reforms to the judicial system of Pakistan. In Section A The Independence of Judiciary, the document for the first time set rules and procedures for
judges to separate themselves from executive and administrative duties or assignments such as
the holding of a position of an Acting Governor of a province and duties in general elections.
The National Judicial Policy aimed to bring major reforms in both criminal and civil litigation in
Pakistan, in particular, to eliminate unnecessary delay in handling cases.
Apart from the oath of office under the Constitution of 1973, judges of the Supreme
Court and the High Court (Superior Courts) perform their duties under a Code of Conduct
framed by the Supreme Judicial Council under the old Article 128 (4) of the Constitution of 1962
as amended later under Article 209 (8) of the Constitution of 1973 of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan. After the Lawyers’ Movement, the Supreme Judicial Council in its meeting held on
August 8, 2009 gave approval to the addition of a new article XI in the previous Code of
Conduct for the judges of the Superior Courts and ordered the government to publish the full text
of the amended code in the Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary) for the information of concerned
people. There are eleven Articles of this Code including the added Article XI which states:
No Judge of the superior judiciary shall render support in any manner whatsoever,
including taking or administering oath in violation of the oath, of office prescribed in the
Third Schedule to the Constitution, to any authority that acquires power otherwise than
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through the modes envisaged by the Constitution of Pakistan. (Article-XI of Code of
Conduct, p.2)
The addition of the Article XI in the Code showed the firm belief of the judges of the
superior judiciary that they wanted to stop even the remote possibility of taking oath on another
Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) by another military adventurist in the future. For first
time in the judicial history of Pakistan judges made themselves bound to their oath of allegiance
to the Constitution only.
A respondent, SL 1, who participated in my study, explained the impact of this
Movement on both superior and inferior courts in Pakistan. According to him the impact on the
justices of the superior Courts is significant as compared to the lower judiciary at the Tehsil or
District levels. He further elaborated:
I think it has made the judges more confident certainly more confident, much more
confident, much more strident. The judiciary, it’s a new judiciary, it’s a new era in the
history of Pakistan and I’ve great confidence that it will, in due course contribute a lot to
that. A lot needs to be done about the subordinate judiciary but you can’t change that in a
day.
Another of my respondents, SL 2, felt that:
The LM has not changed the structures of the judiciary yet but it has tremendously
increased the level of expectations of the people with the courts. It has raised tremendous
expectations for them, some extremely unrealistic expectations and probably some have
expectations of political nature.
A similar opinion was shared by a leading journalist, who agreed that the LM has not
only raised the expectations of people, but improved the accountability of judges as well.
Another journalist, and host of a primetime TV talk show, said that the judiciary had become
bolder issuing judgments against the federal government in a number of cases. The respondent
cited the overwhelming support of both the electronic and print media for the courts as a major
factor empowering independence.
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A respondent, HCT Judge 4 mentioned only one positive impact of the LM on the
political system of the country. He said:
At least one thing may be positive, at least the people who were in uniform and the
government realized that now no judge can be thrown away just through a stroke of the
pen. At the same time, the judiciary itself is sacking the judges without following the
procedure.
A respondent, PS Professor 2, elaborated on the impacts of judiciary this way:
I think that judiciary knows very well, and they have acknowledged it many times, that
without the sacrifices of the lawyers’ community, they could not have achieved the status
of independence that they have now. This means judges feel themselves morally bound to
do something good for the society and particularly on the issue of democracy and military
interventions. The CJ of the Supreme Court has been very clear in saying that democracy
is what serves the interest of the country.
A former High Court justice, and one of the leaders of the LM, insisted that this
movement has had an impact on the judiciary, in particular, the judges have shown a new
commitment to uphold law and justice by accepting their mistakes from the past and vowing that
they will not repeat those mistakes in future. A senior journalist respondent suggested the
judiciary had a bright future because the LM had created public awareness among the masses
regarding the rule of law and the role of the judiciary: “The public have developed an interest in
knowing what is happening around them and why.”
Similar views, that the role of judiciary is contingent on the role of other segments in
society, were shared by Senator 1:
We are passing through a very transitory period. The judiciary is feeling very confident
of itself because it has a public support; it has the support of the movement behind it, the
movement support will still continue in the favor of the judiciary. That impact is still
there and media is also supporting the judiciary so, therefore, the judiciary is feeling
much stronger than the rest of the branches of the state.
Perhaps foremost among the political changes was the establishment of a separate Human
Rights Cell to deal with cases of human rights violations. Justice Chaudhary appointed his close
friend, then an ad hoc justice at the Supreme Court, Justice Khalil Ramday, as the head of this
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cell. The major function of the cell was to expeditiously process the human rights complaints
from the general public (Kennedy, 2012). The Human Rights Cell was able to provide relief to
the aggrieved parties without further delay and without going through the traditional litigation
procedures and processes. In a period of one year and three months, the Supreme Court decided
53,082 cases of human rights violations and public policy out of a total 54,935 appeals (Shabbir,
2013, pp. 11-12).
In addition to the institutional changes that occurred, there were a series of significant
court decisions that both differed from previous decisions and signaled a new level of judicial
independence. In Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (2009) PLD 61 SC 644,
the Court revisited its earlier decision regarding the disqualification of Nawaz Sharif from public
office and removed his disqualification, allowing Sharif run again in elections. This decision of
the Court also created an electoral balance between PPP and PML-N in the upcoming general
elections, allowing both political Benazir Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif to participate (Kausar,
2011, p.35). In a second case, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. State, (2009) 61 PLD (SC) 814, 847–
48, the Supreme Court removed the conviction of Nawaz Sharif in the “hijacking case” case of
2000. The Court ruled that Nawaz Sharif was justified under civil aviation laws to prevent
General Musharraf from returning to Pakistan to avoid a military coup d’état (Kalhan, 2013, p.
62).
On July 31, 2009, a larger bench comprising fourteen judges of the Supreme Court issued
a landmark judgment in Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan 2009. This
order declared the Emergency Proclamation Order (PCO) of November 3 unconstitutional. The
Court declared the PCO, the judges Oath Order, the First and Second Amendment Orders, and
the establishment of a new High Court Islamabad unconstitutional, ultra vires of the Constitution

128

of 1973. For the first time in the judicial and political history of Pakistan, the Supreme Court of
Pakistan explicitly made it clear that the role of the Armed Forces is limited to professional
duties and barred them from future interference in politics, as the Court makes clear in its
verdict:
Military rule, direct or indirect, is to be shunned once and for all. Let it be clear that it was
wrongly justified in the past and it ought not to be justified in [the] future on any ground,
principle, doctrine or theory whatsoever…Unless such an approach is firmly entrenched
into the body politic and the jurisprudence of this country, military takeovers previously in
the name of martial law, and later in the garb of proclamation of emergency will continue
to recur as heretofore, there will be nothing to stop (PLD 2009 SC 879, Para 56).
In addition to the preceding, the Supreme Court issued a number of decisions to provide
relief to the general public under its Public Interest Litigation (PIL) jurisdiction, declared a
presidential appointment illegal, ruled on MPs fraudulent resumes, and established their
jurisdiction over government contracting in a variety of fields. Clearly the post LM court was
expanding its turf and responsibilities. Perhaps the best example of this new turf, and
independence, was the trial of General Musharraf for high treason, brought at the request of the
Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif (Dawn, Dec. 18, 2019). On December 2017, the Special High
Court found General Pervez Musharraf, who was in exile in Dubai, guilty of high treason.
Judicial Independence before and after the LM: Analysis of the Survey
As discussed in chapter 2, I gave my respondents a survey to gauge their measure of
judicial independence in Pakistan. The respondents were given choices from poor to the
excellent to rank the indicators or determinants of the JI in Pakistan before and after the
Lawyers’ Movement. The results of this survey are presented in Table 6.1 and support the views
expressed by the respondents in my interview data and the documentary data I have presented.

129

Most indicators show an increase after the LM; one, qualification of judges, stayed the
same. I use a Paired Samples T- Test to significant changes in some important
indicators/determinants of JI in Pakistan after the LM including: 1) authority of judicial review;
9) pay/salaries of the judges; 11) financial autonomy; 12) relationship with executive; and 15)
public opinion/support.
As far as the relationship of the judiciary with other branches and institutions of the State
are concerned such as executive, legislature, and the military, the nature of relations deteriorated
compared to the past before the Lawyers’ Movement. These changes are understandable given
the Court’s newfound interest in challenging the other power centers in the Pakistani polity. In
fact, one might argue that the negative changes on these indicators actually show increased
judicial independence in the Pakistan case. In the end, the results of this survey clearly show that
the respondents felt that there was a significant increase in judicial independence in Pakistan
after the LM.
Status of the Judicial Independence after the Movement: Opinions of the Respondents
As Table 6.1 shows, most respondents agreed that there was more JI after the LM, and
the qualitative interview data support this conclusion. According to the respondents, judges feel
more independence and freedom to render the decisions without fear or favor. The role of the
judge as an individual and the judiciary as an institution has been improved tremendously. Some
of my informants gave credit to CJ Chaudhary in that he was a linchpin of the whole judiciary
and acted freely and independently. However, the majority of respondents speak of the
improvement of the judiciary as a whole and the LM’s role in that improvement.
For example, a respondent CSR 2 emphasized the importance of the LM in these words:
Of course, a huge change, a huge change and I’m not saying that I agree or disagree with
what they are saying but the environment has changed. The judges who were like very
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subservient, very meek, now the environment is such that they have been given that kind
of feeling of being elevated to that level that sense of responsibility also.
Table 6.1. Indicators/Determinants of Judicial Independence in Pakistan Since 1947
(Paired Samples T Test)
Indicators

Before LM After LM

1. Authority of judicial review

Mean
2.10

Mean
3.14

t
Sig.
-4.396 .000*

2. Appointment of judges

2.03

2.60

-2.036

.051

3. Qualification of judges

2.50

2.50

-.000

1.000

4. Retention methods of judges

2.29

2.39

-.532

.599

5. Removal methods of judges

2.28

2.31

-.133

.896

6. Jurisdiction of the courts

2.45

2.90

-1.822

.079

7. Number of judges

2.10

2.21

-.516

.610

8. Administrative powers of judges

2.63

2.83

-1.000

.326

9. Pay/salaries of the judges

2.43

3.37

-5.635 .000*

10. Term of office

2.83

2.87

-.239

11. Financial autonomy

2.45

2.93

-4.525 .000*

12. Relationship with executive

2.76

1.97

3.237

.003*

13. Relationship with legislature

2.31

2.14

.708

.485

14. Relationship with the military

2.69

2.35

1.516

.142

15. Public opinion/support

1.67

3.30

-6.885 .000*

.813

CSR 2 further added:
I think a lot of things are happening and it’s going to take shape. As I said things don’t
happen overnight but there are lot of things happening. First, now it is the Supreme Court
that sets the tone for the whole judiciary, you know, that has changed. So that is, again
people say that it’s not big, it is something big, and it’s a huge deal. So, don’t
underestimate that it’s not something huge that has been changed and the appointments of
the judges in the high courts, it has had changed and there is a trickledown effect and they
are working on a lot of things. In the session courts they are working on numerous
judicial reforms from a perspective that is now informed by the LM reforms.
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A respondent, HCT Judge 5, said the following about the changes to the judiciary after
the LM:
Rather than distinguish between significant or insignificant I feel the change after the LM
is such that corruption cases are now attracting the attention of the judiciary. Similarly,
mega-constitutional deviations are being taken notice of by the federal government and
given suo motto jurisdiction. Similarly, the entire judiciary is falling into accordance with
the rule of law, although it will take at least four to five years for this to be the norm. You
cannot achieve miracles with Allah Din’s Lamp.
Respondent LP 2 argued the appointment of judges had been improved post-LM:
We achieved a very transparent system of appointment of judges, there is a Judicial
Commission, very appropriately represented by the judiciary and by the Executive and by
the President. Its recommendations go to the parliamentary committee, which itself has
very adequate proportional representation of the government and the opposition. So, the
appointment process has become more transparent and accountable and judges are more
secure at the moment with reference to appointment and removal. The Supreme Judicial
Council rules have been framed which are fairer and transparent which ensure
impartiality so the judges are not in fear of removal. Financially they are given more
autonomy and now they are not as dependent as they were before the Lawyers’
Movement. So, judicial independence status is very positive and sustained.
Another respondent, SL 2, added his views that the courts are more resilient to external
pressures:
The change is certainly visible, the change is visible as far as the High Courts and
Supreme Court is concerned. The judges are more conscious. They are under pressure.
The real test of this judiciary will come if as in the past there is any unconstitutional
move to remove an elected government or to remove an elected parliament. I believe that
it has become impossible for the present judiciary to stamp its name to any
unconstitutional act and probably, I believe that is one reason why, despite a lot of hue
and cry, it is not happened because I don’t think this judiciary will ever be able to do that.
So, yes, it’s a huge step forward and it’s because of this Movement. So, in that sense, I
believe it’s a big, big change.
A respondent, Senator 2, argued that the courts’ new strength actually improves their
interactions with Parliament:
Yes, yes. Most certainly, I see that change and I know that there is a lot of skepticism and
there is a talk of perhaps the judiciary overstepping but I’m not bother by this. I’m not
bother by this … for two reasons. A, if you look at it from a historical point of view then
in any transitional developing democracy tug of wars within institutions, within the
framework of the law and the constitution do take place. The thing to be watched and
judged is whether institutions behave maturely or not and I think in terms of the 18 th
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amendment, in terms of the 19th amendment, the judiciary acted very responsibly. And I
think that parliament reciprocated very responsibly. So, to that extent I’m not perturbed.
Questions of interpretations, a question of what is gray and what is black is always there
and will always be there.
And another respondent, Senator 2 admitted:
After the Lawyers’ Movement, judiciary has been independent, I would say yes, they are
independent and what seems to have been done either by the CJ himself and together
with his colleagues is to see that is rank and file is solid. So, first thing he has done is to
see to it that all those judges, PCO judges, had taken oath after emergency and after they
had issued the junction that they should not take oath. Whether they were good, whether
they were very intelligent should not be among their rank and file.
A small group of respondents had the view that the judiciary has become more politicized
or incompetent. And some of them argued that the judiciary got some independence, but only
partially. One of my respondents, SL 5 presented a very bleak picture of the judiciary and the
lawyers:
If the goal was to get rid of Musharraf, yes, they achieved that but in the process the
judiciary is destroyed. The Islamabad High Court went down for years, 1,400 cases went
unheard. One hundred and six judges were removed and we have still even today not able
to fill that task. We have no judges, people don’t want to become a judge. Lawyers for
the first time learned violence. Now every day, we here of a lawyer thrashing a judge,
whether it is in Faisalabad or elsewhere. I always thought that the practice of law related
to logic, reason and prestige. Where is the rule of law? So, I think the lower judiciary is
disheartened and destroyed.
Financial Autonomy of the Courts
The financial autonomy of the judiciary is highly linked with the independence of
judiciary. The judiciary can perform its functions efficiently, effectively, independently, and
fairly when it enjoys significant control over its financial support. It is the responsibility of the
other branches of the government, such as legislature and executive branch, to ensure sufficient
financial resources for the judiciary to perform its role properly and smoothly. A statement of
principles adopted by the National Conference of Court Administrators and Conference of Chief
Justices in the United States in 1965 asserted the need for financial independence for courts:
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Judicial finance, should be exercised free of interference by agents of the executive
branch of the government, in the same manner that the executive and the legislative
branches administer the funds appropriated for their internal operations (Ferguson, 1973,
p. 975).
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Government of Sindh v. Sharaf Faridi PLD
1994 SC 105 has ruled that the allocation of funds for the judiciary is at the disposal of the
judiciary itself without any interference from any agency of the executive. The Supreme Court in
this judgment asserted that:
The Court held that the independence of judiciary also means the elimination of financial
control of the Executive over the judiciary, and therefore, the CJ of the Supreme Court
and High Courts should be authorized to make re-appropriation of funds within the
budgetary allocation, without the approval of Finance Ministry. The Court went on to
elaborate that the Chief Justices would thus be competent to re-appropriate amounts from
one head to another and may also create or abolish posts and upgrade or downgrade the
same. (Hussain, 2007, p.8)
Public Support for the Judiciary
Chief Justice William Rehnquist of the US Supreme Court rightly observed and
suggested that “Justice is too important a matter to be left to the judges, or even to the lawyers;
the American people must think about, discuss, and contribute to the future planning of their
courts (Harahan & Malik, 2000, p.1).” The image or perception of the courts among the general
public is also a hallmark of the developed democracies of the world. Courts enjoy support and
trust of the people, which enables them to perform their functions freely and independently. In
this study, I ask my respondents to evaluate the impact of the LM on the public perception of the
judiciary. Regardless of political background, I got near-unanimous positive response from my
respondents that the LM has had a positive impact on the public view the courts.
A respondent, HCT Judge 5, discussed the impact of the LM on enhancing the image of
the Courts among the people in these words:
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So, the impoverished class did not support the judiciary and vice-versa because neither
had knowledge of the other. The Lawyers' Movement changed all this. Pakistan is now
on the march to progress because the leadership is gradually, slowly becoming aware of
the plight of the poor and in [the coming] years they will become vociferous …. I’m very
clear that Lawyers Movement has ignited a flame that was only a flicker. It will
strengthen Pakistan and Pakistan will have an excellent future.
A respondent LP 1 explained the LM’s impact on general public opinion in these words:
Yes, the judiciary enjoys public support. The public wanted the supremacy of the
constitution, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, democracy, and an accountable
government. They were dependent on politicians to fight against the establishment to
protect their rights, yet nobody responded to them for sixty years. So, they ultimately
came to the conclusion that it is the judiciary which could assure all these things.
Still, not all agree with that assessment. A former high bar official disagreed with the
notion that LM enhanced the image of the Courts among the general public, rather “it has misled
and confused the public.” He went on to argue that the people have started questioning the
wisdom behind suo moto powers of the Superior Courts. Similarly, a High Court justice who
participated in the LM, stated that “certainly it has raised tremendous expectations from them,
some extremely unrealistic expectations and probably some have expectations of a political
nature, so, it has enhanced the image but enhancing the image at the same time has tremendously
enhanced the public’s expectations.”
Changes in the Appointment and Removal Method of the Judges
The process of the appointment of justices at the Superior Courts is a major determinant
of their independence. Before the LM, the appointment of the judges at the High Court and
Supreme Court levels was made by the concerned chief executives, the prime minster for the
Federal level appointments, and the chief ministers of the Provinces at the High Court level (Ijaz,
2014, p. 87). However, the chief executives had to “consult” the respective chief justices for the
appointments of judges, but the word ‘consultation’ was not defined by any law or a court
decision. Normally, there existed an informal deal or understanding between the CJ and the chief
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executive about who should be on the bench. The common practice was that the CJ would send
the names of the judges to be appointed and the chief executive would recommend to the Head
of the State, the President for an appointment of a justice to the Supreme Court and the Governor
in case of appointment to a High Court. The consultation among these three individuals was a
kind of an informal agreement and the executives could reject the nominations made by the chief
justices (Ijaz, 2014, pp. 87-88).
The major development after the LM was the adoption of the 18th Amendment to the
Constitution regarding the appointment of judges to the Superior Courts with the “consent” of a
Judicial Commission where the judges were in majority. A Parliamentary Committee was
established to approve the recommendations of the Judicial Commission. However, the
Parliamentary Committee had no right to reject the recommendations made by the Judicial
Commission without the valid written reasons (Ijaz, 2014, p. 88).
The respondents I interviewed had different perspectives about the 18th Amendment and
its impact on the JI in Pakistan. A respondent, LP 2, discussed the appointment process of judges
after the 18th Amendment in the Constitution and he said that after the change:
The appointment process has been changed fundamentally. Article 175-A has been
incorporated which prescribes that there would be a judicial commission and there would
be a parliamentary committee. All the recommendations by the judicial commission
would be rectified by the parliamentary committee within fourteen days, if they are not
rectified, they will be automatically presumed to be passed by the parliamentary
committee and they would be sent to the Prime Minster and through the Prime Minister
to the President, this is the procedure.
A respondent, SL 2 lauded these changes:
I think this present parliament has done a wonderful change and I think historic change
that they brought about to the 18th Amendment as far as the appointment of judges is
concerned but it is just an initial period. What they have done is that at least involve the
main stakeholders in the process of the appointment of judges has made it more
transparent and more accountable on the paper at least. But it would require some fine
tuning and it would require a change of mindsets which is a process that is already
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started. So, I believe that with time it will develop into system where it will function and
I think it’s already functional, far better than what was being practiced from last 65 years.
A respondent, Senator 2, added:
When we sat down in the Parliamentary Committee at that time you would recall that
controversy of a clash between Parliament and the Judiciary in particular on the
appointment of judges was taking place. So, the Committee was very careful that it did
not want to impinge on the independence of judiciary. Yet it wanted to introduce a
transparent system in which individual discretion would be limited or would be done
away with because the old system essentially was based on the discretion of the Chief
Justices. Therefore, Article 175-A came out in the shape that it did and you see that it has
majority of the judges in the Judicial Commission and you have the executive
representatives.
In replying to the question of what was the utility or significance of the parliamentary
committee when the Supreme Court set aside its role in one case and ordered it to appoint those
four judges who were rejected by the Parliamentary Committee, he said:
I think the real importance is the breakthrough. I think the real importance is the
introduction of a new element and its acceptability. Yes, what we had envisaged the 18 th
Amendment that to an extent has been curtailed by the 19th Amendment and the
subsequent decision of the Supreme Court but I am still optimistic. I am not one of those
who say that the Parliamentary Committee is now been rendered, abducted, no I don’t
think so.
A respondent, Senator 1 discussed these issues:
Judges have been appointing judges and for some time it worked well and we found no
complaint. I was also Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs in the Government of
Pakistan for four years from 65 to 69. Judges then appointed and judges earlier appointed
they all were very famous judges they became famous in their own juristic approach and
there was no problem. In that case always there has been consultation by the judges with
the administration of past. But the choice was mostly by the judges but later, during the
time of politicians, it’s unfortunate more during the times of politicians, there have been
interference and they have been trying to get certain people appointed of their choice.
As far as the removal procedure of the judges is concerned, the removal method and the
security of the tenure of service of the superior court judges have paramount importance with
regard to the independence of judiciary. Under the Article 209 of the 1973 Constitution, the
justices of the Superior Courts could be removed only by the Supreme Judicial Council.
However, after the restoration of the suspended CJ and some other judges, through the decision
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regarding the appointment of PCO judges in the Sindh High Court Bar Association Case, the
Supreme Court deposed more than 100 hundred judges of both the Supreme Court and High
Courts.
A respondent, HCT Judge 5, explained in detail the removal method and the concept of
impeachment of judges:
I must say that all the judicial appointments and judicial removals they should put on TV,
I don’t want that judiciary should become arbitrator as it. CJ of Pakistan should become a
totally dictatorial power, total absolute power. I say that we should try to examine this
process of impeachment in a manner that the people should know that it is being
conducted. A good man when invested with absolute power and functional condition to
exercise that power in darkness, he becomes a Satan. So similar principle should be
followed that transparency should not be written in the constitution, transparency should
not be written in the TV, but transparency should be through such a method that people
must try a lot to know.
Accountability of the Judiciary
Accountability of judges has paramount importance in terms of the independence of the
judiciary as an institution and the independence of a judge as an individual. Judicial
accountability should not be taken as opposite to the JI, but rather it enhances the independence
of the judiciary. Accountability helps to maintain legitimate theoretical limits on the actions of
the judiciary. To a larger extent it strengthens the independence of the judiciary. It also ensures
that no one in the state is above the law and contributes to the principle of the rule of law. On this
issue, I asked my respondents and they had different opinions in terms of how judges could be
held accountable without usurping the legitimate powers of judges and courts.
Khan (2012) explains the concept of judicial accountability as follows:
The concept of JI is deeply connected with the accountability of judiciary. In India, the
parliament can impeach the judges of the superior courts. The American political
system’s judges, who are highly independent because they are appointed for lifetime, can
also be impeached by Congress. No institution can be built and progress without
accountability. Pakistan is probably the only nation in the world where judges appoint
judges and judges remove judges. Hence, one could say there is no system of independent
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accountability. According to the Constitution, under Article 209, there is a Supreme
Judicial Council headed by the CJ of Pakistan and joined by other judges, which can
remove a judge from his office. Only a handful of judges have been removed for
misconduct through this process since the formation of Pakistan (Khan, 2012).
A respondent SJ 3 expressed his views on the subject and said that “…the journalist
should criticize the CJ and the highest Courts if they exceed from their statuary powers in order
to keep them under pressure and it’s a good change which is growing slowly and steadily.”
Another respondent, HCT Judge 4 gave his opinion about the accountability, especially the
system of judges judging the behavior of other judges: “I think there must be check on the
judiciary and also through Parliament, through an institution rather I think the powers under
article 209 should not remain with the judiciary that should go to a committee like Senate, etc.
and through, at least the judges must have in their fear that if they do wrong that way they will be
there to face the music.” According to him, the powers of removal of superior court judges is in
the hands of judges by themselves as under article 209 of the Constitution, the Supreme Judicial
Council composed of senior judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts is responsible for
removing judges. For him, it is not fair that judges are accountable only to other judges and
Parliament should have the power to make judges accountable.
One of my respondents, HCT Judge 1, endorsed the process of the accountability of
judges under the Article 209 of the Constitution 1973 and focused on the self-accountability of
judges. He gave the example of three judges, Justice Akhlaq Hussain, Justice Shoukat Ali, and
Justice Fazal Ghani who were removed by the Supreme Council composed of judges. According
to him, no other institution can make the judges accountable other than judges themselves,
otherwise, it could diminish the independence of judiciary.
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A respondent, SCT Judge 1, expressed the view that the accountability of the justices has
been made more open under the provision of the Article 209 in that any citizen of Pakistan could
file a case of removal. He said:
It’s there, the provision is there, and the question is if a judge misconducts himself, the
provision is there. Simply now it’s that provision that has been enlarged, previously it
was the president of Pakistan who would file a complaint, who would invoke that
provision. Now a complaint can come from any source and proceedings under 209 can be
started. Somebody has to bell the cat that is somebody has to start the proceedings and
the courts will take them on.
According to him, the accountability of the superior court judges is clear and open. Any
citizen can file a removal reference to remove a judge from his or her position. Another
respondent, SCT Judge 1, defended the accountability process of judges provided in the
Constitution. He also defended the removal of the senior judges of the High Courts and Supreme
Court through the Sindh High Court Bar Association Case:
There is accountability, which has also some provisions on Supreme Judicial Council
which, there are provisions in the Constitution under article 209 that the judges, that
anything against the judges can be considered in the supreme judicial council and if some
misconduct was proved then he will be removed. But the removal authority that is the
president, that is the executive. The process of holding the trial with regard to misconduct
that is by the judges, i.e., the Supreme Judicial Council constituted under the
Constitution.
Relationship of the Judiciary with the other Branches of the Government
The Courts do not work in a vacuum. Their smooth working is highly dependent upon
their interactions with the other branches of the government and some other state institutions. In
transitioning democracies like Pakistan, the work and performance of the Courts is not only
dependent upon the textual or constitutional boundaries, but also on the informal relations with
the other stakeholders in the state, including the military, which as an institution has played a key
role in the performance of the superior courts in the past (Kausar, 2011, p. 37).
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There has been constant confrontation between the judiciary and civilian governments
after the Lawyers’ Movement. The Pakistan Peoples Party’s (PPP) government came into power
after the February 2008 general elections. Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani was elected as the Prime
Minister of Pakistan by the National Assembly. After President Pervez Musharraf stepped down
as the President, the PPP’s Co-Chairperson Asif Ali Zardari was chosen as the elected President
of Pakistan by the Parliament and the four Provincial Assemblies in the Electoral College for the
election of the President. The PPP’s Government restored almost all of the deposed judges of the
Supreme Court and High Courts except the CJ and four other judges.
The delay in the reinstatement of CJ became a bone of contention between the restored
judiciary and the PPP’s Government. Later, under the leadership of CJ Chaudhary, the Supreme
Court issued decision after decision that targeted the powers of the executive branch. The
Supreme Court through its suo moto actions and using powers under 183 (4) of the Constitution
of 1973, and the Contempt of Court Powers under the Article 204 of the Constitution, almost
crippled the civilian Government. At one stage, the Court disqualified the Prime Minister of
Pakistan on Contempt of Court charges and issued arrest warrants for sitting Prime Minister Raja
Pervez Ashraf in a corruption case. Similarly, in the Memo-gate case, the Supreme Court exerted
its pressure on tPresident Asif Ali Zardari to face charges of corruption and money laundering in
a Swiss court (Waseem, 2012, pp. 16-18).
The second civilian regime after the LM of Mian Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister after
the May 2013 general elections also faced a similar defiant attitude from the Supreme Court.
These tensions did not diminish, even after the retirement of Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary as
CJ and judge of the Supreme Court. For the second time in history, the Supreme Court of
Pakistan disqualified the Prime Minister of Pakistan as a member the National Assembly and as
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its leader disqualifying him from politics for life under the Article 62 (1) (f) of the Constitution
of Pakistan. Previously, prime ministers were removed from their positions by presidents through
powers granted under the Eighth Amendment. For the first time in the political history of the
country, the judiciary removed and disqualified a prime minister using powers under the
disqualification clause of Article 62 91) (f) of the Constitution of 1973. The same pattern
continued in the third civilian regime of the PTI’s Government of Imran Khan as Prime Minister.
On December 15, 2017, the Supreme Court disqualified the senior most politician and close
friend of the Prime Minister, and Secretary General of the ruling party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
(PTI), Jahangir Khan Tareen under Article 62 (1) (f) of the Constitution of 1973 and the Section
99 of the Representation of Peoples Act which states the qualifications of a member of the
Parliament. One of the respondents, SL 3 agreed that the LM has changed the nature of the
relationship between the judiciary and the other stakeholders:
Certainly, it has changed in a big way. In the sense that executive always appeared to be
very powerful before the courts prior to 2007 meaning thereby the government was
always the blue-eyed baby, the will of the law as well as the Courts. This was the
perception among the people and they were afraid of going to the courts against the
government because it thought that, ultimately, they will lose. But this is for the first time
everybody is feeling that this Supreme Court or even the High Court does not care much
about the Executive. It [judiciary] can give its verdict even on more sensitive issues like
the High Court recently has said that the President cannot hold two offices, he cannot be
head of the political party while being the President of the country so you have to quit as
the Chairman of the party. So, this verdict has come from the High Court. So, what we
are seeing that increasingly the High Courts and the Supreme Court are becoming
assertive towards their own Legislature. The judges who were dropped by the
Parliamentary Committee, their case was taken up by the Supreme Court and
Parliamentary Committees’ own decision to drop those judges has been set aside. And
they have been asked to reappoint those judges and extend their tenure. So, judiciary is
certainly asserting itself in a big way which was not there previously.
A respondent, PS Professor 1, endorsed the argument that there is a significant change in
the relationship of the judiciary and the other stakeholders in Pakistani politics such as the
executive, legislature, and the opposition parties. He stated “…well, I mean, the relationship is
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changed, judiciary is very active and lawyers are overconfident. Therefore, the relationship is
changed. I think judiciary is more independent of parliament, it’s more independent of the
executive and it continues to reprimand these two institutions.”
Another respondent, Politician 1, admitted that in the past there was no active role of the
judiciary as an institution, however, after the LM, the judiciary has emerged as an active and
powerful branch of the government. Thus, the other two players, the executive and the legislature
are not happy with the changing role of the judiciary and there is tussle among these institutions
and he believes it will continue well into the future.
A respondent examined the relations of the judiciary with the other stakeholders. CSR 2
said, “…of course it has changed because the other branches are feeling threatened because they
are still part of their status quo and they are beneficiaries of a system that the judiciary is taking
on. So, of course they are uncomfortable with an independent judiciary, very uncomfortable.”
Impact of the Movement on Pakistani Society at large
Kareem (2010) focuses on the development of an effective and vibrant civil society in
Pakistan after the LM. According to him, Pakistani society is passing through a transition from
an authoritarian regime to a democratic system. He highlights the role of lawyers and their
councils and bar associations in aiding this transition to democratic rule. He emphasizes the
positive impact of the LM on the mindset of citizens and their ability to effect a change in the
society through democratic means. The author also conducted 52 interviews of some high-level
officials, civil society activists, and the leaders of the LM.
According to Kareem, the LM has had four major impacts on Pakistani society at large.
First, the success of this movement is itself a major impact. It gave the general masses a feeling
of empowerment and the confidence to bring change through a peaceful struggle. Second, it
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changed the mindset of the people in general about the concepts of democracy and the rule of
law. It gave the impetus to other organizations and groups in the society that they could also
achieve their goals through peaceful protests and movements. It brought a significant change in
the processes and procedures of the protests of various groups in society such as the Pakistan
Medical Association, and missing persons advocacy groups, etc. These groups better organized
their protests to put pressure on governmental authorities. Third, unlike the past when the
military took advantage of public protest and movements and directly intervened in the political
system by staging a military coup d’état, during the Lawyers’ Movement, the military did not
engage. The unity among the judges and the lawyers played a key role this time in the transition
and consolidating democratic norms in the society. Fourth, another major success of this
movement was the inclusion of new social classes in the political arena such as educated, urban,
civic, middle and lower classes became more aware of the fact that social and political change is
possible through peaceful political struggle (Kareem, 2009, pp. 86-88).
Anwar (2009) considers the LM a social movement started by a professional group over a
single issue. According to him, the transformation of a legal discourse into a social discourse and
transitioning of a legal discourse into a social movement was a challenge for the research
community. He also examines the role of modern communicative means, the private electronic
mass media which gave the legal community an opportunity to communicate its message
broadly. This research is based on focus group discussions (FGD) with the people from the legal
profession in Pakistan. The results of these FGDs show that there was a consensus among the
legal community that the main focus of the LM was the restoration of judges intertwined with the
ultimate goal of JI and the rule of law in the country.
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A Harvard Law School Report (2010) also examines the immediate effects or impacts of
the LM on Pakistani culture and society. The LM helped the general public to understand the
role of the Constitution, the role of the courts, and the significance of the legal profession. It also
created among the general masses a kind of collective identity with the lawyers, along with a
pride that activist lawyers are an asset for the society as were national heroes and lawyers
Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru, and Iqbal. Similarly, the lawyers played a very crucial role in the
struggles against Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Genera Zia-Ul-Haq in the past. According
to this study, the LM had similar impacts on judges. Despite all the pressure from the Musharraf
regime, judges also stood firm during the protests in the streets for the restoration of judiciary.
A respondent, LP 2, strongly endorsed the idea that the LM has had a significant impact
on Pakistani society as a whole:
The overall impact is still emerging, transitioning. We cannot conclude at the moment but
the impact that has emerged up until now is that people are more conscious, people are
thinking more democratically, they are not supporting the dictatorial governments and
they are not supporting the Taliban style ideas. So, they have got more belief in these
institutions and these principles. They are continuously working for that and this is
expressed through civil society, the masses, the media interviews of the public, the print
media in which they are writing the articles and through the demonstrations.
Impact of the Movement on the Democratic Health of the Country
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on the role of courts in transitioning democracies like
Pakistan. Courts can play one of two “upstream” roles when a polity is shifting from
authoritarian rule to democracy: support for said change or choosing to stay out of the political
process. After the Lawyers’ Movement, the role of the courts in Pakistan has been mixed. The
courts neither supported the military establishment nor the political democratic forces. The
courts neither suppressed the democratic forces nor the remnants of the military regime.
Ultimately the Pakistani courts played it safe. In some cases, the courts handed down verdicts
against the military establishment and favored the democratic forces or the opposition to the
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establishment. In other cases and situations, the courts suppressed the civil and democratic forces
in order to placate the regime and to protect themselves. Due to this unique role of the Pakistan
courts, the military has found no need to directly intervene in political affairs (Fruman, 2011, p.
17).
Historically, democracy in Pakistan has faced serious challenges in the past, in particular,
the military intervened in politics four times through the dismissal of elected governments and
the dissolution of elected assemblies (Fruman, 2011, pp. 5-6). And each time the military
interventions were challenged in the courts which not only provided them with the legitimacy to
rule, but in one case authorized the military dictator to amend the Constitution as he wished, an
authority that the apex court itself did not possess.
In this study, I asked my respondents whether after the LM the superior judiciary is
capable of being a bulwark against any military adventurism in future. The respondents have
mixed opinions on the issue. Many of them have the view that the judiciary is more active and
independent after the LM and could resist future moves by the military to topple constitutional
governments. On the other hand, some of my respondents doubted the post-LM judiciary’s
ability to stop the military from intervening in political affairs.
Respondent, SJ 3, told me that the military would face stiff resistance from at least two
institutions, the judiciary and the media, if it attempted a coup. According to him once the
military was trying to use Nawaz Sharif against the government of Asif Ali Zardari and a few
military officers came to him [SJ 3] and reminded him that once the media stood against Pervez
Musharraf and forced him to step down and now the media should help the military to topple the
Zardari regime. He stated that he told the military officers that when one ordinary citizen like
him breaks the traffic signal, he is caught and punished, but when a military dictator breaks the
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Constitution then there is no punishment for him. Another respondent, SJ 1, had the view that if
the military intervenes again it will be the last intervention because the country will split again.
Historically, it is a fact that after the military regime of General Ayub Khan in 1970, the country
was divided into two and Bangladesh became a separate state.
Conversely, a respondent, PS Professor 1, disagreed when asked if the modern judiciary
could stop a military takeover:
Not necessarily, because you don’t stop coups through judiciary because firstly under
the present circumstance there is no chance of a coup in Pakistan in the near future due
to a number of reasons, there are a lot of reasons. But let’s assume for a minute, come
on, Pakistan had four coups, there could be another one. Let’s assume that happens
and the military thinks that judiciary will be in the way, solution is very simple, they’ll
remove the judiciary.
Similar views were shared by a respondent, Senator 1. According to him, the judiciary
always sided with the military and most judges took oath under the PCOs and the judiciary will
never be a bulwark against future military takeovers. Another respondent, SCT Judge 3 had the
same opinion that the judiciary has historically validated military coups and would do so in
future because it cannot stop the imposition of martial law on its own.
A respondent, Senator 2, also insisted that the judiciary cannot be a bulwark against any
military coup, but it is the public who can stop a military dictator:
I feel that at most legislation and judicial judgments can be deterrence, they cannot be the
bulwark against the military takeover. The only dam against the military takeovers are the
people themselves. When a military dictator realizes that tomorrow if I takeover my writ
is not going to be acceptable and I don’t mean in the Supreme Court and the High Court,
my writ out of the street is not going to be acceptable and there are going to be people
outside. Then that is real deterrence.
Another respondent, SCT Judge 1, observed that in the future it will not be easy to curb
the powers of the judiciary:
I believe the passage back to intervention has been blocked by exercise of its
extraordinary jurisdiction by the Supreme Court in cases like Sindh High Court Bar
Association, and I put time to see but I do not see the Supreme Court of Pakistan or High
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Court of Pakistan one way or the other going against the judgment or even trying to draw
a distinction, it should be very difficult, very difficult.
Achievements of the Lawyers’ Movement
Ahmed (2012) admits that the LM achieved its set objectives such as the removal of a
dictator through the people power. A similar conclusion was drawn by the Asian Human Rights
Commission (AHRC):
The contributions of the lawyers must be treated as a positive direction for the future
political and democratic set up. The movement can be termed as a strong foundation
stone of future democracy in Pakistan and it should be recognized by the new parliament
(AHRC, 2008).
As far as the question of the success of this movement is concerned, the respondents in
this study evaluated both success and failure differently. Many of my informants concluded that
the LM had achieved its goals such as the restoration of the CJ and other judges, the
independence of judiciary as an institution which is reflected in the various decisions rendered by
the superior courts after the restoration, the appointment process where the judges were given
more powers to appoint their colleagues, and most importantly the confidence of public in the
courts was restored. Some of my respondents focused on the idea that for the first time in the
judicial history of Pakistan, a new debate started to change or reform the structure of the whole
judicial system in order to make it more effective and efficient. On this point respondent SL 2
stated:
It has started a process and I think that’s a big achievement. It’s a long way because it’s
not just one thing that needs to be reformed. Starting with the educational, the legal
education you see. Starting the reforms from there and going right up to the top. I think
everything needs and requires those reforms but at least this movement and the
restoration has initiated debate and has consensus at least focused on various issues
which at least would take a long time but that process has started and I believe that is the
biggest achievement of this movement.
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A respondent, SCT Judge 2, said that “…I think so yes, judiciary is now independent at
least I may say with regard to the superior judiciary.” Another respondent, SCT Judge 1,
concluded that:
I believe this Movement established a few principles. One that any action against the
Constitution will not be upheld by the Courts, this result and this is there in the
Constitution, it is there in the law books, this what the movement was for, and I believe
today if any intervention under the present conditions are made, I don’t think any court
would undertake the adventure of validating any non-constitutional intervention, it will
not. It’s the result of this Movement.
One of the respondents, HCT Judge 1 added to this sentiment:
I think we have reinstituted the independent judiciary and judges and they are a check on
corruption, and a check on discriminatory and arbitrary discretion and the people
appreciate that very much. I think if there is one thing standing between corrupt
administrators and their ability to fill in their coffers.
Respondent, SL 2 concluded that:
I will say there are two achievements which we have made on this front. One was of
course the restoration of the CJ and judges who did not take oath on 3 rd of November that
we achieved in March 2009. The other purpose was that we must cleanse the judiciary
from those people who had cooperated with Musharraf or Musharraf’s appointee CJ
Dogar.
And HCT Judge 5 had more mixed opinions on the achievements of the LM:
This movement was partially successful, it was partially successful. What I mean is that
for the first-time judiciary never acquiesced and judiciary stood up and resisted. When I
say judiciary never acquiesced I say judiciary in 1954 acquiesced and surrendered before
the might of gun and validated the act of usurpation by Munir. Then again in 1958 when
Dosso case judgment was delivered. This judgment too was delivered under the bayonet.
The Adverse Impacts of the Lawyers’ Movement
The most significant impact of the LM was on the judiciary itself. The Supreme Court of
the post-Lawyers’ Movement sent more than 110 judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts
home due to their connection with the ousted regime. As far as adverse or negative impacts of
the LM are concerned, one PCO High Court judge and a PCO Supreme Court justice, strongly
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disagreed that the LM was a successful social movement. Both were of the opinion that it
divided the judiciary and brought incompetence to the institution. Respondent, SCT Judge 3 said:
Now you see they are disappointed. They are disappointed with their goal, they, some of
them who started that movement with the object that independent judiciary would be
there, the problems of people will be solved, and cases will be decided expeditiously.
People have not to go to the Supreme Court at every petty matter but they are
disappointed. Even those persons, who led the processions, who were on the forefront of
that Lawyers’ Movement, they are now disappointed.
After the Movement there were incidents in lower civil and district courts where lawyers
misbehaved with the judges, including female judges. In some cases, the judges were beaten and
injured by lawyers. In Multan, in a Lahore High Court bench, after a heated debate between the
president of the Multan Bar Association and a High Court Judge, lawyers boycotted the court
and blocked the doors of the courthouse, thus preventing judges from entering. The CJ of the
Lahore Court, who is also an administrative head of the all courts in the Province intervened and
facilitated a deal between the Bar Association and the judges.
A new term has been coined by the media regarding the rowdy behaviour of some
lawyers, ‘wukala gardi’ (lawyers’ hooliganism). Immediately after the LM in 2009, there was a
rapid decline in the moral and social standing of the lawyers. Their image as heroes has been
transformed into hooligans due to the violent actions of some lawyers, in particular, young
lawyers, against other lawyers, police, litigants, judges, and other community groups like young
doctors. There was a widespread perception among the public that the success of the LM against
both military and civilian regimes and this newly-discovered power of defiance have
emboldened the lawyers to undermine other segments of the society including their own, the
legal fraternity (Leiby, 2012).
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have analyzed the major impacts of the LM on the judicial system of
Pakistan. The LM has brought significant changes in the structure and functioning of the courts.
The LM emboldened the courts to challenge military and civilian political regimes and to hand
down decisions to ensure the rule of law in the country. The courts made legislators, members of
executive branch, including cabinet ministers and prime ministers, the civil and military
bureaucracies, influential individuals, business icons, and their own colleagues accountable to
the laws of the country. The judicialization of politics, or empowerment of the judiciary, is a
major result of the LM, making the judiciary more independent and autonomous. This chapter
suggests there has been a significant improvement in judicial independence since the LM.
The first major impact of the LM was constitutional. The addition of the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments in the Constitution of 1973 introduced far-reaching reforms in the
judicial system of Pakistan including the process of the appointments of the judges of the
superior courts, their compensation, and the length of their tenure. There was also a fundamental
change in Article Six of the Constitution of 1973 regarding capital punishment for the people
who would subvert, abrogate or suspend the Constitution of 1973. For the first time in the
nation’s history, there is binding clause in the Constitution, Article 6 (2A) that calls for the same
punishment for the judges of the superior courts if they validate an act of high treason. A
separate cell for human rights litigation was established in the Supreme Court. The new Judicial
Policy of 2009 overhauled the entire judicial machinery in the country and strengthened the
independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. A new Code of Conduct was adopted for the
judges of the superior courts that made them bound not to take oath “…to any authority that
acquires power otherwise than through the modes envisaged by the Constitution of Pakistan.”
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The majority of the respondents I interviewed in this study felt that the current judiciary
have realized their independence as a result of the sacrifices of the LM and they want to preserve
and protect it. Most of the respondents concluded that the judiciary after the LM enjoys strong
support among the public. Some of my respondents also considered an independent judiciary a
bulwark against any military adventurism in the country and they believed that the independence
of judiciary and rule of law will strengthen the democratic values in the country; others
disagreed.
Unlike its past history where the judiciary played a subservient role to the military
establishment and validated their illegitimate rule applying the Doctrine of Necessity, or state
necessity, the judiciary after the LM have played a remarkable role and challenged both military
and civil regimes. While the impact of the LM on the judicial system of the country has been
largely positive, like any large social movement it brought some unexpected negative results as
well. It gave the general public a ray of hope, encouragement, and awareness regarding their
fundamental, social, political, and constitutional or legal rights. On the other hand, there was
some deterioration in the attitudes of some within the legal community, in particular, among
younger lawyers. There were incidents of violence, hooliganism perpetrated by the lawyers
against the police, judges, litigants, doctors, and their own colleagues. Still, overall, the LM was
a peaceful, non-violent social movement for the restoration of the independence of judiciary and
the rule of law in the country. While it lasted just two years, it mobilized all segments of the
society and has led to lasting change.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Introduction
In this final chapter I briefly revisit my research questions, with a focus on the role of the
courts in the process of transitioning to democracy, and the independence of the judiciary as an
important pillar of democracy. I have analyzed the major impacts of the LM on the judicial
system of Pakistan. The LM has brought significant changes in the structure and functioning of
the courts. The LM emboldened the courts to challenge military and civilian political regimes
and to hand down decisions to ensure the rule of law in the country. This chapter also examines
the impacts of the LM on Pakistani society and the democratic health of the country. This
chapter highlights the impact on the LM on de jure independence of the courts. The chapter
concludes with some suggestions for further research.
The Role of the Courts in a Transitioning Democracy
As discussed in the literature review, courts play different roles in different types of
regimes, and the role played by the courts is dependent on constitutional (textual), situational,
and strategic variables. In addition, the role of courts in a transitioning democracy is highly
contingent upon its relationship with the other branches of the government, in particular, the
executive. The literature on the courts’ role in transitioning democracies also divides the role of
the courts into different phases, depending on the timing of regime change. As in the first phase,
the upstream roles of the courts start either at the time when an authoritarian regime is near
collapse, or in the early period of a new democratic government. Similarly, the downstream roles
of the courts have two scenarios - either the courts strengthen the authoritarian positions or they
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consolidate the move to democratic forms of government. In some cases, the courts play no
significant role.
In this regard, I asked my respondents how they saw the role of courts in a transitioning
democracy like Pakistan. Senator 1 defined the roles of a judiciary to ‘promote the
parliamentary values’ and ‘values of democracy.’
Similarly, SL 1 stated:
I think in a democratic state like in our region, if you look at it from my point of view, the
judiciary’s role is little larger than it may be in a more historically-democratic state,
where democratic traditions are much stronger, like USA, although again it is well known
that in USA, the judiciary has been one of the main pillars of democracy. They are the
ones who keep the Constitution a living organ of the state and have been able to enforce
democratic traditions over there. Of course, there are periods when their record is not
very amiable. But coming to cases like Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and South Asia as a
whole, we face real difficulties in democracy, especially in Pakistan where we had so
many interventions - non-democratic and unconstitutional interventions, extraconstitutional interventions. So, the judiciary is called upon to play an even larger role
than we know in the Western democracies.
He went on to describe the role of the judiciary in transitioning democracies as follows:
It has a very important role. It keeps everybody on track. It should be an activist role. I
think I believe to consolidate democracy, whether it is in the early days of United States
of America with a Chief Justice like John Marshall, or in the 60s and 70s in India, or in
the 2000s in Pakistan. But to consolidate democracy, the judiciary must have a proactive
role.
One of my participants, HCT Judge 5, described the role of the judiciary as dependent on
both the larger political context and the individuals who filled the role of judge. According to
him, in Pakistan’s history, the judges in the superior judiciary were not free and independent. He
also made the distinction between de jure and de facto independence.
On this topic, respondent LP 2 argued:
The judiciary in a democratic state is basically a creation of the law or a creation of the
constitution. So, the role of the judiciary is to act in accordance with the constitution and
law, and get out of any influence by the public, parliament or the government. There are
two opinions. One school of thought thinks that democracy does nurture the
independence of the judiciary, while the other says that it is the judiciary itself, or its
independence nurtures democracy. You can say that in the present situation, an
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independent judiciary will ensure democratic values in this country, Pakistan. It will
strengthen political and democratic institutions.
A respondent, SJ 1, stated that judiciary’s role in a capitalist democracy is to protect the
‘status quo’ and to develop the perception among the common people that they are getting
‘justice.’ The judiciary always protects the rights of the dominant factions in the society and
gives the common people a little ‘piece of pie’ to ensure that they will not stand against the state
or will not go for the revolution or anarchy.
Conversely, respondent SL 4 stated:
Judiciary has to have a liberal mind, has to protect the rights of the common people, and
has to empower the very downtrodden and the voiceless. The tones that they keep do not
necessarily have to be used in the first place for empowering themselves, which is what
has happened in Pakistan because public interest litigation, by and large was used by the
judiciary to empower itself, to give it the powers to appoint judges. Now in my view, that
is a very subservient way of using a very unique, and in a way, affective judicial
emancipation if you would like to say it which into the fold of emancipation.
Respondent LP 1 argued:
Judiciary is a corrective institution. It cannot build the distributive paradigm on its own.
Distributive paradigm is to be laid out by the legislature and the people within that
domain functioning in the distributive paradigm. Whatever goes wrong, the judiciary
functions as a plumber, as an institution to fix those errors - a corrective institution.
Since, we have thrown bigger challenges to judiciary, bigger than anything, almost
compelling them to encroach on distribution.
PS professor 3 added:
One of the basic features, which should be there for the protection of the democracy in a
state, is a judiciary, which should, of course, be independent. And because judiciary’s
role is to also protect the rights of the people, rule of law is already ensured over there.
And for that very viable, very, you may say independent judiciary is required for any
state, I think, to survive and to flourish.
Another respondent, PS professor 2, stated:
So, I think that judiciary has to be independent and autonomous. It should function as a
custodian of the constitution and a final arbiter of constitutional disputes. So, we can’t
think of a democratic state without two things - separation of power and judicial
independence.
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Finally, Senator 2 was of the view:
I think that first of all, judiciary, when we are talking in general terms, is a very important
pillar of democracy. Not only is it there to interpret the constitution and the various laws,
but it is also there to lend transparency in governance. In general terms, it is there to
ensure that the rule of law is enforced and that every person is equal before law.
There is a consensus among the respondents that the role of the judiciary in a
transitioning democracy, like Pakistan, is to act as an important pillar of democracy. It should
safeguard the rights of the people through its interpretation of the Constitution and law. The
courts should serve as the final arbiter in conflicts between the government and the people, to
ensure equality and the rule of law. As chapter 3 illustrated, this role was too often unfilled
before the Lawyers Movement. That said, as demonstrated in chapter 6, most of my respondents
and those who study Pakistan agree that the courts are now serving this important role.
Judicial Independence
There is a consensus among the scholars and researchers in judicial politics that the role
of the court is not automatic. Rather, it is heavily contingent upon certain traits or factors such as
respect for the rule of law and the definition of judicial independence itself. JI is commonly
viewed as an important feature of modern liberal democracies. There is a consensus among
scholars that JI contains three significant features: impartial judges, respect for their decisions,
and non-interference in their affairs.
There is a difference of opinion among the scholars over the measurement of JI (Hayo &
Voigt 2007; Ramseyer & Rasmusen 2003; Rios-Figueroa, 2006; and Rosenn, 1987), however
there is agreement that formal legal and constitutional safeguards like the appointment of judges,
clear rules governing their retention and removal, their tenure, qualifications, and financial
autonomy are key (Davis, 2002; and Ramseyer & Rasmusen, 2003). Moreover, in a vibrant civil
society, lawyers and their associations (Sarat & Scheingold, 2001; and Chavez, 2008), and the
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public support in general, are also considered crucial aspects for the judicial independence and
rule of law (Verner, 1984; and Vanberg, 2008).
Most of the respondents from the legal profession emphasized constitutional and textual
guarantees for judges and courts when describing the concept. They mentioned a number of
salient features such as: 1) transparent and fair appointment of the judges; 2) security of their
tenure; 3) no interference from other branches of the governments in the affairs of the judiciary;
4) non-interference from the government or any other forces of the society in the decision
making process of the courts; 5) the jurisdiction of the court and the role of the judges should
clearly be defined; 6) the other branches of government, the executive in particular, should
implement the decisions of the courts; and 7) the courts should have a control over their
administration and should have financial autonomy.
For example, a respondent, SL1 argued:
JI implies that, first of all, the judges should be appointed through a process that is
transparent and a process that is by law. The decisions taken at the highest possible level
and the appointments therefore, should not be tainted (as far as possible) with favoritism,
nepotism or with any corrupt motives. The first is the appointment process. The second is
the security of the tenure. The judge once appointed should have the security of tenure;
he should know that he cannot be removed except through a process that, again, is fair
and solemn and matches the dignity, the high dignity of the office of the judge. And third
is that judges themselves should avoid becoming politically partisan or getting into
political debates and issues. So, the independence of judges is important but it is a
structural issue, more than an emotional or a personal issue.
Some of the respondents focused on the importance of education or qualification of the
judges. They were of the opinion that the education in law should be of a fine quality or high
standard. Judges should be skilled, deserving, and experienced, having the ability to work
independently without fear and favor.
As a respondent LP 3 stated:
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I feel that even before independence, there should be an independent quality people at
place, first. Not just the formal qualification but integrity, their integrity, their human
quality. First, we need this society and academia to produce that quality people, then we
introduce them in the courts, and then we have independent judiciary that will be the
idealist judiciary.
One of the respondents stated that the judiciary must have the ability to control their
budget. Another suggested that judges should understand their limitations, staying within its
constitutional limits when deciding cases. As a respondent, PS professor 2 emphasized on the
significance of JI and the implementation of the court decisions:
By JI, what comes up to my mind is that judiciary is not a subordinate institution that
would serve political interests of a particular political class and will stand as an
institution, stand above the political foray and will be above the political polarization and
conflict in the society, and by staying above and out of these conflicts, will provide
justice to all – by resolving the constitutional, and other problems. It is both autonomy
from the state, from the executive, and also autonomy from powerful social influences.
He further added:
There wouldn’t be a JI if the decisions of the court are not implemented, it is clear. If
there is no regard by the executive (which I believe that by a constitution, an executive is
bound to implement the decisions of the courts), it means that it is violating the
constitution as well as the autonomy and independence of the courts.
One of the respondents, Senator 2, highlighted the importance of the checks and balances
among different institutions. He was of the view that JI could only be ensured when there is a
constitutional mechanism to check the performance or working of an institution by another
institution:
I think there is a worldwide concept of an independent judiciary and the concept of an
independent judiciary, essentially, is also to be worked within the broad parameters of
what the constitution of a particular country or state requires now. For example, in
Pakistan after the 1973 constitution, it introduced a trichotomy of power between the
judiciary, the executive and the legislature, and as long as the three organs continue to
function within the trichotomy, it provides a very natural check and balance between the
two.
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As suggested in chapters 5 and 6, these conditions for judicial independence are being
fulfilled following the Lawyers Movement. That said, several of my respondents worried about
the pressures to return to the status-quo prior to the Lawyers Movement. One, Senator 1,
suggested that historically the civilian governments put more pressure on the courts than military
rulers. Another, Senator 2, worried that the “coalescing of interests” of civil and military
bureaucracies, the religious right, and the media could pressure the judiciary, making it
dependent, ineffective and unworthy.
The Impact on the De Jure Independence of Judiciary
The first major impact of the LM was constitutional. The addition of the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments in the Constitution of 1973 introduced far-reaching reforms in the
judicial system of Pakistan including the process of the appointments of the judges of the
superior courts, their compensation, and the length of their tenure.
There was also a fundamental change in Article Six of the Constitution of 1973 regarding
capital punishment for the people who would subvert, abrogate or suspend the Constitution of
1973. For the first time in the nation’s history, there is binding clause in the Constitution, Article
6 (2A) that calls for the same punishment for the judges of the superior courts if they validate an
act of high treason. A separate cell for human rights litigation was established in the Supreme
Court. Former CJ Chaudhary formed the new Judicial Policy of 2009 in order to overhaul the
entire judicial machinery in the country and strengthen the independence of the judiciary and the
rule of law. A new Code of Conduct was adopted for the judges of the superior courts that made
them bound not to take oath “…to any authority that acquires power otherwise than through the
modes envisaged by the Constitution of Pakistan.”
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The Impact on the Democratic Health of the Country
The majority of the respondents I interviewed in this study felt that the current judiciary
have realized that their independence as a result of the sacrifices of the LM and they want to
preserve and protect it. Most of the respondents concluded that the judiciary after the LM enjoys
strong support among the public. Some of my respondents also considered an independent
judiciary a bulwark against any military adventurism in the country and they believed that the
independence of judiciary and rule of law will strengthen the democratic values in the country;
others disagreed.
Unlike its past history where the judiciary played a subservient role to the military
establishment and validated their illegitimate rule applying the Doctrine of Necessity, or state
necessity, the judiciary after the LM have played a remarkable role and challenged both military
and civil regimes. CJ Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary issued numerous judgments giving relief to
the people and to protect the fundamental rights of the people took suo moto notices of the
violation of the rules by the government agencies. In some cases, the Supreme Court made the
government accountable before the rule of law and passed judgments against the excesses of the
executive. In one contempt of court case, the Supreme Court disqualified the chief executive, the
Prime Minister of Pakistan from his position. Another prime minister was disqualified for failing
to declare his assets or income. In the Sindh High Court v. Federation of Pakistan case, the
Supreme Court ruled more than one hundred judges of the superior courts ceased to be the judges
by declaring their appointments illegal and unlawful.
While the impact of the LM on the judicial system of the country has been largely
positive, like any large social movement it brought some unexpected negative results as well. It
gave the general public a ray of hope, encouragement, and awareness regarding their
fundamental, social, political, and constitutional or legal rights. On the other hand, there was
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some deterioration in the attitudes of some within the legal community, in particular, among
younger lawyers. There were incidents of violence, hooliganism perpetrated by the lawyers
against the police, judges, litigants, doctors, and their own colleagues, the lawyers. This was very
unfortunate and a sad impact of the LM in the country. Still, overall the LM was a very peaceful,
non-violent social movement for the restoration of the independence of judiciary and the rule of
law in the country. While it lasted just two years it mobilized all segments of the society for the
noble causes of an independent judiciary and a healthy democracy in Pakistan. The Lawyers’
Movement challenged both civil and military regimes and ensured the safety of the fundamental
rights of the people. The LM brought the Pakistani courts the will and strength to exert its own
power to protect the rights of the people of Pakistan.
Suggestions for Future Research
I hope that this dissertation has increased our understanding of the impact of the Lawyers
Movement in Pakistan. The LM demonstrated how peaceful protest could bring change in a
democratic direction. It should serve as an example to political, religious, and sectarian groups
on how to best achieve their goals. Some of these movements have applied the same techniques
and processes in recent protests, for example, young doctors and other paramedical staff. Thus,
there are different ways to further analyze the effects of the LM on Pakistani institutions such as
the legislature, the executive, the bureaucracy, the military establishment, and the lower courts.
Other areas of further research could examine special cases relating to public interest law, human
rights, constitutional interpretation, women’s rights, and labor law. Social and political
movements have economic, political, and socio-psychological implications for both individuals
and groups. Future research might be fruitful in exploring how the Lawyers Movement impacted
social society and individual beliefs.
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